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Preface 
I begin by dedicating this issue of  the proceedings to the memory of  our 
friend  Rod Kessler, Partner, Deloitte & Touche. Rod graduated from  the Uni-
versity of  Kansas with a B. S. in accounting in 1975. He died of  a heart con-
dition two days after  the 1990 Auditing Symposium. We are deeply saddened 
by his untimely death. He will always be remembered for  his enthusiasm, 
commitment, and dedication for  the symposium and for  our accounting pro-
gram. 
The 1990 symposium was the tenth of  the series of  biennial auditing sym-
posia held at the University of  Kansas. Nineteen-ninety was a special year for 
us because of  a five-year  $300,000 grant from  the Deloitte & Touche Foun-
dation to support the auditing symposium, a faculty  fellowship,  student fel-
lowships, and the introductory accounting course. We would like to thank 
the Deloitte & Touche Foundation for  their generous support. In particular, 
we would like to thank Ed Kangas, Managing Partner of  Deloitte & Touche, 
Todd Rossel, Partner in the National Office,  David Hunerberg, Managing Part-
ner of  the Kansas City Office,  and the late Rod Kessler, Partner in the Kansas 
City Office,  for  their support. 
Continuing with the tradition of  the Kansas symposium, topics relevant 
to both academics and practitioners and individuals serving as presenters and 
discussants were selected after  extensive consultations with faculty  members 
at the University of  Kansas and professionals  in auditing at other universi-
ties and in practice. In particular, I am indebted to my colleagues in the ac-
counting area, Bruce Bublitz, Lyn Cravens, Allen Ford, Betsy Goss, William 
Salatka, Tim Shaftel,  Chet Vanatta, and Beverley Wilson, for  their valuable 
assistance in planning the symposium. Special thanks are due to Jim Waegelein, 
another of  my colleagues, who very happily served as a co-chairman for  the 
1990 symposium. Also, I would like to express my thanks to Dorothy Jones 
and Susan Carlson for  their secretarial help, to Val Alexander for  her edito-
rial assistance, and to the graduate students in accounting for  their general 
support. 
The symposium started with a paper on professional  ethics and con-
cluded with a panel discussion on "The Impact of  Mergers of  Accounting Firms 
on the Auditing Profession."  Each paper was critiqued by a discussant. Main-
taining the symposium tradition, we selected a practitioner to be the discus-
sant for  a paper by an academician and vice versa. However, in the case of 
the paper "Illegal Acts: What is the Auditor's Responsibility?," we had two 
groups of  discussants. In addition to the regular academic discussant, three 
students who were selected as the Deloitte & Touche Symposium Fellows 
responded to the paper. The selection of  these symposium fellows  was based 
on their academic performance  and personal interviews. The 1990 symposium 
was unique with the introduction of  student discussants and a panel 
discussion. 
All papers, except for  the keynote speech by Ed Kangas and the papers 
presented during the panel discussion, were distributed in advance. Each paper 
was allocated about 90 minutes - 20 minutes for  the presenter to summarize 
v 
his or her observations and conclusions, 20 minutes for  the discussant's re-
marks, and about 50 minutes for  open discussion with the participants. As 
expected, the open discussion provided the opportunity for  lively discussion 
and debate by the distinguished participants on many of  the major issues con-
fronting  the profession. 
About fifty-five  invited participants were present each day of  the two-day 
symposium. A roster of  the participants is given before  this preface.  Also, a 
number of  observers, such as doctoral students, faculty  members from  ac-
counting and other disciplines, and practitioners in the area, attended parts 
of  the symposium. We would be pleased to receive an indication of  interest 
from  those who might like an opportunity to participate in a future 
symposium. 
The proceedings of  each of  the symposia except the first  are still in print 
and may be purchased from: 
Kansas Union Bookstore 
University of  Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045 
Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The 1990 symposium 
proceedings are priced at $15.00 each. The prepaid price covers mailing 
costs with the exception of  orders outside of  the United States and Canada, 
in which case an additional $3.00 for  each copy should be included for  sur-
face  transportation. For the benefit  of  those who may wish to refer  to a paper 
in one of  the previous volumes the contents and prepaid price of  available 
proceedings are given below. 
Rajendra P. Srivastava 
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New Global Realities and Their Impact on the 
Accounting Profession† 
Edward A. Kangas* 
Deloitte & Touche 
It's great to come back here. Back east we don't have a sky like this. You 
can't see the clouds on the horizon because you can't see the horizon. It's 
different.  I remember so many things about my days at KU, five  of  the best 
years of  my life.  Some of  the people here helped me get to where I am, and 
a lot of  faculty  members such as John Tollefson,  Joe Pichler, John Blocker, 
Howard Stettler, Arno Knapper, and a bunch of  others were very important 
to me. I learned a lot of  things here about business, accounting and finance, 
but I learned a lot more about things that I have reflected  on with my col-
leagues a number of  times: The importance of  communication and the abil-
ity to write. Leadership a team sport. Sometimes in life,  in business and 
life,  taking the trip is more important than the destination. I learned about 
the power of  consensus. I learned the fact  that in many organizations power 
flows  up, not down. I don't know if  I would have learned all this any other 
place, so I have very special feelings  about this University. So I thank you for 
being here. 
My purpose is to talk about one of  my favorite  topics: the accounting pro-
fession.  I am not going to talk about auditing because there are too many peo-
ple here that know more about auditing than I do. But I am going to talk about 
auditing firms,  and some things that I call the new global realities that have 
impacted our firms,  our markets, our clients, causing us to rethink the way 
we are organized, what we do, how we do it, and what we are all about. I've 
identified  fourteen  or so, such realities, just by simply reflecting  back on what 
it is that I have watched happen in the last ten years for  sure, but maybe for 
the last three, four,  or five  as they became more intense. Let me start. I'll go 
through them quickly. 
Individually, I think you're going to find  that none of  these are earth shat-
tering, and I doubt that I am going to tell you very many things that you don't 
know. If  you take them together, however, and paint the mosaic of  what has 
confronted  the profession,  and especially the big international, multi-national 
accounting firms,  I think you may get a sense of  just how much buffeting,  or 
†This paper is an audio transcript of  the keynote speech delivered by Ed Kangas at the 
symposium. 
*Edward A. Kangas is Managing Partner of  Deloitte & Touche. We are very proud that Ed grad-
uated from  the University of  Kansas with B.S. (1966) and M.S. (1967) in accounting. 
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as John [Tollefson]  would say, just how much whitewater, these firms  have 
been through, and what we are still facing  over the course of  the next four 
or five  years. 
First new reality: The world is balanced. In the mid 1800s the sun never 
set on the British Empire. The world was centered in London. After  World 
War II, the world was clearly centered politically in Washington and finan-
cially in New York. We Americans for  many years believed that that's what 
the world was about. In fact,  when we talked about auditing or talked about 
auditing firms,  they really were U.S. firms  with overseas branches. We never 
wanted to say it, but that's the way many behaved. Well, things have changed. 
A new sun is rising in the Asian Pacific.  Tokyo and the Japanese are a pow-
erful  economical and political force,  with growing strength in Korea and Tai-
wan and all through the Asian Pacific.  Europe is gaining strength with its 
consolidation and its economy in general. So today we have a very, very bal-
anced world, both politically and economically. 
Number two: Specialization. We have talked about specialization for  years, 
but it has come home to roost in the auditing firms.  It used to be that every-
one wanted to be a generalist. Then we went through a phase in most of  the 
big firms  that we focused  on industry practice. Well, it's gone a step further 
than that. Today, if  you want, for  instance, to focus  on health care, you don't 
just focus  on health care. You often  have to have expertise in managed care, 
or HMOs, or some subset of  health care. Today you don't just specialize in 
financial  institutions or financial  industries. You don't even focus  simply in 
securities. You may have to become an expert in the unit investment trust. 
The degree of  specialization that is driving the firms,  especially the larger 
firms,  is significant  and is going to continue. It has its advantages. The mar-
ket demands it. Therefore,  it is easier to sell services. The services are prob-
ably more efficient  when done by specialists and people that focus  on them. 
The quality tends to go up and as a result of  the efficiency  associated with it 
and the value, that determines higher prices, you are more efficient  and 
make more profits.  The drive toward specialization is significant,  but it flies 
somewhat in the face  of  what the young people joining the profession  want 
to do with their careers. 
Number three: Technology. I won't dwell long here; most of  you are very 
familiar  with the advancements. The impact of  technology at our clients and 
how they do business and the way the firms  go about using technology to 
audit is still in what I call the embryonic stages. In the next five  years we will 
see a major, major change in the way the major firms  use technology in the 
conduct of  their auditing business. 
Number four:  The world is becoming seamless. We are clearly not there 
yet, but the signs are there. Just think about Europe 1992. They may not do 
all they set out to do, but they will make strides. Barriers will come down, as 
with the U.S.-Canadian trade pact, and in the Eastern European countries. 
There's constant pressure to remove trade barriers with Japan. The move-
ment of  the trend is clear. The world from  the business and financial  trading 
perspective will become more seamless as time goes by. 
Number five:  Globalization of  the big multinationals. Ten years ago com-
panies really weren't multinational companies. They were huge. They had 
primary headquarters in the U.S. or the U.K., or wherever they were, and they 
had overseas branches and subsidiaries. Generally, the overseas branches 
operated as self-contained  companies with their own manufacturing,  distri-
bution, marketing, accounting, etc. systems. As a result of  that, companies 
could have the same auditor worldwide, or they could have different  audi-
tors in different  countries. It was up to them. Well, the world has changed in 
the last three years, maybe four.  It's changed primarily because of  telecom-
munications and computers. Today it's possible for  the big multinational 
companies, if  they so choose, to operate in truly one global enterprise. They 
may design their product in Germany, buy raw materials in Brazil, manufacture 
in Mexico, distribute all around the world, get their debt financing  in Lon-
don and their equity financing  in New York. They behave as one intertwined 
ball of  yarn, all driven by on-line computer and telecommunication systems 
that have in fact  allowed them to operate as one entity. 
Number six: Global financial  markets are driving global financial  report-
ing standards and the globalization of  these big multi-nationals is driving global 
audits. More and more companies in fact  cannot have audits done by one au-
ditor in one country and even refer  to another. In fact,  the audits have to be 
conducted more and more as one global audit led by one globalized en-
gagement partner as one engagement on a consolidated basis. 
Number seven: The U.S. today is a tax haven. Our tax rates are incredi-
bly low compared to the rest of  the world. The dollar is relatively low in re-
lationship to the value of  other currencies. Our assets and operating businesses 
are bargains. What's more, this is a politically stable country. 
Number eight: The world has been, for  the past eight or nine years and 
probably well into the future,  awash with money. There is more money chas-
ing fewer  deals than probably any time in the last fifty  years. 
Number nine: Direct foreign  investment is significant  and it will con-
tinue. I predict that domestic takeover activity, while at a bit of  a lull now with 
the demise of  junk bonds as a preferred  source of  financing,  will come back. 
Not like it was in its heyday, but it is already strengthening and we've seen 
it in the last 60 to 90 days. And direct foreign  investment has continued, not 
quite at the same pace, but the amount of  money coming from  Japan, from 
the Asian Pacific,  from  the UK, from  the Netherlands and France, is signifi-
cant and it will continue. In many ways we've had the largest change in eq-
uity ownership in American business than at any time since the Great 
Depression. That probably will continue. 
Number ten: The firms,  as they look at where growth is going to come 
from,  are finding  the greatest opportunities for  audit growth do not exist in 
the U.S. They exist in Europe, they exist in Japan, and the Asian Pacific.  Take 
all the major Fortune 1,000 or equivalent companies from  various parts of  the 
world, 95 percent of  them will be audited by the Big Six firms  here in the U.S. 
In Europe the number is only 70 percent and in the Asian Pacific,  it's only 
running 65 percent. The opportunities for  new and merging multi-nationals 
and the opportunities for  growth are in Europe and the Asian Pacific  more 
than they are in the United States. 
Number eleven: Auditing is becoming more important, not less important 
at this stage in time. There was a period of  time during the late 70s when I 
was, when probably a lot of  us were, a little distraught, because I believed 
that auditing was in fact  declining in its importance, somewhat driven by the 
competitive behavior of  the profession,  and it was becoming too much of  a 
commodity. That has reversed. The last two, three, or four  years auditing has 
become more important for  a whole variety of  reasons. 
Number twelve: The Big Six accounting firms,  and many others, today 
in fact  are consulting firms.  At Deloitte & Touche we have revenues of  ap-
proximately two billion dollars a year in the United States. Our recurring audit 
and recurring tax business, out of  that two billion dollars, is only eight hun-
dred million dollars. That doesn't mean it's all management consulting. In 
fact,  there is four  hundred million dollars of  special auditing type consulting 
work that goes on within the auditing division. There is three hundred mil-
lion dollars of  tax consulting going on out of  the tax division, and then there 
is five  hundred million dollars of  management, actuarial and other types of 
consulting going on out of  the various consulting divisions. What that says 
is that as a firm,  it's eight hundred million dollars of  base, recurring work, 
four  hundred million of  audit consulting, three hundred of  tax consulting and 
five  hundred of  management and related consulting. The realities are that 
we are a consulting firm  with less than half  of  our volume today coming from 
recurring business. 
What is all that consulting? Lots of  debate swirl around what it is. I'm going 
to give you a list from  our firm,  which is not too different  from  most of  the 
other firms.  What is common about these businesses? Think as I run through 
these and I will tell you my conclusions at the end, which also might say some-
thing about why there is so much demand for  these services. 
We do merger and acquisitions, LBOs, capital market service related 
consulting. A lot of  due diligence type of  activity, a lot of  tax structuring, a lot 
of  takeover defense  work. Litigation support, forensic  accounting, special in-
vestigations, bankruptcy consulting and auditing, restructuring. There's a lot 
of  business in companies like Texaco and LTV and Storage Technology, 
Eastern Airlines and Continental, etc.. Liquidation work. Actuarial and ben-
efits  consulting. Valuation and appraisal type work. Hard assets, soft  assets, 
valuing businesses or assets for  tax reasons, borrowing reasons, or in cer-
tain cases, buy and sell reasons. Restructuring, financial  restructuring, big 
companies using accountants for  significant  work. Places like Kroger and Kraft 
and Mason's that we have been involved with. Legislative assistance in Wash-
ington, especially on the tax side. Government contract consulting and re-
lated cost accounting services. Utility rate consultations, business interruption 
type consulting. A couple of  examples: Exxon has their refinery  destroyed 
in St. Croix by the hurricane, the Stouffer's  Hotel was destroyed by the hur-
ricane in St. Thomas. There is accounting related business, interruption 
claim consulting to be done. Information  technology and computer consult-
ing. Advanced manufacturing  systems. Strategy work, in our firm  through a 
division we call Braxton. 
What is in common about those businesses? Many people worry about 
the far  flung  consulting activities of  the accounting firms.  I don't see it that 
way. The businesses that have prospered when the demand is there - and it 
has almost been pulled out of  our firm  - have four  characteristics. They 
have, as a root, a requirement for  objectivity, which is a akin to independence. 
They are fact  or data driven. They are opinion related in terms of  offering  con-
sultation or advice. And four,  they require highly educated, specialized pro-
fessionals,  which says typically these things are not business services, they 
are professional  services. 
In fact,  these businesses very naturally and normally fit  under the umbrella 
of  what the profession  has traditionally done in its base service of  auditing. 
The place where the Big Six firms  have prospered, and I believe the profes-
sion will continue, is when services are required by businesses or by gov-
ernment that fall  back on those fundamental  principles of  objectivity, fact  driven, 
data driven, advice or opinion or consulting related, and they require highly 
specialized professionals.  When all four  are present, there is value added to 
those services coming out of  the Big Six firms.  Those consulting businesses 
will grow, and not so much because the firms  decided to do it. Frankly, ac-
counting firms  are not that well managed and not great marketers. The mar-
ket has demanded and wrung these services out of  these firms  naturally and 
progressively. 
Number thirteen: More and more is being expected of  accountants and 
auditors. There are natural expectations in what we do. Sometimes misun-
derstandings occur, but expectations of  the smart, bright lay person are 
there. The courts add to that their findings  and what they hold the accoun-
tants responsible for.  Politicians get in the act, regulators get in the act, and, 
interestingly, the constant examination of  competence in these consultive are-
nas, in fact,  builds confidence  in what these firms  can do and it adds even 
more to what the expectations are of  the firm  in its auditing role. 
Number fourteen:  The firms  and the services they deliver are more and 
more collaborative. More of  the work that is provided is done by people out 
of  the different  functions.  You don't see as many pure tax projects, or audit 
projects, or management consulting projects, or actuarial consulting pro-
jects. What we're finding  more and more of  is a collection of  specialists out 
of  various divisions being applied to projects. One of  the big requirements 
of  doing that well is that those specialists have an appreciation and under-
standing of  the other disciplines that they are working with. 
You might say, "There are fourteen  new realities; so what?" I am going 
to boil them down to three broad categories. For once and for  real, global-
ization of  the big companies. Not only specialization, but sub-specialization 
is being demanded by the market. And a growing expectation from  the pro-
fession  in terms of  what it must do. 
Those three things have caused two big things to happen to management 
as they wrestle with any firm.  One is, it has changed our definition  of  critical 
mass. Critical mass is a notion that says an office  has to be of  a certain size, 
a department has to be of  a certain size, for  the human resource dynamics, 
recruiting, development, training, the capacity to build presence, the impact 
of  marketing, and building a reputation - you have to be so big. When we 
were a general practice there was a definition  of  critical mass. But as we started 
to subdivide in specialized and sub-specialized areas, the critical mass factor 
for  those became almost as large as what we thought of  as our general prac-
tice. As a result, in order to build that specialization and have enough busi-
ness in that specialization, the practices had to be bigger and hence the def-
inition of  critical mass grows. 
Secondly, the issue of  globalization. Specialization expectations have 
driven us to raise what we viewed to be the standard of  adequate capability 
to serve in many countries throughout the world. We could get away until 
maybe two or three years ago with having weakness in Brazil or Taiwan or 
Malaysia or France or Sweden or pick your country. We had to have pres-
ence, but frankly,  because we tended to do referred  audits, we could sort of 
send someone there to double check it. Or if  you needed to, frankly,  you could 
have another Big Six firm  or local firm  do your work in a given country. As 
these enterprises have become truly global enterprises, that is no longer ad-
equate because you have to audit them worldwide as one entity, which raised 
the requirement to have consistent quality every place in the world. And in 
many of  the middle size and smaller countries, there were not eight or nine 
or ten high quality accounting firms. 
It's pretty obvious what that did. It drove mergers, especially among 
some of  the smaller of  the Big Eight firms,  to the place where today we have 
a whole new order in the profession  in terms of  the size and critical mass. I 
believe these trends will continue and would, in fact,  draw more mergers, ex-
cept for  the Justice Department isn't going to allow it. Jim Rill, the head of 
the Antitrust Department, and I flew  together recently between New York 
and Washington. I had some controversial and testy debates with Jim prior 
to our current merger being approved. On this trip, we had a very friendly 
chat, and he said as long as the Bush administration is here there won't be 
any more mergers among the Big Six, and may not be any mergers from  the 
second tier into the Big Six. He also said, if  Bush gets thrown out by the 
Democrats, I think they'll like big business even less than the Republicans. 
So, I would guess that the order of  the major firms  is going to be where it is 
at least probably for  the next ten years. 
Let me talk about one last new reality, which, frankly,  you probably un-
derstand better than I do. That is that young people have changed. I look at 
the people we have hired today and they are different.  They are different  from 
what I was. I still think of  myself  as a little kid. It just isn't true. They, as a 
general rule, are smarter, they have broader experience than most of  the peo-
ple we were hiring twenty or thirty years ago, they've traveled more, they've 
had more experiences. They have grown up in an economy that has allowed 
most of  them to be able to afford  to do things many of  us were not able to do. 
They generally have a broader education, not necessarily in terms of  the class-
room, but in terms of  what they seem to have experienced at the time they 
join one of  the firms. 
I might digress here and give you a comment or two. That is, all of  you 
are wrestling with the 150-hour program and what that will mean on your in-
dividual campus. You know the Big Six firms  are generally supportive of  that. 
We have put money and people behind it in terms of  the AAA (American Ac-
counting Association) and the AECC (Accounting Education Change Com-
mission) and the projects that are going on there. I would tell you, and I guess 
you would hear this from  other leaders of  the big firms,  two things. Don't 
just give them more accounting. Remember the comment I made about the 
fact  that we now have more collaborative teams - actuaries, auditors, ac-
countants, systems people, tax people, working on teams. One of  the biggest 
problems we have is that we have too few  people who understand enough 
about the other disciplines that they are required to team up with. It's abso-
lutely critical. If  the 150-hour program results in simply more accounting and 
auditing, and students who are better prepared to take the CPA exam, we 
will have failed.  In fact,  I will tell you that I believe there will be a crisis point 
in the late 90s when the number of  students declines. We know that's going 
to happen - they've all been born. The numbers will decline, and I believe 
we will have trouble attracting them to accounting programs. I believe when 
they trade off  a five  year education and the cost and time of  that versus other 
four  year programs, we might double it on the downwards side. 
If  the accounting profession  finds  the 150-hour education to be truly valu-
able, you will find  the profession  will hang tough. If  the leaders of  the major 
firms  and others finds  the 150-hour program is not doing anything for  them, 
I believe you will find  such a huge problem on the part of  the profession  to 
hire enough people, they will reverse fields  on you. And, you will have big 
problems; you will have a curriculum in place that the profession  will not sup-
port. It would be a shame if  that happens. This issue around accounting ed-
ucation is very, very serious. The firms  will put more money behind it, but it 
is going to be a partnership that the profession  and the faculty  are going to 
have to work on and take very, very seriously. For those people who are in-
clined to say let's take what we've got without changing it much and add an-
other year of  the same, you're playing with fire.  Don't do it. 
I'll switch back to young people. They are smarter, more broadly expe-
rienced, better educated. Those thoughts are probably not so earth shatter-
ing. The things that are really different  is that they are more independent. 
They are recalcitrant at times. They value freedom  intensely. They are more 
egalitarian than I remember being. They are less class-oriented. They are very 
impatient. They are less impressed with things. It used to be you'd take a young 
person entering business and say "He or she is a partner" and they would go 
"Wow!" Now they say, "Yeah, they're getting kind of  old, aren't they?" They 
are not that impressed with things. They are less inclined to accept the no-
tion of  apprenticeship. They absolutely want, have a burning desire, to con-
tribute to the organization they join from  the day they walk in the door off 
campus. They do not want to sit on the bench. They want to get on the play-
ing field  from  the day they sign up. They hate and reject control as a legiti-
mate approach to managing. 
We as accountants are not very well suited to this new reality. Most of  us 
went to school and learned about double entry bookkeeping, and that deb-
its had to equal credits. Many of  you took a course in something like con-
trollership. We then learned about auditing and the standards of  auditing. We 
got out of  school, we studied, we passed the CPA Exam. We got burned by 
a few  clients that didn't have the kind of  integrity we would want. We learned 
to doubt. We learned to be skeptical. We learned to double check. We got 
our first  management job somewhere five,  six, seven years into our careers, 
and what was our natural tendency, especially in tough times, to do? Control 
things. 
My partners say you can't let the staff  vote. I say they vote differently.  They 
don't vote with their hands, they vote with their feet  and walk right out the 
door. The turnover rates in the profession  in the last four  or five  years have 
gone sky high. It's a very big new reality that impacts how we will do busi-
ness, how we will organize ourselves, and how we manage. I have the sense 
that all the big firms  will compete reasonably effectively  in the market place 
for  clients, with technology, industry, practice, technical excellence, etc. I think 
that perhaps the firms  that are able to deal with these young renaissance peo-
ple most effectively  and, in fact,  modify  or eliminate the natural desire to use 
control as a legitimate management approach, may find  the real secret to gain-
ing and sustaining a competitive advantage. 
Let me wrap up. New realities: Balanced world; globalization of  our clients; 
sub-specializations of  specializations; demand for  consulting services; foreign 
investment; merger and acquisitions; LBOs; increasing expectations; a re-
definition  of  critical mass primarily driven by the need to specialize; a 
requirement, a demand for  consistent worldwide service capability; a re-
structuring of  the profession  through mergers and other factors,  and a group 
of  renaissance young people. These things are causing us as big firms  to read-
dress who we are, what we do, how we are organized, how we lead, and how 
we manage. The last three or four  years have been fascinating.  The next five 
years will be like having the opportunity of  a lifetime  to try to figure  out how 
to do something better than anyone else in a time when, in fact,  management 
and organization and what we do and how we do it are critical to success, 
and, perhaps, building a sustained competitive advantage. It is a very, very 
vibrant time. 
I sit back at times and look at our business and the big firms,  which is my 
perspective. We are very fortunate  to live in a free  enterprise, capitalistic so-
ciety. The public accounting profession  and its role in facilitating  and lubri-
cating financial  markets is very, very important. It's exciting and challenging. 
I am personally having a ball. I enjoyed sharing some of  these perspectives. 
They certainly weren't very technical, but I hope they have some value to you 
as you wrestle with some of  these issues as we go on with the symposium. 
Deloitte and Touche is delighted to be associated with this program. It has 
emerged and is continuing to emerge as one of  the finest  auditing sympo-
siums of  this type in the country. We're delighted to make a long-term com-
mitment to be part of  it. I thank you for  inviting me back here. Thank you. 
With Firmness in the Right 
Frederick L. Neumann 
University of  Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
One of  the earliest memories I have is, as a child, climbing a set of  stone 
steps in the fading  twilight of  an early spring evening toward a marble build-
ing filled  with light. As my father  assisted me up the last step I remember 
being startled by an enormous statue of  a bearded man sitting in a large chair 
whose kindly, though wrinkled, face  seemed to be looking down just at me. 
I do not recall much that happened subsequently except that I could not get 
that initial view of  the statue out of  my mind. I do remember that there was 
some writing on the walls that my father  and brothers said something about, 
but I could not take my eyes off  of  that statute. I have returned to the Lincoln 
Memorial several times since then and have been similarly affected.  Learn-
ing his story and reflecting  on the words on the walls that surround his 
statue have only added to my original sense of  awe. 
I am not a native of  Illinois, but one does not live there for  very long with-
out noticing the shadow that the Great Emancipator still casts over the Prairie 
State. Lincoln remains somewhat of  a folk  hero as well as a revered resident. 
The nose on his weather-stained bust in Oak Ridge Cemetery is as bright as 
gold, rubbed shiny by countless visitors who use it as a sign of  friendly  re-
spect toward this humble man of  the people. 
One of  the attributes of  Lincoln that has attracted me to him is his writ-
ing. We have probably never had another president who could write as mov-
ingly as he. In this day of  ghost writers, it is difficult  to know who really 
originated a presidential turn of  phrase that may catch our fancy. 
Hark back then to the days when presidents wrote their own material. 
Certainly there was Jefferson,  but his prose, while brilliant, was not of  the 
earthy nature or straightforward  metaphor of  Lincoln. Teddy Roosevelt was 
another of  our literary presidents, but, again, his prose did not reach to the 
depths of  Lincoln's. Among American writers of  any connection, it is hard to 
match the Old Testament grandeur of  Lincoln's style or the rich resonance 
of  his expression. 
Despite all the attention given to his Gettysburg Address, Lincoln had many 
other memorable pieces of  prose. Today, I would like to focus  on his second 
inaugural speech. The speech was delivered near the end of  the Civil War, 
when reconstruction loomed as the new challenge. It was not long before  the 
assassination that would keep him from  carrying it out. 
The particular words I want to recall deal with what Lincoln thought 
should be the nation's perspective toward that future.  In particular, I have 
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titled this paper after  that phrase that so typified  his own attitude, "with firm-
ness in the right..." For, I believe commitment is at the heart of  right behavior. 
Resolution in execution is essential to ethical integrity. Right intentions with-
out follow-through  count for  naught. We must not forget  this in our discus-
sion of  ethics with our students. 
In his famous  address at Cooper Union in February 1860, Lincoln fore-
shadowed his sense of  high resolve with the words, "Let us have faith  that 
right makes might, and in that faith  let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as 
we understand it." 
I would therefore  like to use Abraham Lincoln as a frame  of  reference  for 
my remarks about the development of  an ethical orientation in our classrooms. 
First, I would like to make a few  remarks about ethics, just to set the stage. 
Then I would like to take a few  minutes to consider some aspects that we, as 
teachers, may have overlooked in dealing with this critical topic. There are 
three: Personalized integrity, little vs. big, and good vs. bad. I would like to 
close with a discussion of  just how we might look at our personal ethical choices. 
What Is Ethics? 
The term ethics comes from  the Greek "ethos" and refers  to the charac-
ter and sentiment of  the community. It relates to the collective judgment of 
human action based on some perceived standards of  goodness and badness 
or right and wrong. 
Codes of  ethics refer  to standards of  conduct held in common among mem-
bers of  groups and associations. The term usually relates to rules that gov-
ern the moral behavior of  its members. It may also refer  to a study of  principles 
defining  one's duty to one's neighbor. The codes typically are derived from 
a set of  values or a system of  behavior adopted by the group. Codes can help 
to clarify  what kind of  conduct is deemed to promote the general welfare. 
Though they may be self-serving  in some respects, codes may also encour-
age higher standards of  behavior. 
Ethics can be an important part of  economic activity. It can and should 
permeate all aspects of  administration and decision making. Some have re-
ferred  to it as the soul of  the management profession.  The ethics of  an or-
ganization and its members can therefore  have a significant  influence  on how 
they conduct their business and how they are viewed by the society in which 
they function.  Is it any wonder that consideration of  ethics is creeping back 
into our classrooms? 
The growing renaissance of  attention to ethics in the classroom may be 
looked upon as a reaction to societal pressure - as a concession to critics. 
Business schools have become sensitive to the charge that they need to de-
velop better standards for  the behavior of  future  American businessmen. I 
think the increase in attention is the result of  more than that, however. I be-
lieve that it is also an acknowledgement that you cannot teach business with-
out an awareness of  a sense of  values. Teaching business or accounting in a 
vacuum only invites other considerations to take over. Something has to drive 
consistent actions; otherwise anarchy will ensue. 
The generally high level of  ethical behavior of  individual accountants is 
one of  the primary reasons the profession  still retains the confidence  of  the 
public. Our Codes of  Conduct provide guidance where laws and regulations 
do not exist, and challenge practitioners to perform  at a level above the min-
imum expected. A mark of  a professional  is the ability to correctly perceive 
ethical dilemmas and to behave appropriately. 
Professions  enjoy a legal monopoly backed by the power of  the state. In 
exchange for  this exclusive franchise,  professionals  are expected to serve the 
public good. Codes of  conduct are instituted as a guide and a reminder. Stu-
dents need to be apprised of  this contract and of  the type of  commitment it 
calls for  on their part. This peculiar responsibility of  the professional  deserves 
constant reiteration in the classroom. 
Personalized Integrity - living Ethics 
I am sympathetic with our nay sayers who tell us that we cannot "teach 
ethics" in the classroom. That, they say, is something that students should 
have learned at their mothers* knee or accepted from  early instruction in 
church, synagogue, or mosque - as if  "you can't teach old dogs new tricks." 
Well, I have always felt  that you are "never too old to learn," but my point is 
that stressing ethical behavior is not likely to be successful  if  it is only just 
"learned." It needs to be internalized, to be believed - like the faith  of  a little 
child - if  it is to be an effective  guide to future  behavior. 
Fundamentally, our students today seem to have pretty good instincts -
from  whatever source. In their discussions in class, their hearts generally seem 
to be in the right place - if  I can characterize mainstream beliefs  as being 
"the right place." If  that is so, then why do they make wrong decisions out 
there, in the work place? One response is that they do not know how to think 
through the issues. In today's complex world, without some kind of  model 
or structured response, it is believed that people make "satisficing"  decisions 
or just go with the crowd. 
On this very day, in fact,  a group of  accounting educators will be gather-
ing in Atlanta for  a conference  on the teaching of  ethics. I will be going there 
tomorrow. One of  the things that will be stressed is how to help students struc-
ture an approach to an ethical dilemma. There is a seven-step decision model 
that has been suggested to help bring a resolution. 
Step 1: Determine the facts,  known and desired; 
Step 2: Identify  the ethical issues and the stakeholders involved; 
Step 3: Define  the norms, principles, rules, and values related to the sit-
uation; 
Step 4: Identify  alternative courses of  action; 
Step 5: Compare the alternative courses of  action with the norms, prin-
ciples, rules, and values; 
Step 6: Evaluate the consequences of  each possible course of  action, both 
long- and short- term; and 
Step 7: Reach a decision as to the appropriate course of  action. 
Another step might be inserted before  making the final  decision. If  ap-
propriate, discuss the alternatives with a trusted person to help gain a greater 
perspective regarding the alternatives. 
I have found  this approach to be very helpful,  but it presupposes a will-
ingness and a basis on which to make an often  difficult  decision. I would sub-
mit that one of  the reasons our students make wrong choices is not that they 
don't have any idea of  what is right, but that they just don't have firm  enough 
convictions to put their right inclinations into practice. 
The bureaucratization of  business leads to impersonality, the loss of  a sense 
of  personal identity and accountability. Decision making becomes more cen-
tralized with the ensuing isolation of  various units. Is it any wonder there ap-
pears to be a loss of  altruism and a sense of  personal service and commitment? 
A former  student told me about a friend  of  his who was on a job where 
the budget was more than needed to do the engagement - a rarity these days, 
I suspect. The senior doled out the added hours (to be reported as overtime 
work), to preserve the budget and provide a little "year-end bonus." Besides, 
as the senior apparently put it, "it provides some compensation for  all that 
time we put in and don't charge." 
The former  student asked his friend  if  he did not realize this was wrong. 
The friend  replied, "If  it's wrong, why did the senior do it?" Whose ethics are 
we to adhere to? If  our students' frame  of  reference  is whoever is in charge, 
then we are in for  a difficult  time and the profession,  indeed this country, is 
in deep trouble. Was the Holocaust that long ago? 
Joseph Wells [1990] reminds us in a recent article in the Journal  of  Ac-
countancy that among those who commit fraud,  three common factors  are: 
motive (usually financial),  opportunity, and an ability to rationalize the theft, 
usually by calling it something else - borrowing, for  example. It is the third 
issue, the ability to compromise one's integrity, that has to be the most trou-
blesome. 
Professional  Codes of  Conduct and Corporate Codes of  Ethics may very 
well be necessary and a valuable frame  of  reference  if  today's actions are wind-
driven. They may be more effective  in identifying  ethical problems and be 
more persuasive in gaining adherence. In the last analysis, however, unless 
individuals know what is fundamentally  right, and act on it, our world faces 
a dim future. 
My suggested response to that latter augury is to emphasize integrity -
personalized ethics - in broaching the subject in the classroom. As we con-
sider cases with ethical overtones in class, I do not ask what Jones should 
have done. Rather, I ask, "what would you do in this case?" When explana-
tions rely on the "circumstances," I ask why the setting has anything to do 
with the issue, to force  the students to come to grips with a more fundamental 
question. 
I have been told that ethics is a personal thing and that to challenge stu-
dents so boldly on their beliefs  is threatening and a mistake. Will life  be any 
more gentle? Isn't it better to force  students to confront  such a situation in 
the classroom incubator than have them sweat out the fiery  consequences 
in the furnace  of  life? 
It seems to help my students to recognize that they, not someone else or 
any code of  ethics, are responsible for  what they do. Reminding them of  the 
potential consequences of  wrong behavior may have some effect,  as well. In 
my experience, however, most students pass that off  as not likely to be a prob-
lem inasmuch as they will probably never be in the public spotlight. Being 
able to live comfortably  with oneself  also seems to have little power, at least 
at their age. 
In this world of  growing depersonalization, students may be helped by 
being reminded that there is one thing that is still uniquely theirs, and that 
is their integrity. Though we put it at risk every day, our integrity is very frag-
ile. It is too easily lost and, if  lost, almost impossible to recover. Students may 
not realize what it means not to be trusted any more. We need to remind our 
students of  this and to help them avoid losing their integrity either con-
sciously or unconsciously. 
It was Abraham Lincoln who said, "If  you once forfeit  the confidence  of 
your fellow  citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem. It is true 
that you may fool  all of  the people some of  the time; you can even fool  some 
of  the people all the time; but you can't fool  all of  the people all the time." 
The job is only half  done if  we let our students escape with no commit-
ment. The memory of  a vigorous class discussion may not be sufficient  to 
sustain our students on the firing  line if  they have not decided which side of 
the battle they want to be on. We need to challenge them to commit them-
selves, not just intellectually, but in their hearts, to making this a better 
world. 
This is where "firmness  in the right..." comes in. We need to help stu-
dents internalize a commitment to what is right to such an extent that they 
are willing to take appropriate action. I had an executive tell me that one of 
the reasons for  implementing a code of  ethics in his company was to develop 
a corporate culture of  loyalty and submission. Specifically,  he did not want 
any opposition, especially any whistle blowers. 
Whistle-blowing is not an end in itself.  The need for  it is rare. It should 
be employed sparingly and only when established methods of  resolution 
have failed.  Yet, in some circumstances, it may be the only way to fulfill  an 
ethical obligation. It is both rational and moral, though most employment con-
tracts may expect that remuneration is in exchange for  obedient behavior. 
Where one is not able to live with a situation or change it, walking away nei-
ther ameliorates the wrong nor absolves of  any guilt that someone who 
knows. If  making the right choice is difficult,  sometimes carrying it out may 
be even more so. Yet, how can we say we have done our job if  we stop with 
the decision and ignore the implementation. 
Whistle-blowing is also a very complex issue. Nevertheless, in consider-
ing ethics in the classroom, some attention deserves to be given to the fol-
low-through - to old-fashioned  moral courage. 
You may not feel  that this is what you came into teaching to do. But re-
ally it is. Back in your starry-eyed days, didn't you look at teaching as a 
chance to have some effect,  to influence  the lives of  others, for  good? What 
better opportunity could you have than this? 
The impersonality of  accounting makes it easy to neglect the people as-
pect. In our classrooms, and in our research, the world of  numbers seems 
devoid of  humanity. The popular epithet "bean counters" underlies this pop-
ular perception held by the world at large. But, even in the green-eyeshade 
era of  accounting, people were important. We have long since left  that 
period. As teachers, it is time we returned people to stage front  in our con-
sideration. 
Little vs. Big 
Lincoln was not known as a churchgoer, but seldom has this nation 
known a president with a deeper, more abiding, faith.  He was fond  of  Bibli-
cal allusions. Let me use one here. Remember the parable of  the talents? 
[Matthew, 1953] A nobleman, going on a journey, entrusts three servants with 
five,  two, and one talents respectively. When he returns he finds  that the first 
two have doubled the amounts entrusted to them but the third simply returns 
it, having buried it in the ground for  safekeeping.  The nobleman's comment 
to each of  the first  two is, "Well done, good and faithful  servant; you have been 
faithful  over little, I will make you faithful  over much." The third was cast into 
outer darkness. 
The nobleman in this story tested his servants first  with little and then 
made his decision whether to trust them with more. Life  is often  like that. As 
we grow older, the temptations become greater. It is to be hoped that our 
strength to deal with these situations has grown commensurately. 
Sometimes I fear  that our approach in the classroom to ethical issues may 
overlook the need to evolve through these intervening steps. Too often  the 
cases that we use represent major corporations with enormous resources at 
stake. Often  the problems are so complex and situation-driven that they ob-
scure relevant ethical dilemmas. They may, therefore,  fail  to yield clear prin-
ciples of  general ethical behavior. The state of  affairs  may be, at once, both 
overwhelming and impersonal. We have just dealt with the latter; let us there-
fore  turn to the former. 
My suggestion is that we not start students off  with major corporate per-
plexities but with more familiar,  though perhaps less challenging, situations. 
Get them interested in simpler predicaments that they may have already faced, 
or could. Keep the situations realistic. Test the students on a level where they 
sense a challenge and may feel  a personal tug. Then help them to advance 
from  there. After  all, firms  do not usually start our graduates off  at the part-
ner level. Is that the only level at which they will face  ethical challenges? 
We have to give our students a chance to grow. The old adage that a baby 
has to crawl before  he or she can walk may be more than an aphorism. Some 
researchers have said, in fact,  that children who never crawled may be ham-
pered later in life. 
Who among us has not dreamed of  making that great decision that will 
change the course of  history? Most of  us, however, are not fated  to do so. 
For most of  us, the successes in life  will come in the little things that we do 
every day. We need to be sure that our students know this as well. Consider 
some cases where the issues are not necessarily the survival of  a Fortune 500 
company, but day-to-day dealings with ordinary people. 
By presenting our students with complex cases having much at stake, we 
may be, in a sense, expecting them to grow up too fast.  By missing the in-
tervening steps of  smaller decisions, their ability to cope with the larger 
problems may be incompletely developed. Moreover, they may be over-
looking the very critical point that the whole of  life  involves being faithful  over 
little things as well as big. Integrity encompasses how we handle all our chal-
lenges, not just the big ones. 
By starting with the complex, high-level cases we may also be neglecting 
an important concept in ethics development - the slippery slope. This is that 
almost impossible task of  determining at what point a minor slip becomes a 
major blunder. The fact  that I cannot tell which hair falling  out makes a man 
bald does not mean that there is no distinction between a man with a full  head 
of  hair and another with alopecia. Ethics by apparent consequence instead 
of  by intent is risky business. 
Over the years the profession  has wrestled with this problem in many 
guises. At what point does a financial  interest violate independence? At what 
point must a pooling become a purchase? At what point does a slight com-
promise with right become a wrong? I am sure you can recall a case or two 
where CPAs accommodated their clients a bit too far  before  they realized just 
how far  they had gone. It would have been better had they never gotten started 
down that slippery slope. 
Another of  the comments attributed to Lincoln is, "If  you call a tail a leg, 
how many legs has a dog? Five? No; calling a tail a leg don't make it a leg." 
Much of  the Lincoln lore is comprised of  small things that he did or was 
supposed to have done. Perhaps some of  them are Parson Weems-type tales, 
but many, I am sure, were of  the substance that made him a man of  high re-
solve. The stories are legion of  his walking miles to return the correct change 
to a customer of  his ill-fated  store or how he braved a driving prairie blizzard 
to borrow a book. The images of  his reading by the flickering  light of  the fire 
in his parents' log cabin are also legend, but they reflect  a growing sense of 
dedication and commitment that was to bring this nation through its dark-
est hour. 
You see, it is often  the little things that lead to the greater life.  It is often 
the smaller predicaments that build the resolve to face  up to the greater quan-
daries. Lincoln knew both and understood the importance of  each. Over-
whelmed with the problems of  the Civil War, he still took time to write 
personal letters of  consolation to those who had suffered  most from  its dev-
astation. In discussing ethics in the classroom, we ought not to neglect the 
small conflicts  or how their resolution may lead to successes in confronting 
even larger ones. Nor ought we to overlook their effects  on the people involved. 
Good vs. Bad 
Just as there may be a tendency in our classes to focus  on the big rather 
than the small, there may also be a similar temptation to feature  the bad rather 
than the good. Cases where auditors have erred or corporate officers  have 
failed  the test may be very appealing to students and instructors alike. They 
point out the consequences of  evil and are unfortunately  too readily available. 
In auditing, wrong choices are at the heart of  most of  our case studies. 
We look at the ESM case and at Jose Gomez's mea culpa confession  that ap-
peared in The  Wall  Street  Journal  [Brannigan, 1987]. The list of  cases in most 
textbooks usually consists of  those considered by the courts as professional 
failures.  My colleagues in tax tell me that much the same is true there. We 
can and do learn from  our mistakes. It is reasonable that we use these op-
portunities to teach our students not to repeat these errors. But, can't we also 
provide them with some examples of  accountants who made some right de-
cisions? Are there no heroes in today's ranks of  the profession? 
This emphasis on failure  tends to inculcate an awareness of  things to be 
avoided, a negative approach to ethics. Actually, it is the positive approach 
to life  that is apt to be the more productive and the more rewarding. More-
over, students need to realize that there is more to this integrity thing than 
avoiding bad situations. Doing right should be our concern, not just avoid-
ing wrong. 
Unfortunately,  the news does not seem to work that way. Tales of  audi-
tors who made the apparently wrong decisions get the headlines while those 
of  auditors who made right choices, regardless of  the pressure or conse-
quences, are seldom, if  ever, mentioned. One would like to think that this is 
because the former  are such rare exceptions - and, indeed, they seem to be 
so. Unfortunately,  there are still too many of  such instances and they tend to 
be more fascinating  than the ones with a successful  ending. 
For those who have taken to writing cases, let me suggest that you in-
vestigate some where the issues have been correctly diagnosed and through 
"firmness  in the right..." an appropriate outcome has been achieved. Wrestling 
with intransigent management over disclosure issues cannot be an easy task 
nor something to which a CPA looks forward.  But, as a watchdog for  eco-
nomic society, the profession  can find  few  other challenges that offer  a bet-
ter chance for  a sense of  accomplishment. 
Let me provide you with a few  possible illustrations. Currently, the Sav-
ings & Loan crisis is in the financial  headlines almost every day. Did you know 
that in the incipient days of  the regulatory accounting blight, one of  the Big 
Six accounting firms  backed away from  doing savings and loan audits? In the 
1960s they resigned from  their S&L clients. Congress, as one of  the first  of 
several questionable acts, had just permitted S&Ls, for  tax purposes, to 
deduct five  percent of  their uncollected mortgages as estimated bad debts. 
Arthur Andersen felt  that the differences  between this amount and the gen-
erally far  smaller amount charged on the income statement should be treated 
as a timing difference.  Treating it as a permanent difference  as most argued 
it should be, however, led to an overstatement of  capital. Since capital is the 
amount upon which the amount of  loans is based, it becomes a critical num-
ber for  the operation of  the business. Believing this, they resigned from  their 
savings and loan clients who adopted this practice. 
They took a similar step with regard to railroad clients because the In-
terstate Commerce Commission refused  to recognize depreciation. When was 
the last time you heard of  a firm  resigning from  all their clients in an indus-
try because they disagreed with the latter's accounting? Today, I suspect we 
might consider that there were "better," more discreet ways, of  handling such 
disagreements. Perhaps so, but this is still one way to make a point. You may 
recall that this is the same firm  that also sued the SEC at one time. 
I just got through recommending that we not emphasize the big at the 
expense of  the small, so let me give you a case about a new senior. He had 
just been assigned to a small insurance company. Although he had never au-
dited an insurance company, he conscientiously prepared for  the assign-
ment by reading and inquiring of  others. 
Shortly after  arriving on the job, he noticed that the company had con-
verted a substantial portion of  its investment portfolio  just before  year-end 
and converted it back shortly thereafter.  The explanation was that the com-
pany normally invested in some securities that were not acceptable to the in-
surance regulatory commission so, they went through this conversion at 
year-end. This, and other matters prompted the senior to suggest to the part-
ner that a more-experienced staff  person take over the job. The partner 
agreed. Eventually, the firm  decided this was not the kind of  client with 
which they wished to be associated. So, in the course of  time, someone else 
was left  to clean up the Equity Funding mess. 
Those of  you who have been in practice know that it must have taken a 
lot of  courage to go to a partner and admit that one may be in over one's head. 
Still, wasn't that the ethical thing to do? Did it hurt his career? I don't think 
so. He is currently a well respected partner in his firm's  national office. 
Accountants take courageous stands every day. We need to get more of 
these cases into our classrooms. Let our students learn the names of  some 
of  our winners and not just of  our losers. We do have heroes, too. 
. . . As God Gives Us to See the Right 
I know that much of  what is said about approaching ethics in the class-
room cautions teachers to stay away from  any particular philosophy. It en-
courages us, instead, to let students just think about issues and to provide 
them some opportunity to exercise their judgment - with no right or wrong 
resolution. Peer pressure is often  looked to as providing the appropriate 
power of  persuasion. 
I am not convinced that such an approach to moral values will succeed 
in the long run. I believe that we must somehow challenge our students to 
think through their positions and develop a philosophy of  their own to guide 
their behavior. To do otherwise is to abdicate our role as teachers and make 
ethics another sterile, intellectual exercise. 
In accounting, we often  proceed as though there is only one right answer 
and all we have to do is find  it - and do it. We know better than that with re-
gard to ethics. Philosophers have wrestled with this issue for  centuries. One 
of  the perplexing problems with many texts on business ethics is that their 
survey of  ethical approaches sometimes yields diametrically opposed solu-
tions. One such text even takes the position that if  there is a majority posi-
tion on the discussed viewpoints, that must be the right answer. No wonder 
our students are confused  and sometimes do not know which way to turn. 
Teachers, too, share this bewilderment. This may very well be a reason 
ethics does not receive more attention in our classrooms. 
A colleague recently admitted to me that his problem in dealing with ethics 
is that he himself  has no set philosophy. Who are we as teachers and what 
is it we are trying to convey if  we do not know what we ourselves believe? 
How convincing can we be if  we do not know where we stand? How much of 
an example will we be for  our students if  our own lives are not guided by the 
standards we imply should be theirs? 
The conclusion of  Lincoln's phrase "with firmness  in the right..." is "... 
as God gives us to see the right." I am not sure that is any more reassuring 
than any of  the better developed views. To take such an approach in our class-
rooms may be looked upon by some as violating the separation of  church and 
state. To others, it may be seen as a cop-out or as creating potentially loose 
cannons on the decks of  our corporate ships of  state. 
Nevertheless, I think Lincoln was trying to identify  an ultimate authority. 
Lincoln's perception of  some of  the views of  his ultimate authority are evi-
denced in the words that precede our title. They are "with malice toward none; 
with charity for  all..." This concept is reflected  to some extent in the three 
levels of  thinking patterns developed by John Dewey [see Shea,1988, for  de-
tails] and augmented by Lawrence Kohlberg [Lande and Slade, 1979]. I was 
first  introduced to this structure in a book by Gordon F. Shea [1988] called 
Practical  Ethics  which was written for  the American Management Associa-
tion. 
Dewey's three stages of  moral development were: 
Preconventional: where we concentrate on our fundamental  needs, 
where survival and security are our primary 
concerns; 
Conventional: where we are led by the rules and conventions of 
society; and 
Postconventional: where we think through our principles and are 
guided by fairness  and justice and the rights of  in-
dividuals. 
As a result of  studying how subjects solved moral problems, Lawrence 
Kohlberg suggested six stages of  moral development and found  that they fit 
into Dewey's framework  as follows: 
Preconventional morality 
Obeying orders - to avoid punishment; 
Marketplace morality - maximizing pleasure, minimizing pain; 
Conventional morality 
Conforming  to group norms - belonging; 
Focusing on law and order; 
Postconventional morality 
Principled morality - autonomous and responsible; and 
Universal morality. 
Gordon Shea had added to this his own fourth  stage: 
Transcendent morality 
Integrity - integration of  thought and feeling  (creative, caring, 
and sensitive). 
While this model does not supply answers, it does get the student to think 
about the level at which he or she is currently situated, compared to the level 
at which she or he may want to perform.  It provides an insight into moral val-
ues and can sensitize the student as to the relative status of  various virtues. 
I use it at step 5 in the seven-step decision model. 
Conclusion 
We need to impress on our students an awareness of  personal integrity 
and the will to make it a habit. We need to nurture its development and di-
rect it appropriately. We need to promote character and the thinking about 
values. To accomplish this, I suggest we consider approaching our study of 
ethics "with malice toward none; with charity for  all; with firmness  in the right, 
as God gives us to see the right..." 
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Discussant's Response to 
"With Firmness in the Right" 
Theodore F. Bluey1 
Deloitte & Touche 
I have an interesting assignment today in a number of  respects. First, I 
am a practicing auditor being exposed to the hallowed halls of  academe. This 
would not be so bad, except for  my assignment - to discuss a paper prepared 
by a well-respected auditing professor.  Again, I thought I could cope with that, 
until I heard the topic - professional  ethics. Nonetheless, I prepared for  this 
task by doing background reading on the subject. Then, on April 2, the paper 
on ethics arrived. Eagerly, I ripped open the envelope and began to read. My 
heart sank. Professor  Neumann, from  the University of  Illinois, had made "Hon-
est Abe" the cornerstone of  his paper. And then for  good measure, he brings 
the Bible into his discussion. I think you get the picture: I'm to try to stir up 
some controversy about Abe Lincoln and the Bible. Politics and religion -
two subjects my mother told me I should never discuss in public. 
In my remarks, I plan to discuss the apparent decline of  ethics first,  fol-
lowed by illustrations of  what I believe constitutes ethical behavior and what 
does not. In some cases, my comments will contrast with those of  Professor 
Neumann and, in other cases, will expand upon some of  his thoughts. I will 
conclude by discussing what is being done to reclaim the high ground in the 
war on unethical behavior, especially the impacts on businessmen of  "ethics 
by consequence!" And somewhere in all of  this, we might find  the time to 
discuss my work at the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Decline of  Ethics 
The decline of  ethics - we hear it every day - is not just in business, but 
in sports, government, and religion. It seems that every aspect of  society is 
in pursuit of  the pot at the end of  the rainbow at the expense of  ethical values. 
In the sports arena, there are allegations of  point shaving (North Carolina 
State), recruiting violations (Southern Methodist), drug use (Ben Johnson), 
and gambling (Pete Rose). In the government, there are the Iran-Contra 
hearings, investigations into the activities of  several senators, the HUD scan-
dals, and the seemingly endless rumors of  bribes and kickbacks. In the re-
ligious sector, we have had numerous controversies surrounding religious 
leaders. And of  course, in the business world, there are the insider trading 
scandals and the savings & loan crisis, to name just a few. 
1The author would like to acknowledge the significant  contributions made to this paper by Teri 
List and George Phillips of  the National Office  of  Deloitte & Touche. 
The reasons for  these actions are difficult  for  us to understand and im-
possible to justify.  They are a tragedy - not just for  those directly affected, 
but for  the taint they cast on others associated with an activity. 
Professor  Neumann asks what has precipitated the focus  on ethics. I sug-
gest that it is events such as those I have mentioned and a realization that 
we can't stand by passively and allow public confidence  to continue to erode. 
Everyone seems to perceive the decline in ethics as a problem that must be 
addressed. 
What is Ethical? What is Not? 
Some philosophers view ethical behavior on two levels: (1) an inner core 
reflecting  objectives and principles of  right conduct and (2) outside layers 
constituting the law, rules, and regulations. I believe, as does Professor  Neu-
mann, that individuals fundamentally  have good instincts of  right conduct. 
Furthermore, early conditioning by family  and society tells us that our own 
self-interest  will be advanced as a result of  doing the right thing. As I will dis-
cuss later, it may not always be easy to conclude that our own self-interest  is 
best served by doing the ethical thing. 
Professor  Neumann emphasizes personalized integrity, and I would like 
to comment on this. Many individuals view professional  ethics in very nega-
tive terms, as a list of  rules describing things to avoid. 
This may be illustrated by considering the auditor's independence stan-
dard. Independence was once thought of  as an important personal emphasis 
on integrity and objectivity in performing  professional  services. However, some 
feel  that over the years the independence standard has developed into a se-
ries of  increasingly minute, arbitrary rules. The SEC Codification  of  Finan-
cial Reporting Releases contains over thirty pages of  detailed rules and 
interpretations about auditor independence, all based upon a particular fact 
pattern. 
Deloitte & Touche, like most other firms,  has developed a system to 
monitor independence, and several individuals commit a significant  amount 
of  time to handling inquiries and issues related to independence. For a large 
organization with enough resources to devote a significant  amount of  time, 
the detailed rules and interpretations may be viewed as helpful,  but for  a small 
practitioner, the rules may seem overwhelming. 
If  independence and professional  ethics rules grow more minute and ar-
bitrary, individuals will continue to find  it easier to avoid exercising their pro-
fessional  judgment to determine what constitutes ethical behavior - they either 
will comply with the rules or they will not. 
Rather than imposing arbitrary rules, personalized integrity needs to be 
so ingrained that ethical behavior is automatic. This means that, for  auditors, 
more emphasis must be placed on the importance of  applying independent 
professional  judgment to tough auditing issues in the classroom, in the uni-
form  CPA examination, in continuing education programs, and in the su-
pervision of  everyday responsibilities. 
Ethics in the Classroom 
How do you teach ethics in the classroom? There are over 500 courses 
in business ethics alone - I'm sure the methods are diverse. Do you really 
teach ethics, or do you just reinforce  what Professor  Neumann says you learned 
at your mother's knee? 
The threshold question is, what is ethical? One view is that anything that 
is legal is ethical (i.e., just comply with the rules, however minute and arbi-
trary they may seem). A second view is more of  a middle ground - a right 
versus wrong decision-making process. A third view is the opposite extreme 
of  the first  - any time you are in doubt, an action is not ethical. Neither ex-
treme seems quite right. Yet, as with insider trading, what is ethical is very 
difficult  to define.  Like so many things that we cannot define  precisely, we 
usually know it when we see it. 
As difficult  as it may be to define  ethical behavior, the general concept of 
right versus wrong must be emphasized in the classroom. But, how do you 
teach someone to "do the right thing"? 
Making the "right" decision in auditing could mean difficult  times for  the 
individual and his firm.  Taking a position that is not in agreement with a client 
will, at a minimum, be unpopular. An individual considering a career in au-
diting should understand and accept this early in his college studies and pro-
fessional  career. 
My experience at the SEC convinced me that the vast majority of  audi-
tors subject to enforcement  actions are not evil, wicked criminals. They are 
decent human beings who have families  just like you and me. They go to Ro-
tary or Kiwanis meetings, vote in elections, coach Little League teams, and 
attend religious services. They may have been caught up in some aggressive 
accounting and may have rationalized a client's position without a thorough 
examination of  all of  the relevant facts.  They may have made a "wrong" de-
cision. Unfortunately,  these wrong decisions are the news, as Professor  Neu-
mann has stated, and not the thousands of  right decisions made each day. 
I agree with Professor  Neumann that case studies tend to focus  on com-
plex problems rather than on clear principles of  ethical behavior. I do not be-
lieve that case studies which attempt to have students reexamine their value 
systems are the answer. I believe that most students already have an estab-
lished idea of  right and wrong, but that adherence to those values is some-
times difficult  in the real world. 
Professor  Neumann is absolutely correct - students need case studies that 
illustrate real-world situations they will face  once they graduate. Such examples 
and illustrations should not be confusing  situations where there is no right 
or wrong answer. Instead, they should be the more common situations where 
the correct response is known. These might include such things as correctly 
reporting your time, completing all the audit program steps you sign off  and, 
for  later in their careers, being willing to take the right, albeit potentially un-
popular, course of  action in dealing with clients. 
Ethics are a habit. Good, or bad, habits formed  early in a career will 
greatly influence  decisions made later when the consequences are often  far 
greater. Classroom illustrations of  ethical decisions that a student will face 
both early and late in his career will help the student make the correct 
choices, particularly if  the reasons for  the correct choices are fully  explained 
and discussed. 
Each year Deloitte & Touche sponsors a Trueblood Seminar for  univer-
sity professors.  During the Seminar, a number of  case studies are presented 
that are based on actual practice issues we have encountered. Cases with eth-
ical overtones elicit a great deal of  discussion, because the professors  are able 
to relate to the issues on a personal level. This same theory applies to stu-
dents, and providing such case studies will allow them to instinctively reach 
back to their college training when they are faced  with these issues in their 
professional  careers. 
Doing the Right Thing 
Given a good foundation,  or inner core, of  objectives and principles of  right 
conduct, why then are there so many apparent examples of  people going astray? 
Rather than an inability to think through the issues, which Professor  Neu-
mann poses as a possible problem, maybe it is precisely that ability which 
leads to the headlines we see so frequently.  In evaluating an ethical dilemma, 
an individual's conviction of  what is right and what is wrong is a very neces-
sary foundation,  but is that conviction, in and of  itself,  enough to ensure ap-
propriate behavior? 
Situations frequently  arise where the ethical action and the action that en-
hances one's self-interest  may represent two divergent courses of  action. This 
is where the pressure begins. The individual knows what the right decision 
is and wants so very badly to make that decision. The difficulty  is that another 
course of  action appears very tempting and perhaps more in his self-interest, 
at least at that point in time. Does the individual lack the self-confidence  to 
do the right thing? If  the individual has the foresight  to think through all of 
the future  consequences of  his action, then the decision should be easy. This 
is extremely difficult  for  a young, inexperienced auditor, and it is the re-
sponsibility of  the firm  to provide this auditor with the infrastructure  to dis-
cuss his dilemma. At Deloitte & Touche, every effort  is made to do so in the 
form  of  counselors, advisors or mentors, who have the maturity and experi-
ence to aid the auditor in making the right decision. This is Step 6 in the de-
cision model discussed by Professor  Neumann. 
Reclaiming the High Ground 
There are a number of  initiatives that, if  present in any environment - may 
directly or indirectly influence  individuals to abide by their ethical principles. 
I would like to discuss three such initiatives that I think are very important. 
The first  is what is referred  to as the "tone at the top." I believe this is a nec-
essary starting point for  any organization. Second, Professor  Neumann ac-
knowledges that codes of  conduct may be a valuable frame  of  reference,  and 
I would like to expand on that. Finally, I would like to focus  on what Profes-
sor Neumann terms "ethics by consequence rather than by intent," something 
I believe is an underlying problem in today's society. 
Tone at the Top 
In response to several widely-publicized business failures,  the Treadway 
Commission [1987] studied the causes of  fraudulent  financial  reporting and 
made recommendations that it felt  would reduce the incidence of  fraudulent 
financial  reporting. I think it is significant  that the Treadway Commission fo-
cused on the "tone at the top" and called it "the most important factor  con-
tributing to the integrity of  the financial  reporting process." 
An appropriate attitude at the top is essential and must be communicated 
to all levels of  an organization. A lack of  leadership and moral guidance cre-
ates a vacuum of  uncertainty. Over time, an individual's inner core of  princi-
ples can be greatly affected  by his or her environment. 
Businesses that are serious about ethical behavior need to adopt policies 
that consider ethical behavior in determining advancement and compensa-
tion. Such policies must be designed to protect individuals from  the negative 
financial  consequences of  their ethical decisions. These negative conse-
quences are the responsibility of  the organization as a whole. The corpora-
tion that institutes such policies is sending a clear message about top 
management's commitment to ethical behavior. 
Motive, opportunity, and the ability to compromise one's integrity are the 
three common factors  cited by Wells [1990] as being present among those 
who commit fraud.  Certainly, it is the third factor  that is most troublesome. 
If  an individual's environment seems lax about ethical conduct, it becomes 
much easier to rationalize unethical actions which can lead to deceptive fi-
nancial reporting, insider trading, fraud,  and all the other events that make 
headlines. 
Code of  Conduct 
The Treadway Commission also concluded that a code of  corporate con-
duct was an essential component of  establishing an ethical corporate culture. 
A code provides a vehicle to communicate the "tone at the top" to all levels 
of  an organization. It certainly cannot be the only form  of  communication; 
newsletters, training sessions, and management actions are also important. 
Many people believe that the mere existence of  a code can raise the eth-
ical level of  an organization because it clarifies  what actions are considered 
appropriate and signals an organization's expectations to all employees. Un-
fortunately,  most codes are the product of  a crisis environment and are re-
active rather than proactive. A recent survey [Pitt and Groskaufmanis,  1989] 
indicates that most codes address conflict  of  interest, misuse of  confidential 
information,  foreign  corrupt practices, and insider trading. These topics 
would seem to indicate that a fundamental  purpose of  a code of  conduct is 
protection against illegal actions. 
To be effective,  a code should be tailored to the particular needs of  an or-
ganization; applicable, in some fashion,  to all individuals in the organization; 
communicated through educational programs and updated on a regular basis; 
and, most importantly, monitored for  compliance. Individuals must understand 
an organization's values and principles from  their first  day on the job. Such 
training is as important as the technical training programs that are provided. 
Some people on Wall Street attribute its woes to the dramatic growth in 
investment banking. Firms added people faster  than they were able to train 
them in the traditions and values of  the investment banking firms.  With im-
mediate, big-dollar rewards at stake and limited or no guidance on accept-
able conduct, the risks of  errant behavior occurring were high. 
For CPAs, maintaining the public's trust and confidence  has always been 
critical. Although a 1986 Louis and Harris poll ranked CPAs first  among pro-
fessionals  in their moral and ethical practices, the accounting profession  has 
been, and will continue to be, under scrutiny. In the same year of  that sur-
vey, the Anderson Committee [AICPA, 1986] called for  a restructuring of  the 
profession's  ethics code. In carrying out this recommendation, the profession 
recognized that the code should emphasize the attainment of  goals rather 
than only rule compliance. The new Code of  Professional  Conduct sets forth 
professional  standards in a positive, goal-oriented manner; the former  code 
concentrated on telling CPAs what they should not do. 
Ethics by Consequence 
A recent article in The  Wall  Street  Journal  cited a Wharton School study 
[Robertson and Anderson, 1989] which indicated that highly-supervised em-
ployees at bureaucratic firms  are more likely to act ethically than those at en-
trepreneurial firms.  The authors of  the study noted that there is evidence that 
people in such an environment think through the risk of  getting caught in 
an activity that would be perceived as unethical. That's an interesting ob-
servation - improve your ethics through a centralized bureaucracy. 
In dispelling common myths about fraud,  the article by Wells [1990] dis-
cussed previously notes that people are not immune to the temptation to com-
mit fraud.  The greater the promise of  reward or the more pervasive the 
threat of  punishment, the higher the motivation for  a particular behavior. The 
above two articles indicate that even with a good foundation  of  ethical prin-
ciples - an organization's commitment to ethical behavior and a code of 
ethics - individuals may still be tempted to act in an unethical manner. 
A recent headline in The  New  York  Times  [Norris, 1990] characterized 
Michael Milken's guilty plea as reflective  of  the ethics of  the soaring '80s -
a willingness to cut legal corners in pursuit of  further  profit.  Shortly after  that 
plea, I overheard a conversation - Milken earned $1.1 billion in salary alone, 
and his punishment is a $600 million fine  (of  which two-thirds may be tax de-
ductible) and a possible jail term (in a minimum security prison). Wouldn't 
you trade places with him? "Not such a bad life,"  was the response. 
Risk vs. Reward 
What's the risk and what's the reward from  my action? Spoken or unspoken, 
I would be willing to bet that this thought process is inherent in many instances 
of  unethical conduct. I do believe that there are some business people who 
assess the risks of  being caught in an unethical or illegal activity against the 
rewards of  not being caught. Getting caught is, for  them, just another cost 
of  doing business. 
What is it that has caused this attitude? Is it a result of  today's service econ-
omy, whose main economic activity is buying and selling stocks, bonds, com-
modities, real estate, foreign  exchange, and futures  in everything imaginable? 
These items are represented by numbers on a computer screen, not by a man-
ufactured  product that is judged by its value to society or the quality of  its 
workmanship. Because of  the impersonal nature of  these financial  transac-
tions, it is tempting to rationalize that no individual will be injured by any un-
ethical behavior. There is no intent to do harm to any individual; the intent 
is solely to make a profit  from  the financial  transaction. Who really gets hurt 
if  you bend the rules slightly in your favor?  Is the perceived reward worth 
the risk? 
Sociologists question whether punishing a criminal is effective  in deter-
ring others from  committing similar crimes. Does this mean prosecution 
shouldn't be pursued? I believe that failure  to punish offenders  does send a 
strong message to other potential offenders  - the reward remains, while the 
risk is diminished. Thus, the consequences associated with the unethical de-
cision are not seen as a deterrent. 
Whistle-blowing 
In his discussion on whistle-blowing, Professor  Neumann notes that walk-
ing away doesn't "fix"  the wrong. This is true, and I agree that whistle-blow-
ing is a very difficult  issue. An individual who blows the whistle may sacrifice 
his career and his security - there are only negative incentives. What posi-
tive incentives can be provided? 
The term "whistle-blowing" is usually associated with a disgruntled em-
ployee who reports violations of  normal business practice to public authori-
ties or the media. Recently, the term has also been associated with the 
auditor. Legislation was threatened that would make the auditor the "pub-
lic's watchdog" for  detection of  fraud  and illegal acts. The profession  re-
sponded with self-regulation  - expectation gap Statements on Auditing 
Standards which, among other things, require communication with audit com-
mittees or directors to improve the integrity of  financial  reporting. In my pres-
ent job, I deal with management integrity issues quite often.  When the auditor 
suspects an integrity issue, what is he to do? Resign? Walk away? Blow the 
whistle? To Whom? 
Heroes 
Are there heroes in the accounting profession?  I'm sure there are, but be-
cause of  the nature of  the profession,  they are not as glamorous as those in 
other walks of  life,  such as corporate business, sports, or politics. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Professor  Neumann that there is a tendency 
in classes, in newspaper headlines, and in organizations to focus  on the neg-
ative rather than the positive. It is much easier to criticize - it sells more pa-
pers - but what advantage is gained? Of  course we learn from  the negatives, 
but we should provide more examples of  people making the "right" choices 
- our accounting heroes. 
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Introduction 
According to SAS No. 59, The  Auditor's  Consideration  of  an Entity's  Abil-
ity to Continue  as a Going Concern  [AICPA, 1988], the auditor has a respon-
sibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the client's ability 
to continue as a going concern for  a reasonable period of  time, not to exceed 
one year beyond the date of  the financial  statements being audited. Once this 
evaluation is complete, if  the auditor concludes there is substantial doubt, he 
is required to add an explanatory paragraph to the audit report reflecting  his 
conclusion. The going concern evaluation is particularly troublesome for 
commercial bank clients operating in a regulated environment. For these in-
stitutions, federal  and state regulators ultimately decide whether and when 
a particular bank will be closed, and the auditor faces  the additional challenge 
of  predicting whether regulators will take such actions within 12 months of 
the date of  the financial  statements. 
This study examines the usefulness  of  annual financial  statement data and 
alternative modeling methodologies for  modeling regulators' decisions to close 
commercial banks. A bank failure  prediction model could be applied at the 
audit planning stage (using annualized third quarter data) to aid resource al-
location decisions. The model could also be applied at the review stage of  the 
audit (using annual post-adjustment data) as an aid to the final  opinion re-
porting decision. 
We focus  on two different  methodologies - logistic regression and neural 
network computing - and compare their abilities to predict commercial bank 
failures  over a 12-month horizon. Our preliminary results indicate that both 
methodologies yield similar predictive accuracy across the range of  all pos-
sible model cutoff  values, with the neural network performing  marginally bet-
ter in the "gray area" where some failing  banks appear to be less financially 
distressed. 
The remainder of  the paper contains sections covering sampling method-
ology, selection of  candidate predictor variables, modeling methodology, es-
timation of  model fit,  and prediction results. The paper concludes with a 
summary of  our research findings. 
Sample Selection Process 
During the period from  1983 through 1988, there has been a dramatic in-
crease in the number of  federally  insured commercial banks requiring dis-
bursements by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Sheshunoff 
& Co. of  Austin, Texas reported 45 such bank failures  during 1983; 79 dur-
ing 1984; 117 during 1985; 138 during 1986; 164 during 1987; and 179 during 
1988. These failures  included institutions entering receivership, institutions 
that had their deposits assumed by others, and institutions merged into oth-
ers under Federal assistance plans. For this study, we used an estimation sam-
ple comprised of  102 of  the 117 banks that failed  during 1985 (1984 annual 
financial  statement data) and a separate holdout sample containing 131 of  the 
138 banks that failed  during 1986 (1985 annual financial  statement data). Failed 
banks from  the 1985 and 1986 Sheshunoff  lists that were not included in ei-
ther sample had been closed by the regulators during the first  month of  each 
year, and as a result no prior year's financial  statement data were available. 
A stratified  sampling design was applied to identify  nonfailed  banks for 
inclusion in both samples. Nonfailed  banks were drawn from  the nine different 
peer groups listed in TABLE 1. These peer groups are based on differing  ranges 
of  total assets. The nine strata for  the holdout and estimation samples of  non-
failed  banks are approximately proportional to the population strata propor-
tions as shown in TABLE 1. This stratification  design was undertaken to test 
the general applicability of  estimated models to banks of  all different  sizes. 
As shown in TABLE 1, 906 nonfailed  banks were included in the 1984 esti-
mation sample and 928 nonfailed  banks were included in the 1985 holdout 
sample. 
Selection of  Candidate Predictor Variables 
Candidate predictor variables were identified  using the results of  prior 
research, and researcher intuition. Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis and Sinkey 
[1981] summarize several prior bank failure  prediction studies including 
studies sponsored by the FDIC, Federal Reserve Board of  New York, Office 
of  the Comptroller of  the Currency (OCC), Board of  Governors of  the Fed-
eral Reserve System, and other studies. Our set of  candidate predictor vari-
ables includes the most efficacious  of  the predictors tested in these studies. 
During 1988, the OCC published a document entitled Bank Failure  -An 
Evaluation  of  the Factors  Contributing  to the Failure  of  National  Banks  [1988]. 
The document reports the results of  an analysis of  banks that failed,  became 
problems and recovered, or remained healthy during the period 1979 through 
1987. It identifies  eight broad categories where weaknesses had a significant 
impact on bank declines. To the extent possible, we identified  ratios that cap-
ture the essence of  these categories for  inclusion in our set of  candidate pre-
dictor variables. 
APPENDIX A presents a list of  28 candidate predictor variables we iden-
tified  for  possible inclusion in our models. Ratio numerators and denomina-
tors are comprised of  line items taken from  the annual call reports of 
commercial banks included in our samples. We used call report financial  state-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regulators focus  on the information  filed  in these Federal documents, and be-
cause the call reports have more detail than the GAAP reports. Moreover, 
GAAP reports are not available for  a large number of  separate institutions that 
fall  under the umbrella of  a single bank holding company. 
The 28 candidate predictor variables relate to the following  general financial 
features:  bank size, loan exposure, capital adequacy, asset quality, operating 
performance,  non-operating performance,  and liquidity. Size is measured 
using the natural logarithm of  total assets (LGASSETS). Loan exposure vari-
ables include the proportion of  total assets represented by (1) construction 
loans (CONSTLNS), (2) real estate loans (RLESTLNS), and (3) agricultural 
loans (AGLNS). Based on the OCC's finding  that insider abuse leads to bank 
failures,  we included a fourth  loan exposure variable designed to capture this 
condition - (4) aggregate credit to officers  (loans to insiders) as a proportion 
of  net loans (LNSINSID). Although many insider abuses go unrecorded, the 
OCC did observe that such abuse "include[s] situations where the transac-
tions may be technically lawful  [and therefore  recorded in the financial  state-
ments] but exhibit bad judgment or self-interest  above the interests of  the 
bank" [OCC, 1988, p. 33]. The completeness assertion is one of  the most trou-
blesome aspects of  an external audit, and to the extent that insider transac-
tions go unrecorded, the ability to predict financial  failure  is most likely 
decreased. 
Measures designed to capture the adequacy of  bank capital include (1) 
primary capital to adjusted assets (PRMCAPAS), (2) total capital to total 
loans (TOCAPLNS), and (3) the raw measure of  total equity capital (EQ-
CAPTL). It is customary to add the allowance for  loan losses to equity capi-
tal when measuring primary and total capital but we found  that subtracting 
this amount yields stronger predictions. Therefore,  our measures of  primary 
and total capital are quite conservative. Capital has actually been reduced by 
twice the amount of  the loan loss reserve - once by the bank's accrual of  loan 
losses and again by our subtraction of  the amount. So, these measures of  cap-
ital assume that actual loan losses are understated. 
Asset quality predictor variables include various measures of  substandard 
loans as a proportion of  either gross loans, primary capital, or total assets. 
The call report includes the following  separate categories of  substandard loans: 
(1) loans past due over 90 days (used in PDLNSGRL), (2) loans for  which in-
terest accrual has been suspended (used in NONACLNS), (3) total nonper-
forming  loans, which is the sum of  past due loans and nonaccrual loans (used 
in NPLNSPCP and NPLNSAST) , and (4) loans that have been restructured 
(used in RESTRLNS). Two additional asset quality predictor variables are the 
ratio of  net charge-offs  to total loans (CHRGOFFS), and the ratio of  provision 
for  loan losses to total assets (PROVLOSS). 
Measures designed to capture operating performance  include (1) total in-
terest income to total assets (YIELD), (2) total interest expense to total as-
sets (RATE), (3) net interest income to total assets (SPREAD), (4) return on 
total assets (RETNTA), (5) return on total equity capital (RETEQ), (6) un-
divided profit  and capital reserves to total assets (CUMPROF), and (7) in-
come before  extraordinary items (INCOME). Non-operating performance 
measures include (1) total non-interest income to total assets (NONINT), (2) 
total overhead expense to total assets (OVRHDEXP), and (3) security gains 
(losses) and gross extraordinary items to total assets (SECGAINS). 
Liquidity measures include (1) short-term assets less large liabilities to 
total assets (LIQSTAST), (2) large time deposits to total assets (TMDEPS), 
and net loans to total assets (NETLNS). LIQSTAST measures the gap between 
short-term liquid assets and large deposits and provides an indication of  the 
bank's ability to produce cash should depositors make large withdrawals. 
TMDEPS measures the proportion of  total assets represented by these large 
deposits, and NETLNS represents the proportion of  total assets that is non-
liquid. For brevity, we will use acronyms to represent each of  the 28 predic-
tor ratios throughout the remainder of  this study. The reader is referred  to 
APPENDIX A for  detailed definitions. 
Modeling Methodologies 
In our effort  to estimate a model for  predicting bank failures,  we primar-
ily focused  on two modeling methodologies: logistic regression (or the logit 
model), and neural network computing. Brief  descriptions of  each method-
ology are given next. 
Logistic Regression 
During the recent past, binary logistic regression has been applied in a 
number of  research studies that have attempted to model specific  binary de-
cisions or the binary representation of  the occurrence of  an event (e.g., vote 
yes/vote no and bankrupt/not bankrupt). In the current study, the logistic 
regression model can be interpreted as follows.  Suppose there exists an un-
observable theoretical index, Zi, that represents the regulators' propensity 
to close commercial banks. Zi is assumed to be a continuous random vari-
able and is determined by a linear combination of  observable bank charac-
teristics, such as asset quality, loan exposure, capital adequacy, expected future 
financial  performance,  liquidity, etc. The logit model given below allows the 
estimation of  the weights (coefficients)  for  the linear combination of  bank at-
tributes, and the resultant estimation of  the index Zi: 
Pi represents the conditional probability that the regulator will close the 
bank, and e is the base of  natural logarithms. 
The likelihood function  for  use in sample estimation of  the coefficients  of 
Zi is given by the product of  all P;s for  failed  banks times the product of  (1 -
Pi) for  all nonfailed  banks. So, higher failure  probabilities for  failed  banks, 
and lower failure  probabilities for  nonfailed  banks, represent higher points 
on the likelihood function.  The coefficients  comprising Zi can be estimated 
by finding  the global maximum of  the likelihood function  (i.e., differentiat-
ing and setting equal to zero). Due to the nonlinearity of  the partial deriva-
tives, however, an iterative technique such as the Newton-Raphson method 
must be used to determine this global maximum. 
P i= 1 
1 + e 
(1) 
- Z i 
Neural Network Computing 
Over the past few  years a new methodology referred  to as neural network 
computing, or connectionist modeling, has undergone rapid development. 
Neural nets have been applied to a variety of  classification,  clustering, and 
pattern recognition problems and in some cases have significantly  outper-
formed  standard statistical techniques such as the logit model. 
Neural network architecture is biologically inspired, involving the intri-
cate interconnection of  many nodes (also referred  to as processing elements) 
through which inputs are transformed  into outputs. Once a particular network 
architecture is defined,  the network is repeatedly presented with training cases 
from  an estimation sample, and the connection weights between nodes are 
modified  to bring the network outputs closer to the actual target output val-
ues. This training process is referred  to as network learning. One of  the po-
tential advantages of  neural network modeling is the ability to capture inherent 
process nonlinearities through the specification  of  an intricate network ar-
chitecture. Interactions can also be modeled by specifying  multiple connec-
tions to individual nodes. 
The basic elements of  a neural network are (1) nodes, (2) layers (of 
nodes), (3) connections (between nodes), and (4) connection weights. FIG-
URE 1 contains an illustration of  the specific  network architecture used in 
the current study. The first  layer found  at the bottom of  the illustration is com-
prised of  a bias node (similar to a constant in a regression model, and always 
FIGURE 1: NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE FOR KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION OF REGULATORS' 





a g l n s t o c a p l n s n o n a c l n s r a t e r e t e q l n s i n s i d 
Nelwork Attributes: 
1. Hyperbolic Tangent Transfer  Function 
2. Normalized Cumulative Backpropagation - Error Backprogated Using Overall Error Function 
Instead Of  Each Individual Error Function 
3. Training Set = 102 Banks Closed During 1985 (1984 Year-End Data) and 102 Nonfailed  Banks 
4. Approximately 300,000 Epoch Iterations Performed  During Learning 
5. Input Variables Chosen Based On Exploratory Data Analysis, Analysis Of  All Possible 
Regressions, And Logistic Regression Results 
p r m c a p a s p d l n s g r l r e s t r l n s o v r h d e x p l i q s t a s t 
given a value of  1), and one input node for  each predictor variable. This layer 
serves as an input buffer  where the input nodes simply pass the given pre-
dictor-variable values for  the current training case (sample observation) up 
the connections toward the hidden (middle) layer. The input nodes are fully 
connected to the six nodes in the hidden layer. Each connection path has an 
associated weight (similar to a regression model coefficient)  that is multiplied 
by the input value being passed through the connection. 
Each node contained in the hidden layer receives a combined signal from 
each connection below it. This signal is simply the sum of  the products of 
connection weights and input values. Note that each sum of  products is anal-
ogous to Zi in the logit model described above, but each of  the six nodes in 
the hidden layer has a separate sum of  products. Upon entering the six hid-
den layer nodes, these sums of  products are individually transformed  into 
output signals via application of  a specified  transfer  function.  Customarily, a 
sigmoidal growth function  is used as the network transfer  function  for  nodes 
in the hidden and output layers. Two commonly used transfer  functions  are 
the sigmoid (or logistic) function  given in equation (1) above, and the hyperbolic 
tangent function,  given by: 
tanh x = sinh x/cosh x = (ex - e - x ) / (ex + e - x ) (2) 
FIGURE 2 contains a comparative illustration of  the behavior or these two 
growth functions. 
Once the specified  transfer  function  is applied to each of  the six sums 
of  products entering the hidden layer nodes, the six transformed  signals are 
passed up through the connection paths to the output node. The bias node 
also passes a signal to the output node. As in the layer below, the seven sig-
nals are multiplied by connection weights and summed to form  another sum 
of  products. The transfer  function  is again applied to this sum of  products to 
generate the final  output signal. If  the sigmoid function  is used as the net-
work transfer  function,  the network output value will range from  0 to 1. If  the 
hyperbolic tangent is used, the output value will range from  -1 to 1. 
Our final  network illustrated in FIGURE 1 contains 79 connection paths. 
This means 79 connection weights must be specified.  During training, a neu-
ral network is repeatedly presented with sample observations (also referred 
to as training cases) and a learning rule is required to ensure that all con-
nection weights are modified  in a manner that will improve the network's clas-
sification  ability. In this study, the particular training rule applied during 
network training is referred  to as back-propagation. 
Back-propagation is an iterative gradient-descent technique that is simi-
lar in many ways to the Newton-Raphson technique used in the maximum 
likelihood estimation of  the logit model. The basic premise underlying the 
back-propagation algorithm is that each of  the network connection weights 
is, to some degree, responsible for  the final  output error. Once a network is 
presented with a new training case, the final  network output error is computed 
using current connection weights. This error is then propagated back through 
the network and applied to determine how the connection weights should 
be modified. 
FIGURE 2: TRANSFER FUNCTIONS COMMONLY USED IN 
BACKPROPAGATION NETWORKS 
Hyperbolic Tangent and Sigmoid Transfer  Functions 
X = Sum of Products 
Notes: Sigmoid Ranges Between 0 and 1 
Hyperbolic Tangent Ranges Between -1 and 1 
Derivative at Point of  Inflection: 
Sigmoid = .25 
Hyperbolic Tangent = 1 
The amount of  output error that is back-propagated from  the output node 
(call it back-propagated error) is computed by multiplying the derivative of 
the transfer  function  times the raw error (raw error is the actual network out-
put value minus the desired, or target, output value). So, the rate of  change 
in the transfer  function  at its current value also impacts the modification  of 
connection weights. The amount by which the weights on connection paths 
between the hidden layer and the output layer are modified  is determined 
by multiplying this back-propagated error from  the output node times the cur-
rent input signals that just passed through these six connections (seven con-
nections including the bias). In addition, this amount is typically dampened 
by applying a learning coefficient  that ranges between 0 and 1. 
The amount of  error to be back-propagated from  a node in the hidden layer 
is determined by multiplying the derivative of  the transfer  function  at its cur-
rent value (different  from  the transfer  function  value at the output node) with 
the product of  the back-propagated error coming into the hidden layer node 


















this connection path. So each node in the hidden layer is assigned a differ-
ent amount of  back-propagated error - an amount that is dependent on the 
unmodified  connection weight from  the connection above. 
Once these hidden layer back-propagated errors are assigned to each hid-
den layer node, they are used to modify  the connection weights to the input 
layer in the same manner as before.  That is, the delta weight (or weight mod-
ification)  for  a given connection to an input node is derived by computing the 
product of  the respective hidden node's back-propagated error times the 
input value just passed from  the input node, and multiplying this amount times 
the learning coefficient. 
Assuming the network does not get trapped in a local minimum, it has 
been proved that iterative application of  the back-propagation algorithm will 
improve network performance  to the point where the global error is minimized. 
However, in addition to the potential local minima problem, networks some-
times become "paralyzed", thereby preventing further  modification  of  con-
nection weights. Paralysis can occur when weights become very large. In this 
case, signals coming into a node become very large, and the derivative of  the 
transfer  function  approaches zero (see FIGURE 2). 
Model Estimation Results 
Logistic Regression Model 
In an effort  to identify  a powerful  logit model, several exploratory proce-
dures were applied. Initially, we tested each candidate predictor variable for 
significant  differences  between the failed  and nonfailed  sub-sample means 
and medians using the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whit-
ney U-Test. These tests were applied to both the 1984 estimation sample and 
the 1985 holdout sample. The results are presented in TABLE 2. For 19 of 
the 28 candidate predictors, failed  and nonfailed  sub-sample means and me-
dians were significantly  different  in both years. We limited our consideration 
of  predictors for  the multi-ratio model to this set of  19 significant  variables. 
Next, we estimated numerous multi-ratio logistic regression models using 
the 1984 estimation sample and assessed overall model goodness-of-fit.  Also, 
we assessed the incremental significance  of  the individual predictor variables 
for  each model. Further, we compared the signs of  the estimated coefficients 
with expected signs during this stage of  the exploratory work. Expected 
signs of  various coefficients  are given in TABLE 3. Expectations were based 
on evidence gathered from  prior studies and, in some cases, researcher in-
tuition. Finally, we estimated all possible pair-wise correlations to aid our spec-
ification  of  a final  model. Pearson-product-moment correlations in excess of 
.5 are listed in APPENDIX B. 
After  much trial-and-error and fine-tuning  using the exploratory procedures 
discussed above, we settled on the final  eight-variable model given in TABLE 
4. This model includes two loan exposure variables - AGLNS and LNSINSID; 
three asset quality variables - PDLNSGRL, NONACLNS and RESTRLNS; one 
capital adequacy variable - PRMCAPAS; one operating performance  variable 
- RATE; and one non-operating performance  measure - OVRHDEXP. The over-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EXPECTED COEFFICIENT SIGNS FOR SIGNIFICANT 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
Feature/Ratio Expected Sign 
SIZE: 
LGASSETS Minus (-) 
LOAN EXPOSURE: 
AGLNS Plus (+) 
LNSINSID Plus (+) 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY: 
PRMCAPAS Minus (-) 
ASSET QUALITY: 
NPLNSPCP Plus (+) 
NPLNSAST Plus (+) 
PDLNSGRL Plus (+) 
NONACLNS Plus (+) 
RESTRLNS Plus (+) 
CHRGOFFS Plus (+) 
NETLNS Plus (+) 
Feature/Ratio Expected Sign 
PERFORMANCE RATIOS: 
YIELD Plus (+) 
RATE Plus (+) 
OVRHDEXP Plus (+) 
PROVLOSS Plus (+) 
RETNTA Minus (-) 
CUMPROF Minus (-) 
LIQUIDITY: 
LIQSTAST Minus (-) 
at the .0000 level. All estimated model coefficients  are incrementally signifi-
cant at the .05 level, and estimated signs agreed with expected signs. The 
ratio with the greatest incremental explanatory power was PRMCAPAS, 
while the weakest ratio was NONACLNS. 
In order to test for  parameter stability, we estimated the same 8-variable 
model using the 1985 holdout sample. Estimation results for  this sample are 
also given in TABLE 4. As with the estimation sample, the model based on 
the holdout sample had consistent signs, significant  overall model goodness-
of-fit,  and incrementally significant  model coefficients. 
Neural Network Model 
The process of  specifying  an appropriate neural net model is even less 
structured than the exploratory process related to specifying  a statistical 
model. In addition to facing  the problem of  identifying  the appropriate pre-
dictor variables for  inclusion in the model, one must make additional ad hoc 
choices about network architecture and training. For example, should you 
include only one hidden layer? How many nodes should the hidden layer(s) 
contain? What should be the value of  the learning coefficient?  Which trans-
fer  function  should be applied? Should the nodes be fully  interconnected or 
should some connections be disabled or held constant? 
TABLE 4 
ESTIMATED LOGISTIC REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
Signed Asymptotic 
t-Statistics 
Variables 1984 1985 
Constant -3.46 -3.79 
AGLNS 5.85 4.29 
PRMCAPAS -5.88 -5.55 
PDLNSGRL 4.59 2.51 
NONACLNS 1.85 4.19 
RESTRLNS 1.91 1.49 
RATE 2.03 2.07 
OVRHDEXP 5.50 3.97 
LNSINSID 3.30 3.68 
-2 Times Log Likelihood Ratio 
[Chi-Sq (8 df)] 351.46 476.97 
Sample Sizes 
Failed Banks 102 131 
Nonfailed  Banks 906 928 
Total 1008 1059 
Note: Both unweighted and weighted (using the WESML technique) estimations were 
made for  each year. Only the unweighted results are reported. The weighted results were 
not significantly  different. 
Due to our lack of  experience in the area of  neural network modeling, we 
consulted with NeuralWare, Inc. of  Pittsburg, PA and obtained a great deal 
of  helpful  advice about network architecture and network training. Neural-
Ware develops and markets neural network software,  and they also provide 
consulting services in the area of  network design, and application-oriented 
training. They have provided neural net consulting services to many large 
corporations and Federal agencies, and have established an impressive rec-
ord of  many successful  neural net applications. 
In an effort  to identify  an appropriate network architecture for  the bank 
failure  prediction process, additional exploratory analyses were undertaken. 
An all-possible-regressions routine was applied to the estimation sample as 
a means of  identifying  additional candidate predictors from  our set of  28 ra-
tios. Scatter diagrams were generated for  each variable, and outliers were 
identified.  A search was undertaken to identify  sample observations with more 
than one outlier ratio value, but none were found.  After  exhaustive exploratory 
data analysis, we decided to include 11 predictor variables in the input layer 
of  the neural network. These ratios included the eight predictors from  the 
final  logit model, and TOCAPLNS, RETEQ, and LIQSTAST. 
Initially, eight nodes were included in the network's one hidden layer. The 
network was fully  interconnected, and the hyperbolic tangent transfer  func-
tion was chosen for  the purpose of  generating all hidden layer outputs and 
the output layer output. In an effort  to avoid network paralysis, the target out-
puts for  failed  and nonfailed  banks were .9 and -.9 respectively. Mapping sums 
of  products to values inside of  the transfer  function  extremes has resulted in 
successful  avoidance of  network paralysis in other applications. 
The network training set was comprised of  the 102 failed  banks from  the 
1984 estimation sample, and a randomly drawn sample of  102 of  the 1984 non-
failed  banks. Normalized cumulative back-propagation was chosen as the 
method for  updating network weights. Approximately 300,000 epoch itera-
tions were carried out during the network training phase, and the network 
root mean square error was monitored throughout the training period. Ad-
justments were made to the learning coefficient  at times when the network 
error increased significantly. 
About halfway  through the training process, we decided to disable two 
nodes within the hidden layer. This decision was made after  viewing a 
Hinton [1987] diagram of  the network. The Hinton diagram pictorially por-
trays the significance  of  inputs and hidden layer outputs, and at this time it 
became clear that two of  the hidden layer nodes were not making significant 
contributions to the output layer. At the completion of  the training period, 
the network mean square error was approximately .45. 
Prediction Results 
Once the final  logit and network models were identified,  we performed  a 
comparative analysis of  the predictive abilities of  both models when applied 
to the full  holdout sample of  131 failed  and 928 nonfailed  banks. Prediction 
results from  applying the logit model are given in TABLE 5. Both the upper 
and lower tails of  the distribution of  predicted values contain accurate pre-
dictions. For example, at a cutoff  value of  .01, the model accurately predicts 
almost 50 percent of  the nonfailed  sample, and over 99 percent of  the failed 
sample. At a cutoff  of  .05, the model accurately predicts 95 percent (124 of 
131) of  the failed  banks and 81 percent of  the nonfailed  banks. Moving to a 
cutoff  of  .1, the model accurately predicts over 90 percent of  both sub-sam-
ples. 
The model's predictive ability is also impressive at the top of  the distri-
bution. For example, at a cutoff  value of  .8, the model accurately predicts 99 
percent of  the nonfailed  banks and 52 percent of  the failed  banks. The pre-
dictive strength of  the model at the tails indicates that a multi-cutoff  decision 
approach may be beneficial. 
After  assessing the logit model's predictive ability on the holdout sam-
ple, the final  step in the research project was to assess whether the neural 
network could achieve equal or superior predictive performance.  To the best 
of  our knowledge, no unambiguous method exists for  comparing alternative 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































particular cutoff  value would not be appropriate unless the distributions of 
predicted values from  applying both models are identical. Obviously, this is 
not true for  our models since the logit model maps a single sum of  products 
to a point on the sigmoid function,  and the neural net model maps its output-
node sum of  products to a point on the hyperbolic tangent function.  Even if 
the sigmoid function  was used in the neural network, generating a distribu-
tion of  predictions identical to the logit model is highly unlikely. 
One approach that would allow for  comparability across models involves 
estimating the relative costs of  Type I and Type II errors, and then determining 
the optimal cutoff  associated with each model's minimum misclassification 
costs. Due to the high degree of  uncertainty involved in the identification  of 
relative misclassification  costs of  Type I and Type II errors, researchers typ-
ically assume several alternative relative cost ratios, and identify  the optimal 
cutoffs  under each assumption. The idea is to determine if  either model dom-
inates the other in terms of  minimum misclassification  costs across a fron-
tier of  optimal cutoffs  associated with assumed cost ratios. 
We decided to measure the entire range of  tradeoffs  between the failed 
and nonfailed  sub-sample error rates for  both models and then visually in-
spect the relative positions of  both tradeoff  functions  using graphical analy-
sis. By using tradeoff  functions  we avoid the inappropriate use of  specific  cutoff 
values. Instead, we can compare the predictive abilities of  both models across 
the entire frontier  of  all possible cutoffs.  If  one model produces a tradeoff  func-
tion that falls  below the second model's tradeoff  function  in at least one spot, 
and does not fall  above the second model's function  at any point, the first  model 
can be judged superior to the second. 
FIGURE 3 contains overlaid graphs of  the logit and neural net models' 
tradeoff  functions.  Visual inspection of  FIGURE 3 reveals that neither the logit 
model nor the neural net model dominates in terms of  predictive ability. The 
tradeoff  functions  for  both models cross one another at several points. It should 
be noted that one additional Type I error shifts  the Type I error rate upward 
by .0076 (1/131), or approximately .01. Therefore,  most of  the differences 
between the logit model and the neural network are not greater than two hold-
out sample failed  banks. 
Specific  portions of  the graph in FIGURE 3 were magnified  and are pre-
sented in FIGURES 4 through 6. FIGURE 4 focuses  on the top tail of  the trade-
off  functions  where high failed  and low nonfailed  errors rate are found.  Model 
cutoffs  related to these error rates would be appropriate if  the cost of  mis-
classifying  a nonfailed  bank is greater than the cost of  misclassifying  a failed 
bank. The logit tradeoff  function  remains slightly below the neural net func-
tion over this region of  the frontier  where misclassifications  of  nonfailed 
banks remain below two percent. FIGURE 5 focuses  on the central portion 
of  the tradeoff  functions  where Type II error rates range between two per-
cent and ten percent. The neural network's tradeoff  function  is below the logit 
model's over most of  this region. FIGURE 6 focuses  on the bottom portion 
of  the tradeoff  functions  where high TYPE II and low Type I error rates are 
given. The neural net continues to outperform  the logit model up to the point 
where the Type II error rate is 20 percent, and then the models' perfor-
mances reverse. 
FIGURE 3: TRADEOFFS BETWEEN TYPE I AND TYPE II ERROR RATES 
(Circles Denote the Logit Model; Stars Denote the Neural Network) 
Type II Error Rates 
The largest difference  between the two models is found  at the point 
where the Type II error rate is .05 (see FIGURE 5). At this point, the neural 
net correctly predicts nine more bank failures  than the logit model. Across 
the entire tradeoff  frontier,  only three points are found  where the difference 
between the two models is greater than 3 mispredictions. 
Summary 
The preliminary results indicate that neither modeling approach domi-
nates the other in terms of  predictive ability across the entire frontier  of  all 
possible model cutoffs.  On average, the neural network model does appear 
to perform  equally as well as the logistic regression model. According to the 
neural network literature, the back-propagation network may be desirable when 
a decision process is inherently nonlinear, with many interactions among the 
input cues, and/or when a cascaded approach to data processing is used by 
the decision maker. In the case of  regulators' decisions to close commercial 













FIGURE 4: TRADEOFF FUNCTIONS AT LOW TYPE II ERROR RATES (LESS THAN .02) 
(Circles Denote the Logit Model; Stars Denote the Neural Network) 
FIGURE 5: TRADEOFF FUNCTIONS AT MID TYPE II ERROR RATES (BETWEEN .02 AND .1) 
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Type II Error Rates 
FIGURE 6: TRADEOFF FUNCTIONS AT HIGH TYPE II ERROR RATES (GREATER THAN .1) 
(Circles Denote the Logit Model; Stars Denote the Neural Network) 
Type II Error Rates 
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CANDIDATE PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable 
Acronym Variable Name and Formula 
1. LGASSETS Natural  Logarithm of  Total  Assets 
Natural Logarithm of  Total Assets 
2. CONSTLNS Construction  Loans to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Construction & Land Develop-
ment Loans 
Denominator: Total Assets 
3. RLESTLNS Commercial  Real Estate  Loans to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Loans Sec: Nonfarm 
+ Loans Secured by 5+Res 
Denominator: Total Assets 
4. AGLNS Agricultural  Loans to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Ag Prod & Farm Loans 
+ Loans Secured by Farm 
Denominator: Total Assets 
5. PRMCAPAS Primary Capital  to Adjusted  Assets 
Numerator: Total Equity Capital 
+ Minority Interest 
+ Total Mand Conv. in Cap 
- Allowance for  Losses 
Denominator: Total Assets 
- Allowance for  Losses 
6. TOCAPLNS Total  Capital  to Total  Loans 
Numerator: Total Equity Capital 
+ Minority Interest 
+ Total Man Conv. in Cap 
+ Subordinated Notes & Deb 
+ Ltd Life  Pref  Stock 
- Allowance for  Losses 
Denominator: Loans, Net: Unearn Inc. 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
CANDIDATE PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable 
Acronym Variable Name and Formula 
7. NPLNSPCP Nonperforming  Loans to Primary Capital 
Numerator: Total Past Due Loans 
+ Total Nonaccrual Loans 
Denominator: Total Equity Capital 
+ Minority Interest 
+ Total Man Conv. in Cap 
- Allowance for  Losses 
8. NPLNSAST Nonperforming  Loans to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Past Due Loans 
+ Total Nonaccrual Loans 
Denominator: Total Assets 
9. PDLNSGRL Past Due Loans to Gross Loans 
Numerator: Total Past Due Loans 
Denominator: Loans & Leases 
+ Unearned Income 
10. NONACLNS Nonaccrual  Loans to Gross Loans 
Numerator: Total Nonaccrual Loans 
Denominator: Loans & Leases 
+ Unearned Income 
11. RESTRLNS Restructed  Loans to Gross Loans 
Numerator: Total Restructured Loans 
Denominator: Loans & Leases 
+ Unearned Income 
12. CHRGOFFS Net  Chargeoffs  to Total  Loans 
Numerator: Total Chargeoffs 
- Total Recoveries 
Denominator: Loans & Leases 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
CANDIDATE PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable 
Acronym Variable Name and Formula 
13. YIELD Yield  on Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Interest Income 
Denominator: Total Assets 
14. RATE Rate Paid  on Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Interest Income 
Denominator: Total Assets 
15. SPREAD Net  Interest  Income  to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Interest Income 
- Total Interest Expense 
Denominator: Total Assets 
16. NONINT Noninterest  Income  to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Noninterest Income 
Denominator: Total Assets 
17. OVRHDEXP Total  Overhead  Expense to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Total Noninterest Expense 
+ Interest on Mtge Indebtedness 
Denominator: Total Assets 
18. PROVLOSS Provision for  Loan Loss to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Prov: Loan & Lease Loss 
+ Prov: All Transfer  Risk 
Denominator: Total Assets 
19. SECGAINS Security  Gains (Losses)  & Extra.  Items 
to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Gains (Losses) on Sec 
+ Extra Items, Gross 
Denominator: Total Assets 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
CANDIDATE PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable 
Acronym Variable Name and Formula 
20. RETNTA Return on Total  Assets 
Numerator: Inc. before  Extra. Items 
Denominator: Total Assets 
21. RETEQ Return on Equity 
Numerator: Inc. before  Extra. Items 
Denominator: Total Equity Capital 
22. LIQSTAST Short-Term  Assets Less Large Liabs. 
to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Due: Int. Bearing 
+ Federal Funds Sold 
+ Assets in Trading Accts. 
+ Debt Sec. Reprc <1 Yr. 
-Tune CDs >$100M 
- Open Acct. Time >$100M 
- Dep: For Nonint. Bearing 
- Dep: For Int. Bearing 
- Federal Funds Purchased 
- Notes Issued to U.S. Treas. 
- Iiab. for  Borrowed $ 
Denominator: Total Assets 
23. TMDEPS Large Time  Deposits to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Time CDs >$100M 
+ Open Acct. Time >$100 M 
Denominator: Total Assets 
24. NETLNS Net  Loans to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Loans & Leases 
- Allowance for  Losses 
Denominator: Total Assets 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
CANDIDATE PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable 
Acronym Variable Name and Formula 
25. LNSINSID Loans to Insiders  over Net  Loans 
Numerator: Credit to Officers  Agg. Amt. 
Denominator: Loans & Leases 
- Allowance for  Losses 
26. CUMPROF Undivided  Profit  & Cap. Reserve 
to Total  Assets 
Numerator: Undivided Profit  & Cap. Reserve 
Denominator: Total Assets 
27. INCOME Income  before  Extra.  Items 
28. EQCAPTL Total  Equity Capital 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Discussant's Response to 
"Neural Nets Versus Logistic Regression: 
A Comparison of  Each Model's Ability to Predict 
Commercial Bank Failures" 
Miklos A. Vasarhelyi 
Rutgers University - Newark 
Bell, Ribar and Verchio [1990] apply two alternative methodologies in the 
prediction of  commercial bank failure.  This discussion first  examines the na-
ture of  the work; second, explores issues in neural network methodology; 
and third, concludes with the discussion of  other relevant issues such as al-
ternative approaches and paths for  future  work. 
On the Nature of  the Work 
The bank failure  problem has been extensively explored in the literature 
of  accounting and finance.  Consequently, there is a wide body of  knowledge 
about the problem and substantial insight on analytical methods that help in 
the prediction of  failure.  This makes it an ideal arena for  competitive method-
ological testing allowing for  comparison, not only among the methodologies 
in question but also with an external body of  literature. 
The study uses an extensive sample from  the 1983-1988 period for  draw-
ing failed  banks and chooses through a sample estimation procedure. Part 
of  the sample is held out for  model testing purposes. The method is quite 
standard and has been used in many similar studies. Some more recent stud-
ies have used the jacknife/bootstrap  method in order to avoid having to hold 
a large part of  the data as a holdout sample. This approach could be adopted 
in this study leading to a different  set of  basic assertions. Nonfailed  banks 
were chosen through a stratified  sampling procedure for  group pairing. 
The authors used 28 prediction variables for  failure  prediction, very much 
in line with the literature. In these types of  studies, you should always be con-
cerned with two issues: over-fitting  and missing variables. This study presents 
a relatively large sample, thereby decreasing some concerns with the first 
issue. The variables used are the standard financial  variables that appear in 
most studies. These do not include any potential "soft"  causes for  failure  (e.g. 
poor management, fraud)  and/or macro variables. 
In summary, the problem context and approach relate to a large set of 
studies in the literature and are an ideal setting for  evaluating competing sta-
tistical methodologies. It might have been desirable that the authors further 
discuss the literature and the main results. The logit approach has been 
used extensively in research during the recent years while neural networks 
are a new and forthcoming  area. Consequently, they are to be discussed next 
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On Neural Nets 
Much of  the effort  that started the neural network field,  stems from  the 
desire of  scientists and researchers to understand the way the brain functions 
and to emulate its behavior. With a desire to obtain human-like capabilities 
(e.g. speech understanding, learning, vision), researchers have used com-
puters as an alternative to the human being. A family  of  these devices is clas-
sified  as neural computers and are based on what is called neural networks 
as noted by the following  excerpt from  Russo and Lewy [1989]. 
Generally speaking, neural networks are an alternative, parallel com-
puting architecture. Instead of  being programmed like conventional 
algorithm computers, neural nets are trained and it is therefore  arguable 
that they learn from  and/or adapt to the nature of  their input. 
In essence, neural net software  present a series of  desirable characteris-
tics: 
- they are adaptive in nature, 
- they can be retrained for  improved performance, 
- they are fault-tolerant  due to their massive parallelism, 
- their algorithms are typically non-parametric and therefore,  they are more 
robust. 
TABLE 1 drawn from  Miller [1990] compares neural versus digital com-
puters. 
TABLE 1 
NEURAL COMPUTERS VS. DIGITAL COMPUTERS 
DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
YES & NO DECISIONS BASED 
ON MATHEMATICAL AND 
LOGICAL FUNCTIONS 
DATA HANDLED IN A RIGID 
STRUCTURED SEQUENCE 
FIND PRECISE ANSWERS TO 
ANY PROBLEM, GIVEN ENOUGH 
TIME 
SORT THROUGH LARGE DATABASES 
TO FIND EXACT MATCHES 
STORE INFORMATION TO RETRIEVE 
SPECIFIC INFORMATION 
ANALOG DATA PROCESSING 
WEIGHTED DECISIONS ON 




FORMULATE METHODS OF 
PROCESSING DATA 
FIND GOOD, QUICK,.... 
BUT APPROXIMATE.... 
ANSWERS TO HIGHLY 
COMPLEX PROBLEMS 
SORT THROUGH LARGE 
DATABASES TO FIND 
CLOSE MATCHES 
STORE INFORMATION TO 
ALSO RETRIEVE RELATED 
FACTS 
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Nevertheless, in spite of  the promise and potential of  this technology, there 
are many myths and hype that surround its usage. TABLE 2 represents a par-
tial list of  hypes and realities in neural nets. 
TABLE 2 
HYPE AND REALITY IN NEURAL NETS* 
HYPE (H): MANY SUCCESSFUL NN APPLICATIONS EXIST 
REALITY (R): HARDWARE HAS NOT YET CAUGHT UP WITH THE APPROACH 
AND IS HOLDING THINGS BACK 
H: NEURAL NETS PERFORM BETTER THAN BAYESIAN 
CLASSIFIERS 
R: BAYESIAN CLASSIFIERS ARE OPTIMAL BUT CANNOT BE 
CONSTRUCTED WITH MANY VARIABLES 
H: VERY FAST PROTOTYPING 
R: ONLY FOR SMALL NETWORKS TRAINING AND DATA 
GATHERING TAKES TIME 
H: PARALLEL, THEREFORE FAST 
R: SERIAL IMPLEMENTATION, PRACTICAL VLSI 3-7 YEARS AWAY 
H: PATTERN RECOGNITION AND DETECTION IS EXTREMELY 
POWERFUL, ROBUST AND TOLERANT TO NOISE 
R: TRUE— > BUT MUST BE DESIGNED AND TRAINED 
* Adapted from  Russo and Lewy [1989], Miller [1990], and Widrow [1988]. 
A simple neural network will have three layers: 1) the input layer, 2) the 
hidden layer and 3) the output layer. The second layer has some form  of  in-
ternal representation that can be known or unknown. 
There are two major types of  neural networks: feedback  and feed-forward. 
Feedback nets or associative memories can store many template patterns by 
presetting the network weights. A feed-forward  multi-layer network is com-
posed of  rules (not templates) that are learned and stored as the weighted 
connections of  the network. 
Neural nets have been discussed as a family  of  technologies and/or im-
plementations of  similar nature. Among the types of  neural network ap-
proaches to learning and/or propagation and conflict  resolution, we find:  A) 
Grandmothering [Caudill, 1990], B) delta or least mean square rules (LMS) 
[Widrow and Hoff,  1960], C) Back-propagation [Rumelhart, McClelland et 
al., 1986], D) Kohonen self-organizing  network [Kohonen, 1984], E) Outstar 
learning [Grossberg, 1982], F) The avalanche model [Caudill, 1990], and G) 
Adaptive resonance theory [Grossberg, 1982]. 
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The Bell and Ribar paper used NeuralWare's software  (back-propagation) 
using 11 predictor variables in the input layer, and eight nodes in the hidden 
layer. It was trained using 102 banks from  the 1984 estimation sample and 
102 of  the non-failed  banks drawn randomly. The network was trained with 
about 300,000 iterations and after  the examination of  a Hinton diagram it was 
decided that two nodes were to be dropped. This model was compared with 
a rather different  logit model. 
A point to ponder, in this type of  comparison is that both the neural model 
and the logit model are the product of  substantial tinkering in the attempt to 
improve failure  predictability but there is no assurance that they provide any 
form  of  best predictor. Second, considering the model structure and data dif-
ferences,  it is not clear if  there is any information  superiority in one of  the 
approaches. The countervening approach would attempt to keep parity be-
tween the approaches at the cost of  not "best" utilizing its features. 
Some Further Issues 
Researchers differ  in approach and taste when dealing with particular prob-
lems. The authors should be encouraged to continue this line of  investiga-
tion. It is seldom that a commercial firm  endeavors in the examination of 
emerging technologies with the seriousness and methodological quality that 
is found  in this study. A few  suggestions however are of  relevance. 
This study lacks somewhat in the examination and comparison of  its re-
sults with the extant literature. Substantial insights may be acquired by bet-
ter positioning this methodological study in relation to the bank failure 
literature. Furthermore, the quality and nature of  predictions by the neural 
net model should be compared not only with the logistic model but also with 
the nature of  the findings  in the literature. Secondly, as discussed in the in-
troduction of  this paper, considerable insights of  a methodological nature can 
be acquired from  an examination of  better and worse performing  models and 
the nature of  the predictions obtained. 
The authors may also consider, after  some preliminary variable selection 
work, performing  their comparison on the same set of  variables as opposed 
to varying the basic variables set. The approach adopted by the authors may 
be confused  as a methodological improvement while the variance may have 
been explained due to the inclusion of  additional variables. 
The most important issue is that this study is a comparison of  the logit 
technology with a particular type of  neural net approach and algorithm, 
specifically,  the back-propagation method. Neural net, more than many other 
technologies, is a generic name for  many, often  non-similar approaches, and 
within each, dissimilar families  of  more similar types of  approaches are found. 
Consequently, this work tested a particular type of  neural net implementa-
tion versus the logit model. This study has not answered the question of  what 
type of  neural net approach or what type of  structure would be the most promis-
ing for  the bank failure  problem. 
In conclusion, the study found  neural net technology to have some promise 
in a bankruptcy prediction context. From the nature of  the findings  and of 
the approach, many fascinating  ideas for  extension and application to other 
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areas may follow.  For example, can a model be developed and trained to eval-
uate a sample taken in an audit, based on some of  its context variables, to in-
crease the probability of  finding  values in error? Can the same model be 
extended, not only to predict failure  but to rate and point out different  levels 
of  financial  distress? 
This paper deals with a very rich area and much was clearly learned just 
by manipulating the neural model to improve predictability of  bank failure. 
An interesting extension would be to compare different  neural algorithms 
among themselves and in relation to the logit model. 
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When all the AI rhetoric is boiled away, expert systems are simply com 
puter programs much like general ledger packages or even like video 
games. Writing a new payroll program in COBOL is not research, and 
neither is building another auditing expert system. 
1. Introduction 
Since the development of  AUDITOR at Illinois, there have been a num-
ber of  auditing expert systems designed and built by both academics and ac-
counting professionals.  For surveys of  this work, see Messier and Hansen 
[1987], Gal and Steinbart [1987], Bailey, Hackenbrack, De, and Dillard [1987], 
and Bailey, Graham, and Hansen [1988]. However, as encapsulated by the 
statement above, a continuing criticism of  this work (indeed, a criticism of 
any knowledge-based work in accounting) is that it constitutes more devel-
opment than research. In this paper, we contend that such blanket criticisms 
are unfounded  and are in fact  more attributable to a critic's lack of  schooling 
in computer science than to any conceptual shortcomings in the actual sys-
tems research methods. More specifically,  we will look at several auditing 
expert systems and evaluate them in terms of  some informally  developed dif-
ferentiation  heuristics, heuristics whose rationale depends heavily on the work 
of  March [1988] and Cohen and Howe [1988]. We will also try to chart new 
directions for  research in knowledge-based auditing systems. Our central pur-
pose throughout this paper is to try to develop a framework  of  analysis so 
that when someone proposes a new audit expert system or enhancements 
to an existing audit expert system, we can type its contribution as either pri-
marily research or primarily development or both. 
†Support in the development and preparation of  this paper was provided by the Department of 
Accounting at Michigan State University and Arthur Andersen & Co. Steve Rockwell provided 
numerous comments and criticisms. 
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The organization of  the paper is as follows.  Section two will explore the 
cognitive modeling rationale for  Al-based research in auditing. This reason-
ing is critical to our analysis framework,  but it has been explicated in detail 
elsewhere. It will only be reviewed and summarized here. Section three will 
explore the software  engineering legitimacy of  knowledge-based audit sys-
tems, i.e., a rationale that is quite a bit different  from  the cognitive modeling 
approach of  most accounting researchers. This section will explore that ra-
tionale as adapted from  a framework  developed by March [1988] and aug-
mented by other considerations gleaned from  the work of  researchers such 
as Cohen and Howe [1988]. The three subsections of  this software  engineering 
segment will address in order: (a) the March framework,  (b) a set of  argu-
ments concerning domain specificity  and maturity of  the research field,  and 
(c) some considerations involved in deciding whether to build an entire sys-
tem or to prototype just a part of  it. Section four  will explore time-lined de-
velopment of  four  academic audit expert systems and contrast their research 
content with that of  three bogus projects. The rationale developed previ-
ously in both sections two and three will be used in the comparison of  these 
four  real systems and three straw men. Section five  will explore the perspective 
of  the audit practitioners in AI tool development, and it will examine briefly 
areas where academics and practitioners can work together. Section six will 
finish  the paper with a summary of  our arguments. 
2. Cognitive Modeling Rationale 
A central theme which underlies the discipline of  accounting is the be-
lief  that accounting information  influences  decision making processes. This 
orientation has led both academicians and practitioners to be concerned 
with improving decisions that fall  within the accounting domain. There are 
basically three different  approaches that can be used to improve a decision. 
The first  is to provide better information.  A second is to train the decision 
maker to use the current information  set more effectively.  Finally, the deci-
sion maker can be replaced with a device that produces a consistent decision 
according to some prescribed model [Libby, 1981]. An initial issue that must 
be resolved prior to taking any of  these actions is to understand the current 
approach used to make the decision in question so that deficiencies,  if  they 
exist, can be evaluated. As a group, the decisions made by auditors have been 
used as the primary focus  of  a number of  projects as accounting researchers 
seek to understand the auditing decision process. In recent years, the infor-
mation-processing paradigm has been used in an increasing number of  these 
projects as researchers seek to uncover different  aspects of  the auditing de-
cision process. 
When auditors make a decision concerning the state of  internal controls 
or the importance of  a particular account balance to the completed financial 
statements, they must collect information,  combine it using some process, 
and then finally  produce a decision. The information-processing  paradigm of-
fers  a number of  different  approaches to investigate these activities. A re-
searcher can ask auditors to verbalize what they are doing as they make 
decisions. These verbal reports [Ericsson and Simon, 1980] provide a trace 
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of  the steps that the auditor goes through and thus give insights into the in-
formation  used, the combination processes employed, and the decisions pro-
duced. This verbal trace of  problem solving activities becomes a model of  the 
underlying cognitive process. A difficulty  with this approach is that it is hard 
to verify  the model. This deficiency  has led certain accounting researchers 
to use tools and methods borrowed from  computer science in an attempt to 
implement the model of  the auditor on a computer in the form  of  a program 
that simulates the auditor's decision process. The rationale for  building these 
systems is that the researcher now has a program which contains a cogni-
tive model of  the decision maker and can proceed with an assessment of  which 
of  the three approaches mentioned above would be appropriate to improve 
the decision. That is, should we change the information  or should we train 
auditors to use a different  process or finally  should we use the expert system 
to replace the auditor? 
As noted by Bailey et al. [1987], cognitive modeling has certainly provided 
the dominant justification  for  most expert systems work in auditing, and it is 
the rationale most easily accepted by mainstream accounting researchers. 
We turn now to a less well-known (in accounting) justification  for  construc-
tion and use of  AI tools in this area: the software  engineering rationale. 
3. Software  Engineering Rationale 
In describing the scope of  empirical  AI (as opposed to applied  AI)  endeavors 
and in contrasting its methodological differences  with those of  traditional be-
havioral science, Cohen and Howe observe that: "Whereas... much research 
in the behavioral sciences is concerned with teasing apart the components 
of  behavior and their causal interrelationships, empirical AI is concerned with 
putting those components together in one box to produce behavior" [1988, 
p. 18]. These researchers go on to say that the task of  empirical AI re-
searchers "is not to find  out [by statistical induction] how the average human 
organism (or organization) works; but rather to build artificial  systems that 
work in particular ways" [p. 19]. By building such systems in carefully  delin-
eated ways, they contend that we can produce useful  generalizations de-
ducible from  explanations of  AI theory. Cohen and Howe's thoughts in this 
regard echo sentiments expressed a number of  years earlier by Newell and 
Simon [1976, p. 126] who contended that the purpose of  AI research was to 
enrich our collective store of  concrete experiences with specific  classes of 
symbolic processing systems and to use that collective store to reason across 
domains about the general characteristics of  intelligence and its methods 
of  implementation. 
Justifications  such as these form  the basis for  what we call the software 
engineering rationale for  AI research in accounting and auditing. Stated dif-
ferently,  we believe that efforts  aimed at building knowledge-based systems 
in new and innovative ways in previously unexplored task areas can quite le-
gitimately be viewed as research even if  the results of  such efforts  do not strongly 
mimic the behavior of  a human expert in that particular domain. In the sub-
sections that follow,  we explore different  heuristic frameworks  that can be used 
to classify  endeavors in this vein as either research or development. 
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The March Framework 
In a speech given at ICIS-88, Sal March (the present editor of  Computing 
Surveys)  outlined his framework  for  identifying  information  technology issues 
for  information  systems researchers. That framework  is reproduced in Fig-
ure 1, and his explanation is given below [March, 1988]: 
My general framework  for  research in information  technology is 
two dimensional. The first  dimension is an engineering paradigm: build 
an artifact  to perform  a particular task, evaluate  the performance  of 
that artifact  (develop performance  measures and collect data to eval-
uate those measures), and prove the performance  of  the artifact  (su-
perior to another tool or optimal in some sense). The second dimension 
is a problem solving (methodological) paradigm: representation  of  the 
problem within its domain, development of  methods  utilizing the rep-
resentation to solve the problem, and tools  to instantiate the method. 
In order to build a tool to solve a problem, a representation of  the 
problem must be developed along with a solution method to instanti-
ate. The building of  tools based on given problem representations and 
methods typically does not qualify  as research unless it is the first  tool 
to be developed, in which case the research question is feasibility:  can 
the representation and method be instantiated into a viable tool? 
Similarly, for  building representations and methods, the research 
issues involve building new or substantially  different  representations 
and methods. Simply being "different"  or "novel" may classify  work 
as "research" (depending on how novel it is), however, the burden is 
normally on the researcher to demonstrate that the new representa-
tion or method is "better" than existing ones. The evaluate and prove 
columns of  the framework  addresses this issue. 
To adequately evaluate representations, methods, or tools, the re-
searcher must develop measures of  performance.  These must address 
the key issues of  the problem domain and the solution approach. The 
researcher then evaluates these measures for  various representations, 
methods, and tools to provide a performance  comparison. This type of 
work is typically empirical. It develops case by case comparisons until 
the discipline has decided upon a standard set of  measures. 
Given a standard set of  evaluation criteria, research can then pro-
ceed to prove the quality of  representations, methods, and tools. 
Proofs  may be in the form  of  "optimality" of  the solution or superior-
ity of  the representation, method, or tool (where the evaluation mea-
sures define  the optimization or comparison criteria). 
If  we apply the March framework  and explanation to proposed new work 
in knowledge-based audit systems, they give us strong guidelines for  differ-
entiating research from  development or empirical AI from  applied AI. As he 
infers,  building a new tool for  a task isn't really research unless the methods 
or representations change substantially or unless the researcher can demon-
strate performance  on well-developed evaluation metrics. For an audit re-
searcher today, novel representations might include new structures (such as 
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THE MARCH FRAMEWORK 
SOURCE: MARCH (1988) 
advanced forms  of  semantic networks [Winston, 1984]) and new problem-
solving architectures (such as heuristic classification  [Clancey, 1985]). Novel 
methods might encompass the use of  new learning algorithms or the discovery 
of  innovative knowledge acquisition techniques. Moving across to the eval-
uate and prove columns would mean building new systems that are demon-
strably better on tasks such as causal explanations or default  reasoning. 
Domain Specificity  and Maturity of  the Research Field 
According to the March framework,  building a new tool with established 
representations and methods teeters on the research-development fence  un-
less one is clearly the first  person to do something in the area. We believe 
that judgments of  novelty in this arena can be clarified  by considering both 
the domain specificity  of  the new effort  and the maturity of  the particular re-
search field  (or sub-field)  in which that effort's  exposition is to take place. 
These considerations are discussed below. 
Specificity  and maturity considerations are illustrated with hierarchies in 
Figure 2 whose roots are very general and whose leaves are audit procedures 


























































general one's conclusions are, the better; so staying up in the tree is desir-
able. In the three-dimensional plane of  this figure,  we have illustrated the age 
of  the research sub-field.  Our point in accounting for  time variability is that 
we believe that the proper set of  research activities changes as a field  ma-
tures. What is acceptable in an emerging area as exploratory research will 
often  be deemed far  less noteworthy as cumulative results dictate new di-
rections. 
For the proposer of  a new audit expert system today, these time se-
quenced hierarchies carry some important considerations. For instance, just 
finding  an unexplored node and building a tool which uses established rep-
resentations and methods is clearly not innovative enough unless the task is 
at a sufficiently  high level of  generality to warrant reassessment of  the lessons 
learned from  building entire classes of  previous systems. In a like manner, 
exploratory programming of  a new niche or sub-tree becomes less innova-
tive as time goes on because March's research question of  feasibility  has been 
resolved. In both of  these cases, the systems efforts  being proposed would 
fall  under the headings of  development or applied AI. 
Research and Development Delineation in Prototype Systems 
A fully  functional  expert system involves considerably more development 
effort  than research effort,  and designers will find  that the new knowledge 
gained from  building system components will decrease dramatically as the 
project progresses. Actually, prototyping to a proof  of  feasibility  is the essence 
of  research in AI tools, a fact  illustrated by McCarthy, Rockwell, and Walling-
ford  [1989] in their task complexity hierarchy of  Figure 3. 
When a new AI system is proposed, assessing its ultimate feasibility  in-
volves the following: 
a. breaking the operation of  the entire new system into its component 
procedures and arranging those components into a structured hi-
erarchy like Figure 3, 
b. assessing the relative implementation difficulty  of  the top level 
components and choosing the most complex module for  further  in-
vestigation, 
c. implementing a prototype of  that chosen module down to its full  depth 
of  complexity, and 
d. assessing overall feasibility  by combining estimates of  both width 
and depth of  effort  from  the preliminary structuring of  the overall 
task and from  the results of  the prototyping efforts. 
Empirical AI (research) would stop at this proof  of  feasibility  unless there 
was clear evidence that further  overall complexity (unrelated to individual 
module complexity/simplicity) might be introduced by full  implementation 
of  factors  such as scaling problems. Applied AI (development) on the other 
hand would continue with implementation of  the other components. Little new 
knowledge would be revealed by the development efforts,  but the entire pro-
ject would move closer to actual practical use in a cost-beneficial  way. 
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[Source: Adapted from McCarthy, Rockwell, and Wallingford (1989)] 
FIGURE 3 
PROTOTYPE MODULE STRUCTURE 
Summary of  Software  Engineering Rationale 
In their famous  Turing Award Lecture of  1975, Newell and Simon [1976, 
p.114] spoke of  the confusion  surrounding the scope of  basic research in com-
puter science: 
Computer science is an empirical discipline.... Each new program 
that is built is an experiment. It poses a question to nature, and its be-
havior offers  clues to an answer. Neither machines nor programs are 























and software,  and we can open them up and look inside. We can re-
late their structure to their behavior and draw many lessons from  a 
single experiment.... We build computers and programs for  many rea-
sons. We build them to serve society and as tools for  carrying out the 
economic tasks of  society. But as basic scientists, we build machines 
and programs as a way of  discovering new phenomena and analyzing 
phenomena we already know about. Society often  becomes confused 
about this, believing that computers and programs are to be con-
structed only for  the economic use that can be made of  them (or as 
intermediate items in a developmental sequence leading to such use). 
It needs to understand that the phenomena surrounding computers 
are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to assess their 
nature. It needs to understand that, as in any science, the gains that 
accrue from  such experimentation and understanding pay off  in the 
permanent acquisition of  new techniques; and that it is these techniques 
that will create the instruments to help society in achieving its goals. 
Newell and Simon summarize well our viewpoint about AI research in ac-
counting from  a software  engineering perspective. Building new software  sys-
tems that operate in innovative ways and that provide new insight constitutes 
significant  research activity as does the process of  creating or applying new 
methodologies, representations, and methods that facilitate  the construc-
tion of  such novel software  systems. Computer software  in general and, AI 
programming in particular, can legitimately be defended  as the end goal of 
accounting research, not just as a means to some other end such as the test 
of  a certain behavioral or economic theory. 
4. Some Research/Development Examples 
In the previous two sections of  the paper, we have outlined in preliminary 
fashion  some heuristic frameworks  which can be used to assess the research 
content of  a proposed Al-based audit tool. In this section, we will demonstrate 
the use of  those frameworks  in exploring the time- lined development of  four 
academic audit expert systems. We intend also to highlight their evaluation 
by contrasting their research content with three bogus expert systems. We 
have tentatively designated these bogus systems as YAK-BATs (Yet Another 
Knowledge-Based Auditing Tool), and they serve as prime straw men for  our 
research/development differentiation  arguments. 
Our example audit systems are displayed in the box in Figure 4 that por-
trays empirical  AI systems as bubbling up and above the dotted line sepa-
rating research and development and applied  AI systems as gravitating down. 
The four  real systems are AUDITOR [Dungan and Chandler, 1985], AUDIT-
PLANNER [Steinbart, 1987], GC-X [Selfridge  and Biggs, 1988], and IRE [Pe-
ters, 1989]. The three bogus systems are YAK-BAT-1, YAK-BAT-2, and 
YAK-BAT- 3; and we have positioned these straw men at particular time in-
tervals purposely to highlight the types of  proposed work properly classified 
as development. General features  of  each system are given in order below. 
AUDITOR: This was a simple rule-based system that used a linear weight-
ing system to assess the adequacy of  a client's allowance for  bad debts. It was 
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FIGURE 4 
ACADEMIC SYSTEMS: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
the first  publicized application of  knowledge-based methods and represen-
tations to the domain of  auditing, and it was certainly a pioneering research 
effort.  The system was developed and validated with a set of  working audi-
tors. 
YAKBAT-1: At the nascent stage of  the audit expert system field  in 1984-
85, it would be hard to think of  a proposed project which would not have shed 
some new light of  knowledge on the area. However, if  someone had proposed 
to use a known development shell on a fairly  low level task using well-
understood methods of  knowledge acquisition, we would consider that as 
sinking below the R&D surface.  This would be especially true if  there was 
no attempt made at emulation of  an acknowledged expert and/or validation. 
In those cases, the developer would simply have been using the technology 
for  automation of  ad hoc decision-making heuristics. 
AUDIT-PLANNER: This was a rule-based system with a much more com-
plex control structure than AUDITOR. AUDIT-PLANNER was truly a cog-
nitive model of  one individual's expertise in the area of  materiality judgments, 
so its research contribution is unquestioned. It was validated with subordi-
nate auditors of  the same firm.  The representations and methods used in build-
ing the system were well known, but the task was fairly  high on the domain 
hierarchy. 
YAKBAT-2: Steinbart's system circumscribed the entire materiality de-
cision very well, and it was essentially self-contained  in the sense that a con-
sultation with AUDIT-PLANNER elicited a set of  environmental cues from  a 
user and used those cues in its goal of  producing a materiality judgment. A 
tool developed later that would have concentrated heavily on the less com-
plex development branches (such as tuning the user interface)  or that would 
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have used the same rule-oriented representations to emulate a lower level 
audit task would fall  into the development or applied AI compartment. 
GC-X: The Selfridge  and Biggs going concern expert system introduced 
the complex representations of  semantic networks. They also demonstrated 
the complicated interactions between audit task knowledge and client domain 
knowledge that had long been thought to be an important ingredient of  audit 
expertise. 
YAK-BAT-3: This might be a frame-based  or rule-based expert system which 
would lack the domain richness of  GC-X. Certainly at this point in time, sim-
ple implementations of  somewhat specific  judgment tasks would lend little 
new insight to the field,  unless the tool could be moved over to the evalua-
tion or prove columns of  the March framework. 
IRE: The Inherent Risk Evaluator used complex representations of  both 
firm  specific  and general business knowledge along with specific  predictions 
derived from  analytical review rules to assess risk for  audit planning. The sys-
tem was validated carefully  on three sets of  case data, and its cognitive mod-
eling intent is quite clear. 
The research viability of  each real system discussed above is widely (but 
not universally) acknowledged in the auditing community. Their developers 
undoubtedly would cast them first  as cognitive models, but they all display 
innovation in a software  development sense also. Certainly, researchers 
would be wise to concentrate on the more widely accepted behavioral science 
rationale in their development of  proposed new projects. We remain convinced 
however that the technology-oriented rationale of  the prior section constitutes 
an additional basis on which to plan new work. 
5. The Accounting Firm Perspective 
As has been explained, research efforts  concentrate on pursuing more 
accurate representations or models of  cognitive processes while improving 
the methods for  evaluating the representation methods themselves. There-
fore,  academic efforts  focusing  on the particular use of  previously explored 
frameworks  are best characterized as development rather than research 
given our discussion to this point. 
Unlike academic researchers, professional  firms  tend not to be concerned 
about whether a particular project is characterized as research or develop-
ment. Rather, firms  focus  primarily on enhancing the efficiency  and effec-
tiveness of  audit practice instead of  understanding low level cognitive 
processes, exploring complex instances of  judgement, or developing formal 
methods of  evaluating concepts. This interest typically results in accounting 
firms  applying artificial  intelligence technology along two fronts:  (1) au-
tomating clerical or low level audit judgement tasks and (2) leveraging firm 
or individual expertise. 
Notwithstanding the profession's  disinterest in distinguishing between 
research and development, these projects often  result in significant  contri-
butions to academic research efforts.  Graphically, the results of  AI work 
amongst the firms  might be characterized as shown in Figure 5. Although 
the major portion of  a particular firm  project will likely be characterized as 
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development, a portion of  the effort  could legitimately be considered a re-
search contribution. 
The Contribution of  Practice to AI Research 
In a nutshell, we see practice efforts  providing two contributions to AI re-
search. First, the firms  may propose and utilize novel methods and repre-
sentations as well as provide well- developed metrics for  evaluation of  those 
methods and representations; and second, they expose the weaknesses of 
scalability of  academic theories and ideas. 
During the past few  years, a number of  firms  have released various ex-
pert systems which are in use today. To a limited extent, some of  these sys-
tems have provided a contribution to AI research by providing improved 
representation and evaluation methods. For illustrative purposes, we will 
briefly  review the contribution of  Coopers & Lybrand's new audit tool Risk 
AdvisorSM. 
As Graham, Damens, and Van Ness [1990] explain, "Risk AdvisorSM is 
an expert system based on the knowledge and experience of  senior audit and 
consulting professionals.  It is used by auditors to enhance the risk assess-
ment process through the systematic capture and analysis of  a wide range 
of  financial  information  and other data to allow the timely identification  of  audit 
and business issues." The system captures, analyzes, and reports informa-
tion ranging from  standard client, industry, and economy-wide financial  in-
formation  to qualitative information  captured through dialogue with the 
system. The system is utilized during audit planning to identify  and document 
potential audit risks and management issues which are important to the 
audit. Additionally, the system assists in analyzing whether appropriate ac-
tion is taken in response to the issues raised by the system during the plan-
ning process. 
Risk AdvisorSM certainly provides useful  contributions to the issues of 
knowledge acquisition from  more than one expert, knowledge representa-
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tion, and human/computer interaction. However, we believe the larger con-
tribution of  projects such as these lie more in their ability to address the "toy 
world" problems which have plagued academic efforts  for  years. 
Although execution of  a computational model serves a "proof  of  concept 
or feasibility"  which academics have used as their primary evaluation tool, 
the proof  is still susceptible to weaknesses of  scalability such as those often 
revealed by the overly simplistic application of  exhaustive search methods. 
Upon being tested in realistic decision support scenarios, the solutions of-
fered  by auditing academics sometimes prove insufficient  for  addressing 
problems in the real world. As Waterman [1986, p. 27] states, "When gross 
simplifying  assumptions are made about a complex problem, and its data, the 
resulting solution may not scale up to the point where it's applicable to the 
real problem." Projects such as those by Coopers & Lybrand certainly pro-
vide a test of  the scalability of  academic theories and thereby result in feed-
back to the academic community as to the adequacy of  academic research. 
Practitioners and Academics Working Together -
The Optimal Solution 
The primary contribution of  academic researchers in any field  is the low 
cost application of  analytical skills to problem solving. However, when aca-
demic efforts  are isolated from  the real world problems faced  by practition-
ers, the usefulness  of  the research wanes. Conversely, practitioners face 
real, complex, and important problems daily which can prove costly if  not ob-
jectively studied in a timely fashion. 
The logical conclusion to an analysis of  academic and practice efforts  in 
the use of  AI is that the two should work together. Such a consortium could 
possibly result in significant  enhancements to audit practice by providing sound 
solutions to real problems which have been carefully  scrutinized without the 
pressure of  the practice environment. To the extent that academics and prac-
titioners can enhance audit practice while also increasing our understanding 
of  audit judgement, significant  contributions can be expected. 
The reality of  the situation however, highlights significant  challenges to 
developing working relationships between practitioners and academics. The 
strategic nature of  AI projects tends to encourage confidentiality  of  project re-
sults at least in the short run while the firm  realizes the rewards of  being the 
"first-mover"  with a new idea. Such a practice is diametrically opposite to the 
nature of  the academic environment which attempts to distribute project re-
sults in a much more timely fashion  in order to encourage additional research. 
Although differences  are obvious, they are no greater than those faced 
in many of  the physical and engineering sciences in which universities and 
organizations work together on more sensitive issues of  national security as 
opposed to simpler marketing or operational advantages. We believe that any 
challenges can be overcome once practitioners and academics recognize 
the mutual benefit  of  working together. 
6. Summary 
This paper has reviewed the progress of  knowledge-based research pro-
jects in auditing, primarily in the academic section of  the field.  We outlined 
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some heuristic rules and frameworks  against which a proposed new audit tool 
could be evaluated and classified  as either fundamental  research or practi-
cal development. We readily admit that certain types of  expert systems are 
like COBOL payroll programs in the sense that they are simple computational 
exercises that add little to fundamental  knowledge. Building software  systems 
which make marginal  improvements with known  approaches in established 
domains is definitely  development activity, while building software  systems 
which make significant  improvements with novel approaches in unexplored 
domains is most certainly research. The difficulty  of  classification  lies in the 
middle which is where we have concentrated our discussion. Academic re-
searchers can follow  our guidelines in trying to stay above the research-de-
velopment surface. 
We remain very optimistic that work in this particular field  will continue 
to grow, along with knowledge-based research in other areas of  accounting 
as well. Expertise in professional  judgment will always be a scarce com-
modity on both public and corporate accounting staffs,  and AI research meth-
ods continue to offer  promising avenues for  both explanation and leveraging 
of  that expertise. The problems are interesting, the cognate field  (AI) set of 
solutions and research methods continue to grow, and the auditing practice 
imperative for  efficiency  and effectiveness  remains high. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Expert Systems and AI-Based Decision 
Support in Auditing: Progress and Perspectives" 
Dana A. Madalon 
Frederick W. Rook 
Price Waterhouse 
1. Introduction 
A critical issue affecting  progress in the development of  Al-based deci-
sion support systems for  auditing is the relationship between research and 
application development.  In order to present our view of  the relationship be-
tween these two concepts, it is useful  to first  discuss our perspective and back-
ground in both AI technology research and expert system development. 
As AI technology researchers, we have conducted research in knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge representation, natural language analysis and un-
derstanding, planning and design, and computational theory. For example, 
we have examined and advanced the use of  constraint satisfaction  problem 
formulations  as a method of  inferencing.  We recognize the extent to which 
the state of  AI technology is driven by research in the areas of  computer sci-
ence, computer engineering, cognitive psychology, decision sciences, oper-
ations research, human factors  engineering, and mathematical logic. To 
ensure the most effective  use of  these technical developments to the applied 
realm, we have worked closely with a number of  leading AI researchers. These 
include Dr. Robert Wilensky at the University of  California  Berkeley AI Re-
search Center, Drs. Judea Pearl and Rina Dechter at the Cognitive Systems 
Laboratory of  the University of  California  Los Angeles, Dr. Drew McDermott 
at the Yale University AI Project, Drs. B. Chandrasekaran and John Joseph-
son at the Ohio State University Laboratory for  Artificial  Intelligence Re-
search, and Dr. Andrew Sage at the George Mason University School of 
Information  Technology and Engineering. 
As expert system developers, we have designed, developed, and imple-
mented over thirty prototype and operational expert systems in a variety of 
application areas. Our expert systems have addressed such problem types 
as monitoring, diagnosis, assessment, risk analysis, resource allocation, 
scheduling, and planning. While we have successfully  fielded  operational ex-
pert systems, we have also met technological hurdles too great to be over-
come with today's technology. The foundation  of  our success in building expert 
system applications is the ability to leverage existing AI technology, i.e., 
technology that in many cases has been effectively  transferred  from  univer-
sity settings. 
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One of  the greatest challenges facing  both academia and industry is the 
effective  utilization  of  AI research results. Too often  research results fail  to 
be incorporated into the mainstream of  application development This paper 
briefly  identifies  some of  the reasons why. The overall goal of  the paper is to 
provide an industry perspective on several issues identified  in the paper by 
McCarthy, Denna, and Gal [1990]. In Section II, we discuss our view of  the 
difference  between research and development. In Section III, we discuss the 
issue of  bringing research results to bear on real-world problems. In Section 
IV we present a view of  how academia and industry should work together. 
Finally, we briefly  summarize our view of  the future  of  AI in accounting in 
Section V. 
2. Relationship of  Research to Development 
The McCarthy et al. paper focuses  considerable attention on the relationship 
between research and development. The central issue in examining research 
and development is defining  the relationship between the two processes. Re-
search in AI provides a technological foundation  upon which real-world ap-
plications can be developed. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The Relationship of  Research to Development 
The task of  classifying  a program into either research or development is 
not a difficult  one. Research advances the technology by yielding techniques, 
methods, models, or approaches that may be applied to a variety of  information 
processing requirements. For example, AI research in knowledge repre-
sentation has yielded such concepts/paradigms as production rules, frames, 


































matching algorithms, diverse search strategies, control mechanisms, etc.; re-
search in truth maintenance has yielded methods of  hypothetical reasoning, 
multiple hypothesis management, and parallel planning approaches. It is im-
portant to note that while a research program may in fact  be conducted 
under the umbrella of  a specific  problem area, e.g., inherent risk analysis, 
nonetheless its results have application to a variety of  domains. Two exam-
ples will illustrate this point. 
One example of  relevant research, due largely to Chandrasekaran [1985] 
revolves around the theory that there is a small number of  information  pro-
cessing tasks undertaken by humans while solving problems. The richness 
of  problem solving activity is due not to a large number of  problem classes, 
but to both the variety of  instances of  a particular class of  problems as well 
as the synthesis of  two or more problem types in a complex manner. Chan-
drasekaran and his colleagues have identified  six such generic tasks: 
• Hierarchical classification, 
• State abstraction, 
• Knowledge-directed information  passing, 
• Object synthesis by design, 
• Hypothesis matching, and 
• Abductive assembly of  explanatory hypotheses. 
The implication for  application is in representing, in an expert system for 
any domain, problem solving at the appropriate level of  abstraction, and 
these generic information  processing tasks serve this end. For example, ob-
ject synthesis is defined  as the process of  designing an object (selecting and 
organizing components) to satisfy  a set of  specifications.  Object is defined  in 
a very broad sense; it can be a physical entity such as a circuit board, or soft-
ware, or more abstractly, a concept such as an audit plan. Similarly, compo-
nents can be wires, circuitry, subroutines, or more abstractly, concepts, 
actions or sub-plans. 
Another area in which this research can be extended is in developing tech-
niques that permit efficient  extraction of  the type of  knowledge that these 
generic tasks entail. If  knowledge elicitation methods are developed that are 
specific  to these generic tasks, then a range of  human problem solving could 
be efficiently  elicited and represented, regardless of  domain. For example, 
research in the psychology of  problem solving has focused  on the modeling 
of  the associated cognitive processes as explicit information  processes. Pro-
tocol analysis [Ericsson and Simon, 1984; Waterman and Newell, 1971] is a 
form  of  data analysis that has been used to infer  underlying information  pro-
cesses from  a person's verbal utterances while solving a problem. In think-
ing aloud protocols (the form  of  interest to most AI researchers) the subject 
verbally solves a problem, saying everything that is on his mind, however slight 
or insignificant  it may seem to him. The verbalizations are transcribed and 
then analyzed. 
There are several steps to a rigorous protocol analysis [Ericsson and 
Simon, 1984]: 
• Create a tape of  the subject verbally solving a problem. 
• Transcribe the tape into segmentations of  individual topics or ideas. 
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• Create a key-word dictionary to represent the individual thought 
• Transform  the topic segments, via the dictionary, into semantic 
elements, consisting of  knowledge elements and operator ele-
ments. 
• Combine semantic elements into operator groups, each con-
sisting of  an operator and the knowledge it uses (input) and any 
new knowledge it creates (output). 
• Create a problem behavior graph which portrays the problem 
solving process; arcs into nodes represent knowledge currently 
possessed, nodes represent operators, and arcs emanating from 
nodes represent newly generated knowledge. 
The final  output of  protocol analysis, the problem behavior graph (PBG), 
reflects  the problem solving process at the lowest level of  abstraction, that 
of  primitive concepts and operators. These primitives can be written gener-
ically so that task-related meanings for  a particular domain can easily be sub-
stituted. Furthermore, if  the reasoning process is similar, the primitives for  an 
entirely  different  domain  may be substituted. 
Having discussed the role of  AI research as establishing the technical foun-
dation for  all application development, we now turn our attention to the in-
teraction of  research and development activities. A critical issue in examining 
research and development is appropriate recognition of  the role that each 
process plays in application or system creation. Both research and development 
in artificial  intelligence are largely driven by a domain problem as depicted 
in Figure 2. The domain problem generates 1) technology  issues that act as 
the driver of  research activities, and 2) requirements  that drive the applica-
tion development  process. Research activities are concerned with developing 
approaches, techniques, and methods that satisfy  the technology  issues of  the 
problem, while development activities focus  on the application of  existing tech-
nical approaches to the system requirements. The ultimate output of  the re-
search and development process is a completed system. This is not to say that 
every problem has issues associated with it that require research before  a 
system can be developed. In fact,  most systems are built to solve problems 
whose technological issues have already been studied and solved with ex-
isting methods. Also, all research does not have to be driven by a specific 
problem. However, research is not an aimless endeavor, but rather an activ-
ity whose goal is the contribution to the advancement of  a discipline. In the 
case of  artificial  intelligence that translates into technological advancements 
that lead to the enhanced efficacy  and usefulness  of  computer systems that 
solve real-world problems. 
Since the focus  of  research is on technological advances, results can con-
tribute to any number of  application areas. This concept is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3 and contrasts with the view presented in McCarthy et al. For example, 
advancements made in uncertainty propagation that result from  a require-
ment that emerged while developing an expert system for  auditing could po-
tentially enhance the effectiveness  of  an expert system for  portfolio 
management Furthermore, systems previously developed with mature tech-
nology may benefit  from  ongoing research. Our perspective on research and 
development differs  significantly  from  McCarthy et al.'s with respect to the 
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Figure 2. System Development as a Problem-Solving Process 
byproducts of  an application development process. McCarthy et al. appear to 
indicate that many expert system application development projects have an 
associated research component Our experience in expert system development 
is in sharp contrast. Our opinion is that most expert system application de-
velopments involve no AI research, but rather consist of  the application of  ex-
isting AI  technology. In fact,  we maintain that few  expert system development 
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DEVELOPMENT 
The process by which the technological advances are infused  into the sys-
tem development process is called technology  transfer  (depicted in Figure 2). 
This process is the single most difficult  aspect of  relating research to expert 
system development and is discussed in the next section. 
3. Issues In Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer,  i.e., bringing research results to bear on the real-
world problems of  industry, remains the critical, and most difficult  aspect of 
relating research to expert system development. There are several reasons 
for  this difficulty.  Two major ones, scalability and personnel, are addressed 
below. 
The utility of  research findings  is strongly correlated to the accuracy of 
assessing and modeling the characteristics of  the problem domain. Thus, one 
of  the most critical issues in technology transfer  is what has been termed the 
scalability  problem.  Waterman [1986] states "When gross simplifying  as-
sumptions are made about a complex problem, and its data, the resulting so-
lution may not scale up to the point where it is applicable to the real problem." 
We have observed, on several occasions, research activities based on a do-
main subset that assumed away critical problem characteristics such as in-
complete or conflicting  data, real-time processing requirements, and needs 
for  distributed, cooperative processing. The scalability problem involves the 
inability to transfer  technology approaches to the often  more complex, real-
world problem. 
Another source of  difficulty  with technology transfer  rests with the sys-
tem developers themselves. The most successful  expert system develop-
ment efforts  are those that are undertaken by bona fide  expert system 
developers, i.e., persons who are well-grounded in the underlying theoreti-
cal concepts of  artificial  intelligence and are educated in and experienced in 
expert system design and implementation. This foundation  enables: 
• Proper assessment up-front  of  system development feasibility. 
• Knowledge of  appropriate technologies to employ, e.g., what 
knowledge elicitation techniques would be most effective,  what 
knowledge representation formalisms  best correspond to the 
problem at hand. 
• Appropriate system design. 
• Identification  of  areas in which research may prove useful  and 
in what time-frame  results may be expected. 
• Efficient  system implementation. 
In general, domain experts do not make good system developers. First, ef-
fective  knowledge acquisition requires a level of  abstraction that an expert 
is unable to achieve by virtue of  his "expertness." In other words, since an 
expert thinks at a highly compiled level, it is difficult  for  him to effectively  re-
trieve the details of  his problem-solving process stored in long-term mem-
ory—a necessary step in transfering  knowledge to a computer. Second, 
domain experts are not usually educated in both their own field  and that of 
system design. 
79 
4. Academia And Industry Working Together 
We have outlined a framework  for  the process of  academia and industry 
working together. As depicted in Figure 4, in order to effectively  build and 
field  operational expert systems, it is necessary to employ both researchers 
and practitioners throughout the entire cycle. It is incumbent upon practitioners 
to remain abreast of  current research which will facilitate  knowledge of  meth-
ods, tools, approaches, etc. that emerge. Similarly, it is necessary for  the re-
search community to keep abreast of  the needs of  industry in order to most 
effectively  guide the tenor of  research activity. Understanding what problems 
are faced  by industry helps guide research towards such issues as knowledge 
representation, inferencing,  uncertainty handling, algorithms, etc. that even-
tually may help solve problems faster  and better. An example of  this coop-
eration between academia and industry is given below; it is followed  by an 
example of  research in identifying  the nature of  expertise that has implica-
tions for  future  development efforts. 
The problems of  auditing and audit planning have been the focus  of  a con-
siderable amount of  research and development activity. The Peat Marwick 
Foundation and the Graduate School of  Business of  the University of  Pitts-
burgh recently completed a 2-year research effort  to develop systematic 
methods of  risk assessment by trying to understand and model the risk as-
sessment process within auditing [Dhar, Lewis, and Peters, 1988]. The longer 
range goal was to provide a foundation  upon which an operational intelligent 
knowledge-based decision support system (expert system) to support audit 
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The results of  this effort  included: 
• There is a difference  between descriptions in the literature and 
what actually occurs in practice. 
• Auditors do not consider it appropriate to generate numeric es-
timates of  risk on an account-by-account basis. 
• Auditors prefer  to analyze a client's financial  statement using 
knowledge about changes. 
Additionally, the development of  the prototype model contributed sig-
nificantly  to the understanding of  the process of  inherent risk assessment which 
in turn helped fine-tune  the knowledge acquisition process to elicit otherwise 
unobtainable knowledge from  the experts. 
In a recent experiment, Ettenson, Shanteau, and Krogstad [1987] demon-
strate that it is the way information  is used, rather than the amount, that is a 
better indicator of  expertise. In their experiment, 10 audit partners and 11 
accounting seniors from  5 Big-Eight accounting firms  and 11 upper-level ac-
counting students who had completed at least one but not two formal  classes 
in auditing and had no formal  experience, were asked to evaluate account-
ing-related information  in making judgments of  materiality. 
The results demonstrated that while the strategies of  the students varied 
widely, the judgment of  the professional  auditor tended to reflect  one primary 
source of  information.  The professionals  also showed a high degree of  con-
sensus while the students did not. From an expertise standpoint, implications 
include: 
• Simplification  strategies may be an important characteristic of 
expert decision makers. 
• Elimination of  moves that are search intensive may increase 
performance,  i.e., further  research is needed in "information 
search" strategies of  experts. 
• Non-use of  information  by experts may reflect  "skilled omis-
sion" rather than a cognitive limitation. 
• Sheer amount of  information  is not a prerequisite to an experi-
enced decision, rather it is the intelligent use of  available infor-
mation. 
Implications for  developmental efforts  are obvious: if  a better under-
standing of  what makes an expert an "expert" is attained, then better knowl-
edge elicitation methods can be employed, better knowledge representation 
schemes can be developed, and expertise can be better replicated in a com-
puter. 
5. Future of  AI in Accounting 
The future  of  AI in accounting is a bright one. While there are several ex-
amples of  success in applying AI technology to develop expert systems that 
solve real-world problems, the field  is still in its infancy.  An assessment of  AI 
activity in the Big Six accounting firms  reveals that all firms  are actively en-
gaged in AI projects, ranging from  strategic systems for  internal use to the 
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establishment of  AI consulting groups. In addition, many universities are ac-
tively conducting AI research that has significant  implications for  account-
ing expert systems. 
It is important to realize that the very nature of  the fields  of  accounting 
and artificial  intelligence contributes to the current and future  state of  ac-
counting expert systems. Auditing is a mature discipline, with methods, ap-
proaches, and qualified  experts prevalent throughout the industry. In contrast, 
AI continues to rapidly evolve as the result of  research. Techniques and tools 
that are several years old are often  out-of-date.  A situation arises in which we 
are constantly applying a rapidly changing technical field,  AI, to a more sta-
ble, mature discipline, e.g., auditing. Therefore,  the application of  AI to au-
diting is still very much in its infancy.  The last several years have yielded more 
questions than answers about how best to develop auditing AI systems. Nev-
ertheless, current research activities and application development efforts 
will produce the foundation  for  further  infusion  of  AI into the auditing domain. 
The key to this foundation  development is the successful  integration of  re-
search and development. 
Most AI research will be conducted by universities. Most operational ex-
pert systems will be implemented by industry. Understanding the relation-
ship between research and development, the respective roles of  each 
community, and, most important, how the two can effectively  work together, 
will facilitate  the process through which accounting AI successes will evolve. 
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Analytical Procedure Results as Substantive 
Evidence* 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
Christine M. Haynes 
University of  Texas at Austin 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) allow two basic types of 
evidence to satisfy  the third standard of  fieldwork.  These are analytical pro-
cedure results and tests of  details of  transactions and balances. GAAS is 
clear that the third standard can be met with any combination of  the two that 
the auditor deems to be appropriate and GAAS makes no qualitative or "com-
petency" distinction between them. Yet, analytical procedure results are rou-
tinely subject to several biases not present in tests of  details. In this paper 
we clarify  conceptual differences  that may lead to an overassessment of  the 
competency or validity of  evidence provided by analytical procedures. 
Clarification  of  the biases inherent in analytical procedures is important 
given the increased emphasis on analytical procedures in professional  stan-
dards (e.g., SAS No. 39, 47, and 56 and SAARS No. 1), and its increased use 
in practice [Tabor and Willis, 1985]. Auditors may be substituting inferior  ev-
idence for  tests of  details with an attendant increase in achieved audit risk. 
Below we review the history of  analytical procedures and their regulation, 
analyze the essential features  and risks of  analytical procedures, and demon-
strate several sources of  bias in their use as substantive evidence. Finally, 
we provide some suggestions for  research on analytical procedures and a sug-
gestion for  a change in standards. 
1. History of  Analytical Procedures in Auditing 
Essentially, analytical procedure results as substantive evidence are eval-
uations of  the reasonableness of  the assumption of  no material misstatement 
in aggregate recorded amounts, given the auditor's other knowledge. Ana-
lytical procedures do not encompass examination of  details supporting the 
validity of  particular items comprising a recorded population. Thus, the sub-
stantive validity of  any item or group of  items is not determined directly. 
The origin of  analytical procedure results as substantive evidence is un-
clear. Stringer and Stewart [1986, p. 15] cite a Deloitte Haskins & Sells audit 
*We acknowledge the helpful  comments of  Urton Anderson, Sarah Bonner, Vicky Heiman, Lisa 
Koonce, Linda McDaniel and Garry Marchant, and we wish to thank Larry Logan of  Deloitte & 
Touche for  providing a technical document. 
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manual describing the use of  analytical procedures in the 1930s and they had 
reason to believe that the manual merely codified  existing practices. Deloitte 
& Touche provided us with a copy of  Bulletin 302-1 from  the 1939 edition of 
DH&S Technical Procedures Manual. It is reproduced in Figure 1. The Bul-
letin was a revision of  the original 1935 version and was intended to elimi-
nate any confusion  about the use of  analytical procedures. While the Bulletin 
may have fallen  short of  that goal, it provided a number of  interesting points. 
For example, analytical procedures were regarded as "fundamental  and in-
dispensable" in audits involving an income statement "regardless of  the ex-
istence or absence of  internal control." Analytical procedures were intended 
as a substantive test since they were an "effort  to prove its substantial cor-
rectness as far  as is practicable without systematic audit of  the transactions." 
Finally, in contrast to current professional  standards, there is no mention of 
inquiry of  management as an important source of  an explanation for  an un-
expected material difference. 
Figure 1 
Technical Procedures Manual 
Haskins & Sells 
(1939 edition) 
Bulletin 302-1 
ANALYTIC REVIEW OF OPERATING ACCOUNTS 
This is written with a view to clearing up any misunderstanding there may be regarding the reasons 
for  and procedure of  reviewing the accounts comprehended in and culminating in the net income or loss for  a 
period, and as to when such procedure should be applied. 
In a general audit we go no farther  in systematic auditing than to test the original records, so that 
there is a considerable part of  the period that is not covered by the systematic audit of  transactions. It is 
therefore  necessary to supplement the audit tests by review of  the transactions for  the entire period. As a 
matter of  fact,  it is more logical to regard the systematic audit tests as superimposed upon the general 
analytic review than to regard the review as supplementing the audit tests. At all events, the analytic 
review of  operating accounts should be regarded as fundamental  and indispensable, in any engagement where 
the report is to include, and the certificate  to cover, a statement of  income and surplus--or any of  its 
variants--regardless of  the existence or absence of  internal control. 
The procedure in making an analytic review of  operating accounts can be outlined only generally. 
It involves subjecting each detail operating, income, profit  and loss, and surplus account to rigid scrutiny, 
and to some extent to detailed analysis, in an effort  to prove its substantial correctness as far  as practicable 
without systematic audit of  the transactions. Such review and analysis calls for  the exercise of  a high 
degree of  judgment and discrimination. The remarks to follow  should be regarded as only suggestive of  the 
general course to be followed,  subject to such amplification  and adaptation as may be necessary to meet the 
peculiar needs of  individual situations. It should be understood also that these remarks pertain only to the 
analytic review and do not purport to cover all the work to be done on the operating accounts in a general 
audit 
Each operating account (using the term in its generic sense) as it appears in the ledger or other 
record should be scrutinized in order to determine whether or not the entries have varied materially from 
month to month during the year under review, and any material variation should be investigated. In some 
cases, especially where businesses are seasonal, such monthly comparisons should be made with the 
corresponding months of  the preceding year or two. A detailed statement of  the operating accounts should 
be prepared for  the year and for  at least one preceding year (preferably  two or three) in parallel columns, and 
the respective items for  the respective years should be compared. If  there are divisions or branches of  the 
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business, the accounts for  each should be considered separately and in relation to one another. All 
significant  ratios and averages should be computed for  the purpose of  making comparisons. The ratios 
would include, for  an industrial business, the ratio of  returns, allowances, etc. to gross sales and the ratios 
to net sale of  cost of  goods sold and of  each item, or appropriate group of  items, of  selling, administrative, 
and general expenses. For certain expenses such as purchasing and receiving (if  kept separate), the ratio of 
purchases is a better standard of  comparison than the ratio to sales. Every material difference  as indicated by 
all these comparisons should be investigated to the point of  determining, as nearly as practicable, that it is 
proper or improper. The working papers should show all matters investigated and the results of  the 
investigations. 
The cost of  sales should be examined, and considered in relation to the sales, inventory, and 
accounts payable. The account for  cost of  sales, and its principal tributary accounts, such as cost of 
production, should be analyzed, as to essential features  and important amounts, so that the composi-
tion of  the accounts will be thoroughly understood. The method of  determining charges for  material, 
labor, and overhead should be critically investigated. The gross-profit  ratios for  the current and pre-
ceding periods should be computed. The inventory turnover rate should be computed, if  practicable 
as to classes of  goods (i.e., finished  product, raw materials, etc.), for  the current period and at least 
one preceding period, by dividing the cost of  goods sold or used by the average inventory. If  there is 
any indication that the cost does not bear the proper relationship to sales, or is otherwise incorrect, 
the various elements entering into the cost should be examined as exhaustively as may be necessary 
in order to determine the cause of  the difference. 
Among the other accounts which should be examined with respect to operations from  month to 
month and period to period, and with respect to their relation to other accounts, such as sales or gross 
earnings, or in some cases, assets or liabilities, specific  mention may be made of  the following: 
Sales and wages 
Income from  interest and dividends 
Interest expense 
Taxes 
Income or expense for  rents, royalties, and commissions 
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization 
Repairs and maintenance 
Direct charges and credits to surplus 
It is thought that the foregoing  explains the analytic review of  operating accounts sufficiently  so 
that the underlying purpose of  the review and the method of  procedure will be understood, as applying not 
only to the accounts that have been mentioned specifically,  but also to any other operating, income, profit 
or loss, and surplus accounts that may be encountered in practice. 
December 1935 - Revised September 1939 
We scanned the Accountant's  Index  and were unable to locate any specific 
references  to analytical review in the practice or scholarly literature prior to 
1961. Mautz and Sharaf  [1961] discuss what might be called analytical pro-
cedures including the terms "analytical and comparative review," "interrela-
tionships" and "correlations" among "related data" [Mautz and Sharaf,  1961, 
pp. 28, 86, 93, 100-101], According to Mautz, these ideas were not new but 
reflected  existing practices, at least at DH&S. Mautz was employed by DH&S 
for  a time during the 1940s and was later a consultant on an analytical review 
project [private correspondence from  Mautz, December 23, 1989]. 
The first  official  recognition of  analytical (review) procedures in profes-
sional standards appeared in November 1972 with the issuance of  Statement 
on Auditing Procedures No. 54 [AICPA, 1972]. This statement, entitled The 
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Auditor's  Study  and  Evaluation  of  Internal  Control,  established that the evi-
dential matter required by the third standard could be met through "analyt-
ical review of  significant  ratios and trends and resulting investigation of 
unusual fluctuations  and questionable items" [para. 70]. Further, "Regard-
less of  the extent of  reliance on internal accounting control, the auditor's re-
liance on substantive tests may be derived from  tests of  details, from  analytical 
review procedures, or from  any combination of  both that he considers ap-
propriate in the circumstances" [para. 73]. This official  guidance as to allowable 
proportions of  substantive evidence has remained unchanged over two major 
revisions of  analytical procedure guidance. 
SAS No. 23 [AICPA, 1978], entitled Analytical  Review Procedures,  officially 
established guidance on the identification  and investigation of  significant 
"unusual fluctuations."  It defined  analytical procedures as "substantive tests 
of  financial  information  made by a study and comparison of  relationships among 
data" [para. 2]. SAS No. 56 [AICPA, 1988], entitled simply Analytical  Proce-
dures,  provides a more precise definition  as to what constitutes analytical pro-
cedures. Specifically,  analytical procedures "consist of  evaluations of  financial 
information  made by a study of  plausible relationships among both financial 
and non-financial  data." It continues the basic premise underlying the appli-
cation of  analytical procedures stated in SAS No. 23 that: "relationships 
among data may reasonably be expected by the auditor to exist and continue 
in the absence of  known conditions to the contrary" [para. 2]. 
This basic premise is reasonable-if  a prior relation observed, under con-
ditions apparently free  from  material misstatement, continues in the audit pe-
riod, then the current values are, probably, also free  from  material misstatement 
The caveat "absence of  known conditions to the contrary" provides for  up-
dating the auditor's model but doesn't establish a standard for  how the au-
ditor is to "know" about conditions to the contrary. Must the auditor search 
for  or test for  changes in prior relations or just be aware of  known or possi-
ble changes that are more or less obvious to the casual observer? Is positive, 
rather than negative, assurance required for  assessing possible changes? 
SAS No. 56 focuses  on unexpected differences  (rather than fluctuations) 
and is explicit as to the role of  expectations. It states: 
Analytical procedures involve comparisons of  recorded amounts, 
or ratios developed from  recorded amounts, to expectations developed 
by the auditor. The auditor develops such expectations by identifying 
and using plausible relationships that are reasonably expected to exist 
based on the auditor's understanding of  the client and of  the industry 
in which the client operates [para. 5]. 
In identifying  differences  that may require analytical investigation, SAS 
No. 56 [para. 11-12] lists three factors  related to the diagnosticity of  the pro-
cedures. These are: 1) the plausibility and predictability of  the relations, 2) 
the availability and reliability of  data on which the expectations are developed, 
and 3) the precision of  the expectation. The first  suggests a causal model rather 
than merely a "casual" association while the second requires that the audi-
tor base expectations on data other than the recorded values themselves. Fi-
nally, the third makes it clear that the auditor should consider whether a 
procedure could find  an intolerably-in-error "needle" in a haystack [Kinney, 
1987; Loebbecke and Steinbart, 1987]. 
As to investigation and evaluation of  significant  differences,  SAS No. 56 
allows a range of  differences  that can be accepted without further  investiga-
tion and a range that should be investigated. In regard to investigation it states: 
The auditor should evaluate significant  unexpected differences.  Re-
considering  the methods and factors  used in developing the expecta-
tion and inquiry of  management  may assist the auditor in this regard. 
Management responses, however, should  ordinarily  be corroborated 
with other evidential matter. In those cases when an explanation for 
the difference  cannot be obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient 
evidence about the assertion by performing  other audit procedures 
to satisfy  himself  as to whether the difference  is a likely misstatement. 
In designing such other procedures, the auditor should consider that 
unexplained differences  may indicate an increased risk of  material mis-
statement [para. 21] (emphasis added). 
This paragraph, especially the highlighted terms, provides much of  the 
basis for  our concerns about the comparative competence of  analytical pro-
cedures and their tendency to understate achieved risk. We will return to it 
in the next section. 
Passage of  SAP No. 54 and SAS No. 23 was followed  by practitioner and 
scholarly discussion of  the reliability of  analytical review. For example, Mont-
gomery's  Auditing  (9th ed.) [Defliese,  Johnson, and Macleod 1975, p. 145] cham-
pioned the use of  analytical review over tests of  details under conditions of 
weak  internal control while Cushing and Loebbecke [1983] took the oppo-
site position. The latter view seems to have prevailed in that Montgomery's 
Auditing  (10th edition) [Defliese,  Jaenicke, Sullivan, and Gnospelius 1987, 
p. 341-42] discusses 100 percent reliance on analytical procedure results 
when controls are strong. 
Even though SAP No. 54, SAS No. 23 and SAS No. 56 did not indicate that 
analytical evidence was in any way inferior  to tests of  details, there was such 
an indication from  practitioners. Ernst and Whinney placed restrictions on 
the reliance that can be placed on analytical procedures [Grobstein and 
Craig, 1984, p. 14]. Montgomery's Auditing stated that analytical procedures 
produced a "subjective, deductive type of  audit evidence" rather than the "ob-
jective type of  evidence showing 'it is there or not there' which results from 
the other auditing procedures" [Defliese  et al., 1975, p. 145].1 The tenth edi-
tion of  Montgomery's Auditing stated that, relative to analytical procedures, 
tests of  details are less efficient,  but tests of  details "commonly provide a higher 
level of  assurance with respect to an audit objective" [Defliese  1987, p. 340] 
(emphasis added). Blocher and Willingham [1985] were even more explicit 
about the relative assurance. They stated: 
To evaluate the strength of  the evidence from  analytical review, 
we must consider that analytical review provides a negative-type  as-
1The same source later defines  evidence as "objective if  it requires little judgment to evaluate 
its accuracy" [Defliese  et al. 1987, p. 158]. 
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surance rather than a positive one. That is, though analytical review 
can be a useful  technique for  detecting a material misstatement, it can-
not be relied upon to confirm  with positive assurance that a mis-
statement is not present. Positive assurance comes only from  the 
proper application of  the appropriate detail tests procedures. Thus, the 
auditor can never rely exclusively on analytical review when risk or 
materiality is high [p. 10]2 (emphasis added). 
Two recent behavioral studies of  practicing auditors are consistent with 
this view. Both Biggs, et al. [1989] and Cohen and Kida [1989] found  that au-
ditors are reluctant to reduce tests of  details even when analytical procedure 
results seem to support a reduction. 
The large CPA firms  have different  histories and different  degrees of  re-
liance on analytical procedures. As mentioned above, the first  reference  to 
analytical procedures as evidence came from  DH&S. SAP No. 54 was chaired 
by Kenneth Stringer of  DH&S and his firm  was an early champion of  statis-
tical analytical procedures as substantive evidence. Stringer [1975], and 
Stringer and Stewart [1986] described a system entitled Statistical Tech-
niques for  Analytical Review in Auditing. It used time series and cross sec-
tional regression models to identify  likely-to-be-in-error segments of  an 
account or transaction class. Stringer [1975] also discussed the importance 
of  the auditor's "analytical investigation" to determine the likely cause of  a 
deviation. Some other firms  have also used regression analysis (e.g., Price 
Waterhouse, [Akresh and Wallace, 1982, and Walker and Pierce, 1988] and 
Arthur Andersen [Koster, 1981]). 
Statistical analytical procedures have had less usage in most firms,  even 
including one (Peat Marwick) that is highly structured [Wright and Ashton, 
1989, p. 722-723 and Elliott, 1984]. Also, analytical procedures of  various 
types are used for  different  purposes. For example, Ernst & Whinney uses 
different  analytical procedures for  understanding the client's business, for  in-
herent risk assessment and as substantive evidence [Grobstein and Craig, 
1984]. Finally, in contrast to the DH&S regression-based approach to ana-
lyzing an account, Montgomery's  Auditing  (Coopers & Lybrand) seems to de-
fine  the focus  of  analytical procedures to be on "ratio and trend analysis" 
[Defliese,  et al. 1987 p. 156] and is unclear about the extent to which the re-
sults provide substantive evidence. 
Thus, a variety of  analytical procedures have been used to meet various 
objectives. Because of  these differences,  we will try to be very specific  as to 
procedures and their usage in the comparative competency assessment that 
follows. 
2SAARS No. 1 [AICPA, 1978] and other AICPA-sanctioned review reports seem to provide at 
least implicit support for  this view. These reports are characterized as providing only "limited" 
assurance that is expressed in negative form.  The distinction is relevant since the review reports 
are based on only analytical procedures and inquiry of  management. 
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2. Comparative Competency of  Analytical Procedures 
vs. Tests of  Details 
For the purpose of  comparing reliability (or competency or validity) of 
tests of  details and analytical procedures results as substantive evidence, as-
sume that audit sampling is used for  tests of  details, that a single account re-
gression analysis is used to identify  differences  for  analytical procedures, and 
that both tests are for  overstatement. Figure 2 shows the aggregate audited 
account balance Y (say, sales) expressed as (1) the sum of  N error free  y's 
or sales amounts per sales invoices, and as (2) a function  of  the true relation 
between Y and an independently obtained explanatory variable X (say, industry 
sales), and a random unexplained portion, e.3 
Figure 2 
Example Upper Confidence  Limit Formulations 





Upper Confidence  Limit: 
Analytical Procedures 1) 
Y = α + βX + e 
Y = α + βX 
E = Yb - Y 
UCL = E + ZAPR se (pred) 
Tests of  Details 
Y = Σy 
Y= Ny 
E = Y b - Y 
UCL = E + ZTDR s/√  n 
1) Y = audited balance for  the year t 
y = audited balance of  account or transaction class element in year t 
y = average y for  a random sample of  n < N items 
X = "causal" variable value for  year t 
E = error for  year t 
^ = estimated 
Yb = recorded or "book" amount 
APR = risk of  incorrect acceptance using analytical procedures 
TDR = risk of  incorrect acceptance using tests of  details 
3 Although in practice there would likely be a partitioning of  Y by plant, by product line or by 
subperiod of  time, we will use a single estimate for  simplicity. Also, for  simplicity we will assume 
that simple random sampling is used and that a single causal variable X is considered in the au-
ditor's model. 
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Figure 2 also shows the estimate of  Y (Y)given audited values of  a ran-
domly selected sample of  n items and an independent estimate of  Y given X 
and the auditor's estimates of  a and β. Again, for  the purpose of  comparison, 
imagine a case in which the two techniques yield the same point estimate of 
error and that the standard error of  the estimate in tests of  details (s/√n) is 
equal to the standard error of  the regression prediction (se(pred)). Thus, the 
two procedures yield the same upper confidence  level (UCL) on error. If  the 
UCL is just under the minimum intolerable error (MIE), which procedure 
do you think yields more reliable or more competent evidence? 
Figures 3 (tests of  details) and 4 (analytical procedures) show that each 
of  the procedures has two general failure  points; that is, points at which the 
auditor can be led incorrectly to accept a balance that is "intolerably" in 
error. For tests of  details (audit sampling), the points are: (1) the selection 
of  a sample which has smaller book values and/or contains proportionately 
less error than what exists in the population as a whole (sampling error), and 
(2) error in selecting or applying the auditing procedure such as selections 
from  recorded amounts to test the completeness assertion or failing  to note 
an error in a sampled item (non-sampling error). The first  risk can be mea-
sured within the limits of  sampling error, and auditing standards assume that 
the second can be made negligible by quality control procedures [SAS No. 
39, para. 11 and SAS No. 47, para. 20]. 
For analytical procedures, the two points of  potential failure  are (1) the 
identification,  estimation and refinement  of  the expectations model, and (2) 
the analytical investigation of  differences  from  the resulting expectations. For 
the first,  the auditor may incorrectly specify  the causal relations between in-
dependent variables and the account under audit, may misestimate the co-
efficients  or the allowable range of  deviation, or may fail  to note changes in 
the relations or may incorrectly revise the model based on management's sug-
gested explanation. For the second, the auditor may incorrectly accept a non-
error explanation and revise the expectation sufficiently  to yield UCL < MIE 
when the account is intolerably overstated. Figure 5 presents a numerical ex-
ample of  how the second step can inflate  the achieved audit risk. The first 
stage is based on achieving a risk of  incorrect acceptance of  .05. In the ex-
ample, the second stage adds .15 to that amount for  an achieved audit risk 
of  .20 over a number of  audits (see Kinney, [1989] for  an elaboration of  the 
need for  sequential analysis in auditing). 
In the paragraphs to follow,  we discuss a series of  potential and likely bi-
ases that lead us to conclude that the application of  analytical procedures is 
likely to understate the risk of  incorrect acceptance. The basic causes of  the 
biases are both statistical and behavioral, and are, in part, induced by pro-
fessional  standards themselves. 
A fundamental  competency advantage of  tests of  details is that for  sam-
pled items (and absent non-sampling error), misstatement is ruled out or con-
versely, "correctness" or validity of  each recorded y is positively  established. 
The test can lead to incorrect acceptance only through sampling variation or 
sampling error. For analytical procedures, the correctness of  an item or 
group of  items is not positively established, by definition.  Thus, a second in-
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Figure 3 






1) MIE = minimum intolerable error for  the assertions being tested for  overstatement 
A = accept recorded value as not intolerably overstated. 
R = reject recorded values as possibly intolerably overstated. 
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Randomly select 
sample n items 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































ference  is always required for  analytical procedures. Specifically,  if  the un-
explained differences  are small, then intolerable error in the overall account 
balance is inferred  to be negligible. 
Statistical Biases 
At the model identification,  estimation and refinement  stage, the auditor 
is developing a basis for  expected audited values. The auditor faces  several 
risks that increase the variance of  outcomes and some that bias results to-
ward incorrect acceptance. They relate to the model used and the data to which 
it is applied. Many of  these difficulties  are well known. 
First, the auditor may fail  to include variables that are causal. This risk 
can be reduced by auditor expertise in the client's industry. The auditor may 
also include Xs that are not causally related to Y. Here, the risk is over-iden-
tifying  the model or including variables that are spuriously correlated with 
Y in the base period but are uncorrelated in the prediction period. Thus, vari-
ables which by chance have high correlation in the base period are inap-
propriately included for  the prediction period. Finally, the auditor may fail  to 
notice that the parameters of  included variables have changed between the 
base and the prediction periods. 
While these phenomena may lead to incorrect acceptance, they may also 
lead to incorrect rejection. There is no reason to expect a statistical bias. How-
ever, as described in the next subsection, the analytical investigation stage 
of  the process can lead to a model building bias toward incorrect acceptance. 
Specifically,  the identification  of  an unexpected difference  can lead the au-
ditor to search in a biased  fashion  for  omitted non-error causal variables. That 
is, the auditor's search for  omitted variables is caused by the identification 
of  an unacceptable difference  (UCL ≥ MIE) and the ensuing search for  an 
explanation naturally leads to a higher probability of  including a non-error  cause 
that reduces the UCL. For example, suppose that the audit year cost of  sales 
contains an unexpected increase in labor costs of  $10, an unexpected decrease 
in materials cost of  $10 and an inventory counting error of  $10 that under-
states the expense. As a result, cost of  sales is $10 less than expected and 
the auditor searching for  an explanation would be more likely to detect the 
decrease in materials cost than to detect the increase in labor cost or the ac-
counting error.4 Thus, the biased search for  an omitted causal explanation 
can lead to failure  to detect misstatements. 
Second, erroneous or irrelevant data also have both positive and nega-
tive aspects with respect to incorrect acceptance of  accounts with intolera-
ble total error. Bad data in the base period may prevent reliance on statistical 
analytical procedures. For example, random measurement error in the X vari-
able for  the base period will lead to estimates of  β biased toward zero, and 
an inflation  of  the standard error of  the regression (se) will cause the audi-
tor not to rely on regression since the UCL will tend to be high. Thus, ran-
4SAS No. 56 [para. 18] warns that "offsetting  factors  may obscure misstatements," e.g., an un-
expected nonerror understatement could hide an error-caused overstatement Yet the auditor 
trying to explain a UCL ≥ MIE would have no reason to look for  a non-error factor  that would 
increase the UCL! 
94 
dom measurement error in the base period X values leads to an incorrect 
rejection or efficiency  bias. Nonrandom measurement error leads to less pre-
dictable results. However, since the base period has been audited, there is 
reduced risk of  bad data in the base period. The potential problem of  inten-
tionally misstated X data for  the prediction period is one reason that Cush-
ing and Loebbecke [1983] argued for  strong internal controls as a requisite 
for  reliance on analytical tests. 
We have labeled this subsection "statistical" biases. However, the risks 
and biases apply to a non-statistically-based procedure as well as to statisti-
cally-based procedures. Subjectively or judgmentally failing  to consider an 
important causal variable can bias one's judgment about the results to be ex-
pected. Also, a lack of  quantification  of  estimates may lead to unrealistic as-
sessments of  effects  and to systematic underestimates of  the normal variation 
in expected values [Tversky and Kahneman, 1971]. The latter behavioral ten-
dency will cause the UCL to be too low and lead to increased risk of  incor-
rect acceptance. This inability to signal or "flag"  intolerable (or even material) 
misstatements seems to be especially probable when considering ratios 
based on aggregate values.5 
Behavioral Biases 
At the stage of  evaluating analytical procedure results, SAS No. 56 sug-
gests several practices that are almost sure to lead to an increase in the risk 
of  incorrect acceptance. For accounts for  which the UCL equals or exceeds 
MIE, paragraph 21 of  SAS No. 56 (reproduced earlier) provides guidance for 
follow-up.  Specifically,  it lists five  ways in which the process is biased toward 
incorrect acceptance when an unexpected difference  is noted. Rather than 
considering possible misstatement, the first  suggestion in paragraph 21 is that 
A 
the auditor "reconsider" the model used to develop the expectation (Y) and, 
second, it indicates that "inquiry of  management" may assist in this regard 
(is management likely to suggest fraud  or error as the cause?). Third, as to 
corroborating management's suggested explanations, paragraph 21 states that 
they "should ordinarily be" corroborated (but not always?). Fourth, appar-
ently only in those cases in which "an explanation for  the difference  cannot 
be obtained" the auditor should apply other procedures to rule out mis-
statement. Finally, in designing other procedures, the auditor should consider 
that "unexplained differences  may indicate an increased risk of  material mis-
statement." It seems clear that the risk of  such misstatement is increased if, 
indeed, no non-misstatement explanation can be found  for  the difference.  That 
is, if  all other factors  have been ruled out, then all that is left  is chance or mis-
statement. Thus, paragraph 21 of  SAS No. 56 focuses  attention on non-error 
causes that may bias the auditor toward incorrect acceptance. 
In addition to the possible bias due to the official  guidance, the psychol-
ogy literature has identified  several biases that decision makers often  exhibit 
when making probabilistic judgments. Auditing is characterized by complex 
probabilistic judgments and much of  behavioral auditing research has focused 
5For further  caveats about the problem of  weak diagnosticity, see Grobstein and Craig [1984, 
p. 14], Loebbecke and Steinbart [1987] and Kinney [1987]. 
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on auditors' biases in making such judgments. The research discussed below 
is a sample of  the studies indicating possible behavioral biases that may re-
sult in an understatement of  achieved audit risk through the application of 
analytical procedures as substantive tests. The biases are grouped accord-
ing to whether they apply during the audit in determining a possible expla-
nation of  an unexpected difference  (hypothesis generation), or in revising 
assessed probabilities of  possible causes, or after  the audit is completed and 
results are evaluated by others. 
Hypothesis Generation 
The availability bias refers  to the tendency of  a decision maker to judge 
the frequency  of  an event by the ease with which similar events come to mind 
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1973]. Events may be salient because they are 
sensational or vivid or because they have been experienced frequently.  Libby 
[1985] asked auditors to hypothesize up to six errors that might explain un-
usual analytical review results and to rate the likelihood that each error 
caused the fluctuation.  Results indicated that the likelihood of  each error was 
affected  by its perceived frequency,  its actual frequency  and the recency with 
which the error had been encountered by the auditors. These results for  error 
causes are disturbing if  analytical review is to be used as substantive evidence. 
We know of  no archival data on non-error explanations of  unexpected dif-
ferences.  However, if  the auditor has frequently  or recently encountered 
non-error  causes when evaluating significant  fluctuations  in other clients' fi-
nancial statements, he or she may be too easily persuaded that a currently 
observed fluctuation  is also due to a non-error  cause. As a result, achieved 
audit risk may be understated. 
Output interference  occurs when knowledge already retrieved from  mem-
ory hinders the retrieval of  additional items (see Nickerson [1984]). Fred-
erick [1988] found  experienced auditors to be affected  by output interference. 
Auditors studied lists of  internal controls and then were asked to recall the 
controls. Half  of  the auditors were presented with a partial list of  previously 
learned internal controls; the other half  received no cues. Auditors without 
the cues recalled more controls on the recall task than did those provided 
with the partial list. 
Output interference  may cause auditors to misdiagnose significant  fluc-
tuations in analytical review results. If  the auditor asks client management 
to explain a deviation, the non-error reasons provided may interfere  with re-
trieval of  the auditor's own knowledge of  possible error causes. If  the audi-
tor relies on his or her own experience, output interference  combined with 
the availability heuristic may cause the auditor to focus  on the causes most 
accessible in memory to the exclusion of  an important error cause.6 
Heiman [1990] studied auditors' spontaneous generation of  explanations 
for  unexpected differences.  She found  that auditors did not spontaneously 
generate as many alternative explanations for  ratio fluctuations  as they did 
6Hock [1984] and Moser [1989] link output interference  with availability to provide a mecha-
nism by which judgments are biased. 
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when prompted to do so. Failure to generate or consider counter-explanations, 
together with belief  perseverance (see next subsection) may cause the au-
ditor to accept a non-error cause of  analytical review deviations despite evi-
dence to the contrary. If  auditors receive from  management a non-error cause 
for  an unexpected difference  and don't spontaneously generate possible 
error causes, the chances of  incorrect acceptance are increased. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic represents the decision maker's 
tendency to focus  on an initial value (an anchor) and to subsequently update 
(adjust) inadequately the initial belief  as new information  is received. Behavioral 
research has shown that anchoring and adjustment can result in a judg-
mental bias since decision makers may rely on an irrelevant initial anchor, 
or may make insufficient  adjustments with respect to the informativeness  of 
the new data [Libby, 1981, pp. 162-163]. Kinney and Uecker [1982] reported 
results consistent with anchoring in an attention directing analytical review 
task. Auditors tended to anchor on book value to develop point estimates be-
yond which an analytical investigation of  the book value was appropriate. Biggs 
and Wild [1985], and Heintz and White [1989] obtained similar results in ex-
tensions. This bias applies only to non-statistical procedures but is disturb-
ing since it violates independence of  expectations and book values. 
Probability Revision 
Revision of  initially formed  probability or risk assessments may also be 
biased. In some situations, decision makers may continue belief  in an initial 
hypothesis even in light of  subsequently received evidence to the contrary. 
That is, the initial belief  "perseveres." Koonce [1990] investigated auditors' 
tendency to focus  on initial beliefs  in an analytical review setting and found 
results consistent with belief  perseverance. Specifically,  Koonce's results in-
dicated that auditors who developed written non-error explanations for  un-
usual analytical review results continued to accept the explanation as the most 
likely unless explicitly requested to develop counter-explanations. 
After  forming  an initial hypothesis in a judgment task, decision makers 
often  search for  and place more importance on evidence that confirms  the 
hypothesis than on disconfirming  evidence [Fischhoff  and Beyth-Marom, 1983; 
Klayman and Ha, 1987]. This "confirmation  bias" is found  in a variety of  set-
tings including complex problem-solving and probabilistic-judgment tasks sim-
ilar to those found  in auditing (e.g., Wason [1960], Wason and Johnson-Laird 
[1972] and Snyder and Swann [1978]). When auditing a reputable client, the 
auditor may have a strong initial belief  that no material misstatements are 
present in the financial  statements. Mautz and Sharaf  [1961, p. 28] indicate 
that the idea of  an initial hypothesis of  no error is one of  long standing. If  er-
rors or irregularities do exist, however, a confirmation  bias may influence  the 
auditor's assessment of  subsequent evidence and counter-evidence and 
achieved audit risk may be higher than planned. 
While confirmation  bias is potentially important in evaluating analytical 
procedure results, behavioral research in auditing has found  only mixed sup-
port for  it. When evaluating a going-concern issue, Kida [1984] found  that, 
in general, auditors place more importance on the factors  indicating possi-
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ble failure  than on the factors  indicating viability. Trotman and Sng [1989] 
extended Kida [1984] with essentially the same results in an internal control 
task. Ashton and Ashton [1988] found  that auditors were influenced  more 
by disconfirming  evidence than by confirming  evidence in an internal con-
trol task. Butt and Campbell [1989] also tested for  confirmation  bias in an in-
ternal control task and found  that auditors did not seek confirming  evidence 
unless specifically  requested to do so. In a study of  analytical procedures, the 
Biggs, Mock, and Watkins [1989] protocol analyses of  four  audit managers 
and seniors in an analytical review task suggested that, while the two man-
agers were careful  to guard against confirmation  bias, the two audit seniors 
were less likely to do so. The authors concluded that experience might af-
fect  the auditor's ability to appropriately analyze analytical review results. How-
ever, Bonner's [1990] results indicate that experience differences  play an 
important role in analytical review cue selection and weighting but are not 
important in evaluating internal control risk. This suggests that task-specific 
knowledge may mitigate confirmation  bias. 
According to Bayes' rule, the order in which information  is presented should 
not affect  the decision maker's belief  revision process. However, the psy-
chological literature has documented situations in which the order of  evidence 
presentation affects  revised beliefs.  Hogarth and Einhorn [1989] have de-
veloped a belief-adjustment  model that can explain primacy, recency or no 
order effects  depending on complexity, length of  the evidence series, and re-
sponse mode. Ashton and Ashton [1988] used the Hogarth and Einhorn 
[1989] model and successfully  predicted recency effects  in auditors' internal 
control evaluations. Butt and Campbell [1989] also found  support for  the be-
lief-adjustment  model when auditors held weak initial beliefs  about internal 
control reliability. With the exception of  Koonce [1990], we are not aware of 
any studies of  possible order effects  in use of  analytical procedures. However, 
order may be important, especially in light of  the fact  that the auditor may 
stop the investigation before  contrary evidence is received or may resist con-
sideration of  subsequently received evidence to the contrary. 
Post Audit Analysis 
Decisions should be evaluated in light of  the information  available at the 
time the decision was made regardless of  the ultimate outcome. Hindsight 
bias refers  to the inability to evaluate past decisions without considering cur-
rently available information  [Fischhoff,  1975]. While hindsight bias has not 
been studied in an auditing context [Ashton et al., 1988], the bias is particu-
larly detrimental if  analytical review procedures are used as substantive ev-
idence since decisions are based on limited, aggregated information.  If,  after 
the auditor's report is issued, subsequent information  reveals material mis-
statement and the auditor's work is challenged, the courts may determine 
that the auditor should have recognized the potential for  misstatement using 
properly applied analytical procedures. The auditor should consider the po-
tential effects  of  hindsight bias before  choosing to rely on analytical proce-
dures as substantive evidence. That is, ask, "How will others judge the 
credibility of  my evidence if,  indeed, material misstatement exists?" Thus, in 
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addition to consideration of  his or her own biases, the auditor may need to 
consider biases of  others who will have additional information. 7 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In the paragraphs above, we have outlined the history and several potential 
limitations of  the reliability of  analytical procedure results used as substan-
tive evidence. In contrast to substantive tests of  details, we find  that analyti-
cal procedure results are subject to several biases that may overstate their 
apparent competence. 
With proper selection and application of  audit procedures, tests of  details 
will fail  to detect extant intolerable error only if  the auditor is unlucky—that 
is, only if  the sample is not representative of  the population. For analytical 
procedures, the auditor may fail  due to chance fluctuations  in the data. How-
ever, analytical procedures may also fail  to detect error due to biases related 
to the way in which auditor's research question is posed—trying to determine 
that the recorded data might be right  rather than trying to see whether it is 
wrong. 
What, if  anything, can be or should be done? We have some suggestions 
for  researchers and for  standards setters. 
Researchers 
There are several promising areas for  further  research into the reliabil-
ity or competency of  analytical procedures. There is need for  analytical work 
as well as for  statistical and behavioral studies. Our list is based on the 
thoughts expressed above and should not be interpreted as comprehensive 
for  the entire area of  analytical procedures. 
From an analytical perspective, what is the essential mathematical nature 
of  analytical procedures with respect to error and how they should be com-
bined in revising prior probabilities of  error? Is Bayes' Rule adequate? How 
does the second inference  required for  analytical procedures affect  probability 
revision? How should the second order probability by accommodated?8 
How reliable are the analytical procedures used in practice? How does 
their reliability differ  across procedures or across accounts or across levels 
of  expertise? What is their achieved risk? Statements that X percent of  all er-
rors detected by auditors were detected by analytical procedures (e.g., see 
Wright and Ashton [1989]), are one sided. The statement is not reversible 
into a positive statement that absence of  an indication of  misstatement means 
an absence of  material error—the auditor may have been a victim of  bias or 
simply may not have looked hard enough. 
On the behavioral side, to what extent do the biases discussed above apply 
and how much do they affect  achieved reliability of  analytical procedures? 
Are auditors unduly influenced  by management's suggestions of  non-mis-
7Felix and Waller [1984] refer  to the probability of  evidence being judged adequate as a "sec-
ond order" probability. 
8 See footnote  7. 
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statement explanations of  unexpected differences?  Or, do auditors system-
atically discount the results of  analytical procedures as Biggs, et al. [1989] 
and Cohen and Kida [1989] suggest? Is the discounting a recognition of  some 
of  the inherent limitations of  analytic procedure results as evidence? 
Standards Setters 
As indicated above, SAS No. 56 is a considerable improvement in guid-
ance to practitioners. It provides at least a partial conceptual basis for  ana-
lytical procedures and many warnings of  dangers in the application of  analytical 
procedures. However, there is one rather simple modification  to its guidance 
that could lead to substantive reduction in the biases discussed above. 
The suggestion is to change the focus  of  SAS No. 56 paragraph 21 from 
a search for  non-misstatement  causes to a consideration of  misstatement 
causes. Figure 6 presents possible wording. The suggestion is similar to the 
"conceptually logical approach" of  SAP No. 54 [para. 65] to "consider the types 
of  errors and irregularities that could occur" and then to consider which con-
trols would prevent them. For analytical procedures, the approach would be 
to consider possible misstatements and then look for  data that would be con-
sistent with the misstatement. 
Figure 6 
Suggested Revision to SAS No. 561 
.21 The auditor should evaluate significant  unexpected differences  and 
evaluate possible misstatements as the cause. For example, an 
unusual difference  between recorded and expected cost of  sales 
might be due to omitted credit purchases or a pricing error in 
the ending inventory. Consideration of  related payables and 
inventory balances may help resolve the matter. After 
considering possible misstatement, inquiry of  management may assist 
the auditor in revising the auditor's expectation. Management 
responses, however, should ordinarily be corroborated with other 
evidential matter. 
.21a In those cases when an explanation for  the difference  cannot be 
obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient  evidence about the assertion 
by performing  other audit procedures to satisfy  himself  as to whether the 
difference  is a likely misstatement.3 In deciding such other procedures, the 
auditor should consider that unexplained differences  may indicate an 
increased risk of  material misstatement. 
1 Additions are in bold and deletions in the original are lined. 
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Given an unexpected difference,  the auditor would consider what error 
cause might explain it. Then the auditor would consider what other readily 
available data would be consistent with the error and determine whether the 
other data is consistent. For example, when recorded cost of  sales is unex-
pectedly low, the auditor might hypothesize that it could be due to omitted 
credit purchases and then look to see whether ending payables are also 
lower than expected. Alternatively, he or she might consider possible over-
pricing of  the ending inventory and look for  unexpectedly high ending in-
ventory. Note that if  the auditor simply asks management (as SAS No. 56 
discusses), management might suggest improved inventory planning and con-
trol or improved purchasing procedures as the explanation. The auditor 
might search for  and find  some evidence of  such improvements and incor-
rectly attribute too large a dollar effect  to the improvement and stop his or 
her search for  error. 
It seems to us that auditing standards should be designed to help reduce 
biases to which the auditor may fall  victim—especially those that lead to in-
correct acceptance. We believe that a change in the focus  of  paragraph 21 of 
SAS No. 56 could help. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Analytical Procedure Results as Substantive 
Evidence" 
Abraham D. Akresh 
Independent Consultant, former  Partner, 
Laventhol & Horwath 
I generally agree with Bill Kinney and Christine Haynes' analysis of  the 
usefulness  of  analytical procedure results as substantive evidence. As I told 
the conference  organizers when I took this assignment, I won't challenge the 
mathematical aspects of  the paper. Instead, I would like to put the paper into 
a real world context and discuss how we consider their suggestions and how 
we use analytical procedures. 
Kinney and Haynes point out the dangers of  using analytical procedure 
results as substantive evidence. One could read the paper to mean that they 
believe analytical procedures should never be used as substantive evidence. 
I am glad that this is not their view. I agree that there are dangers in analyt-
ical procedures and the auditor needs to recognize these dangers and use 
analytical procedures in the right time, in the right place, in the right way. I 
will try to explain how and when analytical procedures can be used in light 
of  Kinney and Haynes' paper. 
I have no problem with the discussion of  the history of  analytical proce-
dures. It's nice, but it doesn't add much. Auditors have always performed  an-
alytical procedures. That is, they have looked at the forest  and said "does it 
make sense?" Tests of  details have gotten them into the trees; the good au-
ditor needs to see both the forest  and the trees. Analytical procedures are 
important, especially when testing the completeness and valuation asser-
tions. 
There are different  kinds of  analytical procedures and they serve differ-
ent purposes. SAS 56 requires analytical procedures in planning the en-
gagement and in wrapping up the engagement In these, analytical procedures 
serve a useful  purpose as attention-directing techniques. SAS 56 does not re-
quire analytical procedures to be used as substantive tests. The wording of 
paragraph four  makes it clear - "In some cases, they can be more effective 
or efficient  than tests of  details." Obviously in some cases they are less ef-
fective. 
In substantive testing, there are two different  ways of  using analytical pro-
cedures. The first  is as the primary substantive test. Here, analytical proce-
dures are the most important form  of  audit evidence. In these situations, the 
auditor does little or no tests of  details. The second use is as a corroborative 
test. Here the auditor performs  analytical procedures, but he or she also per-
forms  detailed substantive tests. In determining sample size, the auditor 
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considers the corroborative analytical procedures. For example, the auditor 
confirms  accounts receivable using a sample calculated at the 37 percent risk 
of  incorrect acceptance. His justification  for  such a high risk involves several 
factors.  He might consider the inherent risk to be low for  the particular 
client. The client might have an excellent control structure so that control 
risk is low (and the auditor has tested controls). The auditor will do analyti-
cal procedures, including review of  monthly sales and receivables. The re-
liance on analytical procedures caused the auditor to reduce, but not eliminate, 
his tests of  details. The question that needs to be asked is "Is this a valid ap-
proach or would the auditor be better off  increasing his sample size for  the 
tests of  details, say to a 10 or 20 percent risk level?" Kinney and Haynes' paper 
does not address how analytical procedures work as a corroborative test. I 
believe corroborative uses of  analytical procedures occur more often  than pri-
mary tests. 
As a primary test, analytical procedures are used as the only test of  an 
area. This does not happen often  in a major area. For example, it is rare for 
an auditor to use analytical procedures as the primary test for  inventory in a 
manufacturing  firm.  However, analytical procedures are usually the only in-
ventory tests for  a restaurant or hotel, because the inventory is not very im-
portant Typically, analytical procedures tend to be primary tests in unimportant 
areas: prepaid expenses, additions to productive assets when the additions 
are small (for  example, the client bought four  sewing machines during the 
year), sometimes miscellaneous receivables. 
Another important factor  to consider (especially for  primary tests) is the 
relationship of  materiality to the choice between analytical procedures and 
tests of  details. I assume that the auditor quantifies  his materiality judgment 
for  the audit as a whole and allocates or adjusts it to determine the materi-
ality for  the particular test. If  materiality is a large portion of  the population, 
analytical procedures are probably effective.  If  the materiality is a small por-
tion of  the population, the auditor probably needs tests of  details. For exam-
ple, consider a population of  additions to productive assets where the additions 
total $1 million. Let's say that this is a large company and that materiality for 
this test is $500,000. Clearly, it does not take much auditing to be comfort-
able that there is no material misstatement. Auditing could consist of  com-
paring the additions to expectations and thinking about what would cause 
$500,000 of  error in this million dollar population. 
As materiality declines, auditing has to increase. For example, if  materi-
ality were $30,000 out of  this million dollar population of  additions, it is clear 
that a test of  details would be needed (either alone or combined with some 
analytical procedures). For areas of  lesser importance, high materiality per-
centages are not unusual. 
The auditor would ordinarily compute the percentage of  materiality to 
the population. He also might consider what the sample size for  the test of 
details should be. Typically, if  the sample size for  his tests of  details is higher 
than 20 or 30 items, analytical procedures should not be the primary test. 
There is another important difference  between using analytical procedures 
as a primary test versus a corroborative test. When analytical procedures are 
the only important tests of  an assertion, the auditor needs more support for 
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that procedure. We believe the auditor needs an "anchor" to support his an-
alytical procedures. An anchor is: 
• A strong control structure that the auditor has tested. 
• Data from  outside the accounting department. 
• Data from  outside the client. 
• Data that the auditor has tested in another way. 
One cannot just compute a ratio or compare a number to another num-
ber. One of  the numbers has to be audited or one has to have comfort  with 
the number. Otherwise, the analytical procedure is likely to be ineffective. 
This is alluded to in paragraph 16 of  SAS No. 56, but not spelled out clearly. 
I agree with Kinney and Haynes' thoughts about the need to be careful 
in performing  analytical procedures. Certainly, there is non-sampling risk in 
analytical procedures. However, we should recognize that there also might 
be significant  non-sampling risk in substantive tests of  details. Auditors have 
the same psychological problems ("availability bias", "output interference", 
"anchoring and adjustment", "lack of  belief  revision") when they perform  sub-
stantive tests of  details. Many auditors are prone to try to call misstatements 
"isolated" so they don't have to project them. Some auditors still don't pro-
ject misstatements properly and many auditors don't properly consider the 
risk of  further  misstatements. Finally, not all auditors use statistical sampling 
or even sampling when they should. Also, many auditors refuse  to believe 
the evidence. By comparing a well done substantive test of  details with a poorly 
done analytical procedure, Kinney and Haynes compare apples and oranges 
and are not being fair  to analytical procedures. 
Kinney and Haynes identified  an important weakness in analytical pro-
cedures. The weakness is the need to ask management to explain the dif-
ferences  from  expectations. The explanation is needed, because the auditor 
typically doesn't know the business as well as management. However, the 
auditor needs to be careful  who he talks to and how he asks his questions 
(for  example, does he use open or closed questions? Does he tell the client 
what he is looking for?)  He should rarely talk only to the person responsible 
for  creating the data or keeping the books. Instead, the auditor needs to talk 
to someone who knows the business. That person can decipher what hap-
pened in the business that might explain the difference.  Often,  the auditor 
needs to talk to several people. For example, if  sales increased, the auditor 
needs to talk to the sales manager or the owner, not the controller. The au-
ditor recognizes that management is not one person, but many people. 
The auditor also needs to make certain calculations to see whether the 
explanation makes sense and really explains what happened. For example, 
if  sales increased ten percent and the explanation is "we raised prices" the 
auditor needs to ask, how much did you raise prices? When did you raise them? 
On what products did you raise them? Did volume go up or down, because 
you raised prices? In short, the auditor needs to understand not only the ex-
planation, but how it makes sense when quantified.  Then he needs to test 
the explanation, especially for  a primary test, did they really raise prices 
when they said they did? Show me the price change sheet. 
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The auditor needs to be satisfied  as to both the direction and amount of 
the change. Too often  auditors understand why sales went up, but have lit-
tle satisfaction  about whether the increase should be two percent or ten per-
cent. 
Kinney and Haynes correctly note that analytical procedures have a 
higher non-sampling risk component than tests of  details. To minimize this 
non-sampling risk, analytical procedures need to be done by auditors with 
enough training and business sense. While lower level people can compute 
the ratios and make the comparisons, the higher level people need to inter-
view the client to obtain the explanations and decide whether the conclusion 
makes sense. Analytical procedures are tougher to supervise. They require 
more judgment. 
There are two problems with analytical procedures that I see in some of 
our workpapers. The first  is the syndrome of  "the controller said." For every 
difference  the staff  accountant writes "the controller told me that." The sec-
ond situation is where the auditor asks the client "why did payroll go down"? 
The client describes the cost cutting and the labor saving machinery, and the 
auditor is happy. Then the auditor does the audit; the manager reviews the 
workpapers and finds  out the client omitted a major payroll accrual. Payroll 
increased significantly.  The auditor goes back to the client and asks, "why 
did payroll go up"? The client has a logical explanation that the auditor duti-
fully  records. What's happening is that the auditor is not skeptical and is wor-
ried about the difference  rather than whether the total makes sense. 
Much of  the problem with analytical procedures relates to unsophisticated 
auditors, using unsophisticated methods, with poor corroboration of  the an-
swers. Ratios are often  used on an annual (not monthly) basis, and include 
comparisons to last year. When the auditor becomes more sophisticated 
(and involves higher level people) and uses methods like regression and forces 
himself  to recalculate the model for  new explanations and consider how ma-
teriality affects  the model, he is much more likely to get analytical procedures 
that work. 
It is important to recognize the benefits  of  analytical procedures. 
• They are usually quick and easy methods to identify  problems. 
Auditors should first  do the analytical procedures, then decide if 
they need more. 
• They help the auditor avoid overauditing non-problem areas, es-
pecially small areas like prepayments and productive asset addi-
tions. 
• They provide a basis for  reducing sample sizes where the audi-
tor performs  corroborative analytical procedures. 
• They get the auditor to see the forest,  to understand the business 
and not be down in the trees. This is important in testing com-
pleteness, where auditors need to figure  out what is missing. 
• They get the higher level people involved in the engagement. 
All of  this holds if  they are done right. If  they are done wrong, you have 
problems. 
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I believe SAS 56 has caused us to improve documentation of  planning an-
alytical procedures and wrapping up analytical procedures. However, it has 
not greatly changed substantive analytical procedures. 
I agree with Kinney and Haynes' call for  more research and guidance. I 
agree that SAS 56 is an improvement over previous literature. Analytical pro-
cedures are important (maybe even more important than audit sampling). Five 
pages of  general guidance just doesn't do it. A good audit procedure manual 
would be helpful  for  the practitioner. I agree with Kinney and Haynes' sug-
gestions to change the SAS. In addition, the SAS could be improved by: 
• Describing the two types of  substantive analytical procedures -
primary and corroborative. 
• Requiring the auditor to interview people outside the accounting 
function  when corroborating the results of  analytical procedures. 
• Showing the relationship of  materiality to analytical procedures. 
• Requiring recalculations of  explanations. 
• Requiring adequate supervision of  analytical procedures. 
• Stressing professional  skepticism in using analytical procedures. 
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ABSTRACT 
In 1988, Statement on Auditing Standards Number 55, "Consideration of 
the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit", was issued by 
the AICPA as a replacement standard for  AU Section 320, "The Auditor's Study 
and Evaluation of  Internal Control", in an attempt to improve auditors' con-
trol risk assessments. This paper describes the conceptual differences  be-
tween the old and new standards with respect to control risk assessment. In 
addition, results are presented for  an experiment in which practicing audi-
tors are asked to assess control risk following  one of  two risk assessment pro-
cedures based on the two approaches suggested by the old and new standards. 
These tentative results, based on small sample sizes, do not indicate a clear 
"winner" in terms of  consensus, however it appears that a procedural effect 
is present. 
1. Introduction 
Early in 1990, the auditor's responsibility for  the evaluation and testing 
of  a client's internal control structure was altered when Statement on Audit-
ing Standards No. 55 (SAS 55), "Consideration of  the Internal Control Struc-
ture in a Financial Statement Audit", became effective.  According to Temkin 
and Winters [1988, pp. 98], "It's objective is to enhance audit effectiveness 
by improving audit planning and sharpening the auditor's assessments of  con-
trol risk." 
The new standard however, is not simply an attempt at integration of  the 
old AU Section 320, "The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of  Internal Control", 
and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 (SAS 47), "Audit Risk and Ma-
teriality in Conducting an Audit." Significant  changes also appear to have been 
made in the basic concepts underlying the old standards.1 Consequently, a 
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful  comments of  Bill Waller. 
1The conceptual changes in SAS 55, described in the next section of  this paper, resulted in a 
number of  changes to other professional  standards (including SAS 47.) Throughout the paper, 
we use AICPA Professional  Standards,  Volume 1 (June, 1987) to reflect  pre-SAS 55 standards. 
We refer  to these as the "old standards". 
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primary focus  of  the new standard is the introduction and discussion of  the 
procedure for  assessing control risk within the context of  these changes. 
Presumably, following  the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk 
should result in "better" control risk assessments than those made under the 
old standards. Unfortunately,  precise measurement of  the extent of  improve-
ment that such a procedure might provide is problematic. The development 
of  a reasonably specific  normative model which could be applied across all 
firms  to determine what the control risk assessment SHOULD be would be 
difficult  due to the complexity of  the internal control structure and differ-
ences in this structure across audit clients. Furthermore, ex-post determina-
tion that the control risk assessment was appropriate is not often  feasible  due 
to the lack of  any clear link between control risk assessments and observable 
outcomes. However, if  the purpose of  professional  standards is to provide uni-
form  guidance to auditors, then we should expect that application of  the SAS 
55 procedure for  assessing control risk by many auditors in the SAME audit 
situation would result in a greater degree of  consensus among auditors than 
there would be in the absence of  such a procedure, for  reasons discussed below. 
Einhorn [1974] points out that agreement (i.e., consensus) can be thought 
of  in two ways: (a) agreement "in fact"  and (b) agreement "in principle." In 
the context of  assessing control risk, agreement in principle implies that au-
ditors have a common understanding of  the control risk assessment process, 
including the type of  evidence to be collected, how that evidence should be 
weighted and combined to arrive at an assessed level of  control risk, and the 
role of  the control risk assessment in planning the audit. Agreement in fact, 
on the other hand, refers  to agreement on the actual control risk assessments. 
One goal of  professional  standards for  auditors, implicitly, is to achieve 
a higher degree of  agreement in principle than would be achieved in the ab-
sence of  standards. Consequently, if  this goal is achieved for  a given stan-
dard then, ceteris paribus, we should expect to see greater agreement in fact 
among auditors than there would be in the absence of  such a standard.2 The 
term "consensus", as used in this paper, refers  to the degree of  agreement 
in fact. 
The use of  consensus as a measure for  decision quality has received sup-
port in auditing research [see, for  example, R. Ashton, 1983, and A Ashton, 
1985]. It is important to recognize that a high degree of  consensus does not 
necessarily imply accuracy. The "correct" decision at each stage in an audit 
is not generally known. Indeed, the identification  of  "incorrect" decisions can 
often  only be made well after  the fact  in the event of  an audit failure,  if  at all. 
However, the successful  defense  of  auditor decisions in the event of  litiga-
tion often  involves establishing a consensus, via expert witnesses, that the 
auditor acted in a prudent manner [Joyce and Libby, 1982]. This argument 
seems a particularly appropriate reason for  using consensus to measure and 
compare the "quality" of  control risk assessments made using the SAS 55 pro-
cedure with other procedures since SAS 55 is one of  eight new standards is-
2It should be noted that auditors at large firms  see the professional  standards through the fil-
ter of  the firm  audit manual, workpapers, etc. This filter  affects  consensus to the extent that 
there are differences  in this filter  across firms. 
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sued by the AICPA in response to SEC and congressional criticism stemming 
largely from  recent cases of  auditor litigation.3 
The purpose of  this paper is to describe the conceptual differences  be-
tween the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk and the procedure sug-
gested by the old standards.4 In addition, we provide preliminary evidence 
on the effects  that such procedural differences  might have on the degree of 
auditor consensus. The results of  this study are intended to provide insights 
for  future,  more refined  experiments. We conduct an experiment in which 
practicing auditors are given information  relating to a hypothetical client's 
internal control structure elements and are asked to assess control risk on a 
qualitative scale (ranging from  "lowest" to "highest"). Half  of  the subjects re-
ceive a description of  a control risk assessment procedure based on our in-
terpretation of  SAS 55 and are asked to follow  this procedure in making their 
assessment. The remaining subjects receive a description of  an alternative 
procedure based on concepts implicit in the old standards (described in the 
next section of  this paper). Consensus is measured by converting qualitative 
responses into a simple quantitative scale and computing the standard devi-
ation of  each group's responses. 
A potential confounding  factor  which may limit the usefulness  of  our re-
sults is the inability to completely control for  differences  in firm  policy with 
regard to control risk assessments and/or the extent to which different  firms 
have already adopted methods which are congruent with SAS 55. For example, 
although auditor subjects are asked to follow  the specific  procedure for  as-
sessing control risk that is described in their questionnaire, their responses 
may nevertheless be unintentionally biased toward control risk assessments 
which reflect  elements of  their firms'  policies. We attempt to control for 
these effects  by stressing to subjects the importance of  following  the described 
control risk assessment procedure regardless of  how it may differ  from  their 
firm's  policy. However, even if  we are successful  in our attempt to motivate 
(conscious) unbiased responses, it is unlikely that (unconscious) firm  bias 
can be completely eliminated. 
The results of  this experiment have implications for  auditors' assessments 
of  control risk in practice. If  the procedure used to assess control risk has a 
significant  effect  on auditors' control risk assessments, then great care should 
be taken in recognizing and considering these effects  in order to determine 
the most appropriate procedure to follow.  In particular, if  a prescribed procedure 
contains equivocalities with respect to the role of  evidence in assessing con-
trol risk or with respect to the meaning of  the assessment itself,  then low con-
sensus may be an indication that control risk assessment is not necessarily 
recognized as the same task across auditors. In other words, a prescribed pro-
cedure which fails  to achieve agreement in principle is likely to result in low 
3See "Official  Releases", Journal of  Accountancy (July, 1988), pp. 144. 
4While the sequence of  events (i.e., obtaining an understanding of  internal controls, collection 
of  evidence, etc.) does not differ  between the old and new standards, what does differ  is the au-
ditor's internal process (i.e., how the information  collected is used to assess control risk). We 
use the term "procedure" to refer  to the particular way in which judgments are made with re-
spect to control risk. 
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consensus. Consequently, using a procedure which results in low consensus 
among auditors may result in a more difficult  defense  in the event of  litigation 
where there is disagreement among expert witnesses. 
The remainder of  this paper is organized as follows.  The next section de-
scribes the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk and discusses the 
conceptual differences  between it and the procedure suggested by the old 
standards. The third section describes the experiment and discusses possi-
ble results. The fourth  section presents the results and the final  section pro-
vides concluding remarks and suggestions for  further  research. 
2. SAS 55 Control Risk Assessment Procedure 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55 (SAS 55), "Consideration of  the 
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit", alters the audi-
tor's responsibility for  the evaluation and testing of  a client's internal control 
structure. In particular, SAS 55 expands the scope of  the evaluation and 
specifically  identifies  the type of  knowledge needed to obtain a sufficient  un-
derstanding of  a client's internal control structure and the degree of  knowl-
edge needed to plan the audit. The bulk of  the new standard, however, 
focuses  on the auditor's responsibility for  assessing control risk and de-
scribes the procedure to be followed  in making this assessment. A brief  de-
scription of  this procedure follows. 
Prior to assessing control risk, the auditor is required to obtain a suffi-
cient understanding of  the client's internal control structure to plan the audit. 
The internal control structure consists of  the following  elements [Paragraph 
8]: 1) The control environment, 2) The accounting system, and 3) Control 
procedures. 
After  obtaining an understanding of  the internal control structure, the au-
ditor begins the process of  assessing control risk. This process is described 
in SAS 55, Paragraphs 29 and 30, as follows: 
29. Assessing control risk is the process of  evaluating the effec-
tiveness of  an entity's internal control structure policies and procedures 
in preventing or detecting material misstatements in the financial 
statements. Control risk should be assessed in terms of  financial  state-
ment assertions. After  obtaining the understanding of  the internal 
control structure, the auditor may assess control risk at the maximum 
level for  some or all assertions because he believes policies and pro-
cedures are unlikely to pertain to an assertion, are unlikely to be ef-
fective,  or because evaluating their effectiveness  would be inefficient. 
30. Assessing control risk at below the maximum level involves: 
• Identifying  specific  internal control structure policies and procedures 
relevant to specific  assertions that are likely to prevent or detect ma-
terial misstatements in those assertions. 
• Performing  tests of  controls to evaluate the effectiveness  of  such 
policies and procedures. 
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In effect,  the assessed level of  control risk is that level that is supported 
by evidential matter obtained from  evaluating the effectiveness  of  operating 
internal control structure policies and procedures. It follows  then, that after 
obtaining an understanding of  the internal control structure but prior to per-
forming  any tests of  controls (assuming, for  illustration purposes, that no tests 
of  controls were performed  during the course of  obtaining the understand-
ing), the control risk assessment should be at the maximum level. As tests 
of  controls are performed  and evidential matter is collected which confirms 
the effectiveness  of  internal control structure policies and procedures, the 
control risk assessment is reduced. Consequently, the greater the extent of 
testing, the greater the potential reduction in the assessed level of  control 
risk from  the maximum level. 
Ultimately, after  all testing has been completed, the final  (evidence-sup-
ported) assessed level of  control risk is used, along with the assessed level 
of  inherent risk, to determine the acceptable level of  detection risk for  the 
purpose of  determining the nature, timing, and extent of  substantive tests to 
perform. 5. It would seem then, that a primary motivation for  the SAS 55 pro-
cedure for  assessing control risk is to ensure that this necessary input to the 
Audit Risk Model6 is properly supported by evidential matter. 
While SAS 55 attempts to make a positive move toward greater consis-
tency with other standards, some significant  changes in the basic concepts 
underlying the old standards are implicit in the control risk assessment pro-
cedure as it is described in SAS 55. In paragraph 28 of  SAS 55, control risk 
is defined  as "the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an as-
sertion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity's in-
ternal control structure policies or procedures." However, the assessment of 
control risk based solely on the quantity (and quality) of  evidential matter 
collected is inconsistent with this definition.  The auditor's control risk as-
sessment should be, and is defined  as, a representation of  his beliefs  regarding 
the risk of  a material error7 getting through the client's internal controls, but 
these beliefs  are ignored under some conditions in the SAS 55 control risk 
assessment procedure. Consider the following  examples. 
Suppose that we're conducting two audits. After  obtaining an under-
standing of  each client's internal control structure, control risk is assessed 
at the maximum level for  both. For the first  client, control risk is assessed at 
the maximum level because the auditor believes there are material weaknesses 
in the entity's internal control structure. For the second client, the auditor 
believes the internal control structure is strong but has assessed control risk 
at the maximum level because performing  tests of  controls would be ineffi-
5SAS 55'S expansion of  factors  to be considered in obtaining an understanding of  a client's in-
ternal control structure may lead to increased confounding  of  the inherent risk and control risk 
assessments. This issue (albeit critical) is beyond the scope of  this paper. See Waller [1990] 
for  an analysis of  this confounding. 
6See the Appendix of  "Audit Sampling", AICPA Professional  Standards  - Volume 1 (AICPA, 
1987), AU Section 350. 
7We use the terms "error" and "misstatement" interchangeably. 
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cient.8 In the first  case, the auditor has identified  areas of  weakness in the 
client's internal control structure and should direct additional audit effort  to 
searching for  material error where he believes the risk of  error is high. In 
the second case, however, no material weaknesses in the internal control struc-
ture have been identified  by the auditor. The course of  action indicated in 
this case may be quite different  than the first,  yet because the assessed level 
of  control risk is the same for  both cases, this suggests that the nature, tim-
ing, and extent of  substantive testing would not differ  between the two.9 
The maximum assessed level of  control risk does not have the same 
meaning between the two cases. In the first  case, the assessed level of  con-
trol risk is, as defined  in SAS 47, a reflection  of  the auditor's beliefs  regard-
ing the risk of  material error getting through the client's internal control 
structure. In the second case, however, the auditor's beliefs  are not reflected 
at all. The assessed level of  control risk is arbitrarily set for  the purpose of 
planning the audit. It would seem, however, that a key factor  in audit plan-
ning would be the auditor's actual expectations regarding material error, yet 
these expectations are not reflected  in the control risk assessment in the sec-
ond case. 
To illustrate further,  suppose that after  obtaining an understanding of  a 
client's internal control structure, the auditor believes that there is a low prob-
ability that a material error will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis 
by internal control policies and procedures, i.e., he believes control risk is 
low. The auditor's expectations regarding material error in the financial  state-
ments are developed during the course of  obtaining the understanding and 
should be used as the basis for  planning the audit. 
The auditor can follow  a number of  alternative avenues for  the collection 
of  audit evidence. These may include performing  extensive tests of  controls 
and limited substantive tests; few,  if  any, formal  tests of  controls and expanded 
substantive tests; or any combination which the auditor believes will provide 
sufficient  evidential matter to support an opinion on the financial  statements. 
The choice among alternatives would be based in large part on the differen-
tial costs of  the various avenues, but the auditor's beliefs  regarding control 
risk should be used constructively regardless of  which avenue is chosen. Con-
sequently, if  the auditor chooses not to perform  tests of  controls due solely 
to cost considerations, a control risk assessment at the maximum level in-
correctly implies that he believes the risk of  error is high simply because per-
forming  tests of  controls would be inefficient.  This reasoning is contrary to 
the very concept and definition  of  control risk. 
In all fairness  to the drafters  of  SAS 55, this criticism is really a joint crit-
icism of  the SAS 55 control risk assessment process AND the Audit Risk Model 
8Although this option is stated in paragraph 29 of  SAS 55, it seems likely that some tests of  con-
trols would have to be performed  in order to obtain a sufficient  understanding of  a client's in-
ternal control structure. 
9Although this issue is an empirical one, it seems likely that, at least in some circumstances, al-
lowable detection risk and choice of  audit procedures would vary between the two cases described 
in this scenario. This possibility is explicitly recognized in paragraph 3.5 of  the audit guide for 
SAS 55 (AICPA, 1990). This situation may be due in part to a blurring of  the distinction between 
inherent risk and control risk. 
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(ARM). The shortcomings of  the ARM are well-documented [see, for  example, 
Cushing and Loebbecke, 1983, and Kinney, 1989]. In particular, the ARM does 
not accommodate both the auditor's beliefs  and an assessment of  the suffi-
ciency of  evidence to support those beliefs.  SAS 55 attempts to reconcile the 
two by prescribing a procedure for  assessing control risk based on a suffi-
ciency of  evidence criterion, however in many cases (as illustrated above) 
this method will not adequately reflect  the auditor's actual expectations and 
consequently, will, at least as described, ignore potentially valuable information. 
Ideally, a risk model should accommodate separate assessments of  risk and 
evidence sufficiency  [see Waller and Felix, 1984, for  an example of  the rudi-
ments of  such a model.] This concept has also been suggested by Loebbecke, 
Eining, and Willingham [1989] with respect to auditor's assessments of  the 
likelihood of  material management fraud.  They state, for  example; "[I]n ad-
dition to searching for  information  to support the assessment about each com-
ponent, the auditor must make a judgment about the thoroughness and 
reliability of  his/her procedures" [page 4]. 
Although professional  standards do not explicitly "model" separate belief 
assessments and evidence sufficiency  assessments, this basic concept was 
nevertheless reflected  in the old standards,10 as illustrated below. 
The first  standard of  reporting states: "The report shall state whether the 
financial  statements are presented in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." According to AU Section 312, "Audit Risk and Materi-
ality in Conducting an Audit," paragraph 3: 
The phrase 'present fairly  in conformity  with generally accepted ac-
counting principles' implicitly indicates the auditor's belief  that  the fi-
nancial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated 
(emphasis added.) 
Indeed, the opinion rendered by an auditor on a client's financial  state-
ments is a direct reflection  of  his beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error 
in the financial  statements. Consequently, an auditor will issue an unquali-
fied  audit opinion only if  he believes that the risk of  undetected material error 
in the financial  statements is sufficiently  low. The risk of  undetected mate-
rial error in a client's financial  statements at the conclusion of  an audit is the 
familiar  "Audit Risk" discussed in AU Section 312. However, an auditor's as-
sessment of  his beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error is an important 
consideration not only at the conclusion of  an audit, but throughout the audit 
process. Clearly, the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error is 
an important consideration in planning the audit as well. AU Section 312, para-
graph 8, states: 
The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) 
planning the audit and designing auditing procedures and (b) evalu-
ating whether the financial  statements taken as a whole are presented 
fairly  in conformity  with generally accepted accounting principles. 
1 0 In the following  analysis, we use AICPA Professional  Standards, Volume 1 (June, 1987) to re-
flect  pre-SAS 55 (old) standards. 
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At the individual account-balance level, this guidance suggests that if  the 
auditor believes the risk of  material error in a particular account is high, this 
belief  should be reflected  in his choice of  audit procedures to perform  with 
respect to that account. Indeed, AU Section 312, paragraph 19, makes this 
explicit: 
The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-bal-
ance or class-of-transactions  level because such consideration directly 
assists him in determining the scope of  auditing procedures for  the 
balance or class. 
The decomposition of  audit risk into three component risks (i.e., inher-
ent risk, control risk, and detection risk) is an explicit reflection  of  the fact 
that the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error are an impor-
tant consideration throughout the audit process. Furthermore, these beliefs 
affect,  and in turn are affected  by, the auditing procedures performed  at var-
ious stages in the audit. 
For example, at the conclusion of  an audit, an undetected material error 
in a client's financial  statements indicates that (1) a material error occurred, 
(2) it was not detected by the client's internal control structure, and (3) it was 
not detected by the auditor. Consequently, the auditor's belief  regarding the 
risk of  undetected material error at the conclusion of  the audit will depend 
on his beliefs  regarding the likelihood of  the occurrence of  (1) through (3). 
These "component beliefs"  are sequentially addressed at different  stages in 
the audit process. Furthermore, because the auditor's beliefs  are an integral 
part of  the planning process, the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  ma-
terial error after,  say, evaluating the client's internal control structure (i.e., 
after  assessing inherent risk and control risk) affect  the choice of  audit pro-
cedures in the substantive testing stage of  the audit which in turn affects  the 
likelihood of  (3). 
What then is the role of  audit evidence in the formation  of  the auditor's 
beliefs,  that is, on his assessments of  these component risks? Prior to SAS 
55, the second and third standards of  field  work stated: 
Second  Standard:  There is to be a proper study and evaluation of  the 
existing internal control as a basis for  reliance thereon and for  the de-
termination of  the resultant extent of  the tests to which auditing pro-
cedures are to be restricted. 
Third  Standard:  Sufficient  competent evidential matter is to be obtained 
through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations  to afford 
a reasonable basis for  an opinion regarding the financial  statements 
under examination. 
Thus, although an unqualified  opinion on a client's financial  statements 
necessarily reflects  the auditor's belief  that audit risk is acceptably low, this 
belief  alone is not enough to justify  the opinion. The standards of  field  work 
require that the auditor collect sufficient  competent evidential matter to sup-
port his opinion. Sufficient  evidential matter may be obtained through any 
combination of  tests of  controls evidence and substantive testing evidence 
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that, in the auditor's professional  judgment, meets this requirement. For ex-
ample, AU Section 350, "Audit Sampling", paragraph 19, states: 
The second standard of  field  work recognizes that the extent of  sub-
stantive tests required to obtain sufficient  evidential matter under the 
third standard should vary inversely with the auditor's reliance on in-
ternal accounting control. These standards taken together imply that 
the combination of  the auditor's reliance on internal accounting con-
trol and his reliance on his substantive tests should provide a reasonable 
basis for  his opinion, although the portion of  reliance derived from  the 
respective sources may vary. 
Under the old standards, the sufficiency  of  evidence assessment is reflected 
in the degree of  reliance placed on the respective sources of  evidential mat-
ter. At the conclusion of  the audit, then, the combination of  the evidence col-
lected should provide the auditor with the required basis for  reliance on his 
beliefs  regarding the risk of  undetected error in the financial  statements and 
in turn, on the opinion rendered. This concept of  reliance is further  linked 
explicitly to the auditor's component risk assessments. For example, AU 
Section 312, paragraph 24, states: 
The auditor might make separate or combined assessments of  in-
herent risk and control risk. If  he considers inherent risk or control 
risk, separately or in combination, to be less than the maximum, he 
should have an appropriate basis for  any reliance  he places on his as-
sessments (emphasis added). 
This guidance implies that, although the auditor may believe control risk 
is low, in order to rely  on his low assessment, he must have sufficient  evidential 
matter as a basis for  that reliance, and consequently, as a basis for  restrict-
ing substantive tests. It does NOT imply, however, that the auditor's beliefs 
about control risk are determined  only by evidential matter obtained from  tests 
of  controls. We argue that the auditor forms  expectations (i.e., beliefs)  about 
the existence of  material error in the financial  statements prior to testing. In-
deed, it is these beliefs  that form  the basis for  planning the audit, as noted 
above. The role of  evidential matter, then, is to provide a basis for  reliance 
on those beliefs.  The collection of  evidential matter which supports the au-
ditor's beliefs  contributes to the basis for  reliance, while evidential matter which 
contradicts the auditor's beliefs  reduces the basis for  reliance. In the event 
of  contradictory evidence, the auditor may reconsider whether his initial as-
sessments regarding the risk of  material error are still an accurate reflection 
of  his beliefs  and, in this respect, evidential matter may cause beliefs  to be 
revised. However, it seems unreasonable to assume that an auditor either has 
no beliefs  until competent evidential matter is collected, or that his beliefs 
are irrelevant unless sufficient  evidential matter is collected to provide a 
basis for  reliance thereon. 
Unfortunately,  the concept of  reliance was eliminated from  the professional 
standards with the issuance of  SAS 55 because of  perceived confusion  over 
its meaning [Temkin and Winters, 1988] and was replaced with guidance that 
combines risk assessments with evidence sufficiency  assessments in ways 
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that are sometimes inconsistent (i.e., equivalent control risk assessments may 
have different  meanings in different  circumstances.). The old standards em-
phasized the role of  the auditor's beliefs  in planning the audit and moving 
forward  through the various stages of  evidence collection in order to collect 
sufficient  evidential matter to provide a basis for  reliance on those beliefs. 
SAS 55, on the other hand, seems to focus  on the evidence collected as a means 
of  working backwards to "set" beliefs  about control risk. Implicitly, it also elim-
inates the requirement to assess the sufficiency  of  the evidence collected since 
control risk is "assessed" at that level that is supported by evidential matter 
(regardless of  the auditor's true beliefs).  This new focus  represents a major 
change in the basic concepts underlying the professional  standards. 
The procedure for  assessing control risk suggested by the old standards 
does not differ  from  the SAS 55 procedure in terms of  the sequence of  events 
(i.e., obtaining an understanding of  internal control structure elements, per-
forming  tests of  controls, etc.). Under our position, the old standards sug-
gest that the control risk assessment should be based on the auditor's beliefs 
and a separate assessment made regarding the sufficiency  of  the evidence 
collected to rely on those beliefs.  The next section of  the paper describes the 
use of  an "evidence-based" control risk assessment procedure and a "belief-
based" procedure (corresponding to our interpretation of  the SAS 55 proce-
dure and the procedure suggested by the old standards) in an experimental 
task setting. 
3. The Experiment 
This experiment represents a first  attempt at examining the effects  that 
procedural differences  in assessing control risk might have on auditors' con-
sensus. Due to the exploratory nature of  this experiment and the lack of  a 
theory which might predict the degree of  agreement in fact  for  each proce-
dure, we make no predictions with respect to consensus. However, the con-
ceptual differences  between the two procedures do suggest different  mean 
responses between the groups following  each procedure at various decision 
points. These are discussed shortly. 
The subject group for  this experiment consists of  64 practicing auditors 
from  "Big Six" accounting firms.  This group includes 33 seniors, 23 managers, 
two new partners, and four  experienced staff. 11 We intentionally used sub-
jects who were in at least their third busy season. It was believed that these 
subjects would be experienced enough to be comfortable  with control eval-
uation and its role in the audit process. Subjects have an average of  65 months 
of  auditing experience and have worked on an average of  24 audits in which 
they were directly involved in internal control work. The average total num-
ber of  audits worked on is 41. 
Subjects are divided into two main groups and, according to group, are 
provided with specific  instructions for  assessing control risk. Risk assessments 
(for  both groups) are based on a qualitative scale ranging from  "lowest" to 
"highest". 
11Two subjects did not indicate their experience level on their questionnaires. 
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One group, hereafter  referred  to as the "evidence-based" group, are in-
structed to assess control risk at that level that is sufficiently  supported by 
the evidence presented in the questionnaire. Consistent with the SAS 55 pro-
cedure, they are told that a control risk assessment below the highest level 
must be supported by sufficient  evidence. 
The second group, hereafter  referred  to as the "belief-based"  group, are 
instructed to assess control risk at that level that reflects  their beliefs  regarding 
the risk that a material error will not be prevented or detected by the client's 
internal control structure elements. They are further  told that their control 
risk assessment should reflect  their beliefs  regardless of  whether or not 
they feel  that sufficient  evidence exists to support those beliefs. 12 
After  reading their specific  instructions, subjects are provided with in-
formation  regarding a hypothetical client's internal control structure. This in-
cludes a description of  the company and its operations, accounting system, 
personnel, and results of  specific  tests of  controls on the previous year's 
audit. They are told that their focus  is on the valuation assertion for  gross ac-
counts receivable. Half  of  the subjects receive a description which indicates 
that the client's internal control structure with respect to this assertion is rel-
atively strong, while the other half  receive a description which indicates sig-
nificant  weaknesses in the client's internal control structure.13. In addition, 
half  of  the subjects are told that, due to cost considerations, tests of  controls 
will not be performed  on this year's audit. The other half  are told that the same 
tests of  controls performed  last year will be performed  on this year's audit. 
This design resulted in eight different  combinations of  control risk as-
sessment procedures, strength of  internal controls, and planned tests of  con-
trols (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
After  reading the description of  the client's internal control structure, sub-
jects in the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group are asked to assess control 
risk (for  the valuation assertion of  gross accounts receivable) according to 
the instructions provided in their questionnaire. Subjects in the "TESTS OF 
CONTROLS" group are asked to make a preliminary assessment of  control 
risk according to their instructions. Following this preliminary assessment, 
subjects in this group are provided with the results of  tests of  controls and 
are asked to revise their control risk assessment to reflect  this additional in-
formation,  if  necessary. 
All subjects are then asked to make an assessment of  the sufficiency  of 
the evidence provided to support their control risk assessment. Finally, all 
subjects are provided with a description of  planned substantive tests and are 
1 2In the introductory section of  the questionnaire, subjects are asked to follow  the specific  in-
structions for  assessing control risk contained in their questionnaire regardless of  how that pro-
cedure may differ  from  that used by themselves or their firm  in practice. During the pre-testing 
phase of  the experiment, however, there was considerable confusion  among the belief-based 
subjects as to whether or not their knowledge of  SAS 55 should influence  their assessments. 
For this reason, the instructions for  the belief-based  group state that their risk assessments may 
be contrary to the SAS 55 requirement to consider evidence sufficiency  in assessing control risk. 
13Pre-testing of  these descriptions was somewhat limited. Consequently, elements which were 





PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure (N = 35) 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS (a) 
n = 8 
(b) 
n = 9 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS (c) 
n = 9 
(d) 
n = 9 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure (N = 29) 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS (e) 
n = 7 
(f) 
n = 8 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS (g) 
n = 7 
00 
n = 7 
asked to recommend a sample size for  positive confirmations.  In addition, they 
are asked whether or not they would consider sending confirmations  prior 
to year-end appropriate. 
Discussion of  Possible Results 
The first  decision point at which responses can be compared is the pre-
liminary control risk assessment made by those subjects in cells a, b, e, and 
f.  Since subjects in the evidence-based group (cells a and b) should base their 
assessment on that level that is sufficiently  supported by the evidence pre-
sented up to that point, their control risk assessments should be at or near 
the highest level. At this point, tests of  controls have not yet been performed 
and consequently, there should be little justification  to reduce the control risk 
assessment from  the highest level for  either the "STRONG" or the "WEAK" 
internal control structure scenarios. 
The belief-based  group, however, should have significantly  different  pre-
liminary control risk assessments between cells e and f,  corresponding to the 
"STRONG" and "WEAK" internal control structure scenarios. Since their as-
sessments should be based on their beliefs,  regardless of  the degree of  evi-
dence to support those beliefs,  the risk assessments for  the "STRONG" 
scenario (cell e) should be significantly  lower than the risk assessments for 
the "WEAK" scenario (cell f).  The expected results for  the preliminary con-
trol risk assessments are summarized in Figure 2. 
The second point of  comparison is the control risk assessment for  sub-
jects in the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group and revised control risk as-
sessment for  subjects in the "TESTS OF CONTROLS" group. To begin, risk 
assessments for  the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using the evidence-
based procedure should exhibit the same characteristics as described above 
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Figure 2 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments: Expected Results 
PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS High High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS n/a n/a 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS n/a n/a 
for  the evidence-based preliminary control risk assessments. That is, since 
no tests of  controls are being performed,  there should be little justification 
for  a reduction in the control risk assessment for  either the "STRONG" or 
the "WEAK" internal control structure scenarios. Consequently, the con-
trol risk assessments for  both cells c and d should be at or near the high-
est level. 
The risk assessments for  the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using 
the belief-based  procedure should similarly correspond to the belief-based 
preliminary risk assessments described above. That is, even though tests of 
controls are not to be performed,  the belief-based  assessments for  the 
"STRONG" internal control structure scenario (cell g) should be significantly 
lower than the risk assessments for  the "WEAK" scenario (cell h). 
In the cases corresponding to "TESTS OF CONTROLS" (cells a, b, e, and 
f),  we expect to see somewhat different  results. Risk assessments for  the ev-
idence-based group should now differ  between the "STRONG" and "WEAK" 
internal control structure scenarios. Since tests of  controls have been per-
formed,  the risk assessments for  the evidence-based group in the "STRONG" 
internal control structure scenario should reflect  the fact  that evidence ex-
ists to justify  a reduction in the control risk assessment from  the highest level 
(cell a). However, the results of  tests of  controls presented in the question-
naire for  the "WEAK" internal control structure scenario indicate that two of 
the four  controls tested are not operating effectively.  Consequently, we 
shouldn't expect to see a significant  reduction in the control risk assess-
ment. That is, the evidence presented does little to justify  a reduction in the 
assessment from  the highest level for  subjects in cell b. 
The risk assessments for  the "TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using the 
belief-based  procedure (cells e and f)  should exhibit little change from  the 
preliminary risk assessments made by these subjects. The reason is that re-
sults of  tests of  controls presented in the questionnaire reveal few  "sur-
prises." Tests of  controls results for  the "STRONG" internal control structure 
scenario are relatively strong and results are weak for  the "WEAK" internal 
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control structure scenario. In other words, tests of  controls results should 
do little to change these subjects' preliminary beliefs. 
The expected results for  each cell for  subjects' control risk assessments 
are summarized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Control Risk Assessments: Expected Results 
PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure 
-
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS High High 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
All subjects are asked to make an assessment of  the sufficiency  of  the ev-
idence presented to support their control risk assessments. These assessments 
are made on a qualitative scale ranging from  "COMPLETELY INSUFFI-
CIENT" to "COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT". Since subjects in the evidence-
based group are asked to assess control risk at that level that is sufficiently 
supported by the evidence presented, their evidence sufficiency  assessments 
should all be at or very near the "COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT" level. The 
assessments made by the belief-based  group, however, should vary de-
pending upon whether or not tests of  controls have been performed.  For the 
"NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group, we expect the evidence sufficiency  as-
sessment to be low, at or near the "COMPLETELY INSUFFICIENT" level, 
at least for  the "STRONG" internal control structure scenario. It is not clear, 
ex-ante, what the assessment should be for  the "WEAK" internal control 
structure scenario; i.e., how sufficient  must evidence be when controls are 
NOT to be relied on? For this reason, we make no prediction for  the "WEAK" 
scenario. Sufficiency  assessments for  the belief-based  group in the "TESTS 
OF CONTROLS" case should be significantly  higher than for  the "NO TESTS 
OF CONTROLS" case in the "STRONG" internal control structure scenario. 
Again, no prediction is made for  the "WEAK" case. 
The final  point of  comparison between groups is the sample size recom-
mendation for  positive confirmations.  Comparison of  responses at this point 
should provide insight into whether using different  control risk assessment 
procedures results in different  decisions with respect to substantive testing. 
Since the scenarios in cells a and e, b and f,  c and g, and d and h are pair-wise 
identical, we should not see any significant  differences  in recommended 
sample sizes between these pairs of  cells. We expect the sample sizes in cells 
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a and e to be the lowest. Furthermore, if  auditors choose higher sample sizes 
in cases where an evaluation of  a client's internal control structure reveals 
significant  weaknesses, we might expect the sample sizes in cells c and g to 
be somewhat lower than those recommended for  cells b and f,  and d and h. 
In the next section, subjects' responses are evaluated and the results are pre-
sented. In addition, some implications of  these results are discussed. 
4. Results 
In this section, we present results of  an experiment described in the 
previous section of  this paper which is intended as a first  step in the investi-
gation of  the effects  of  procedural differences  on auditors' control risk as-
sessments. While this first  step is an admittedly crude one, the results 
presented here may nevertheless provide some insight into the control risk 
assessment process and suggest possible avenues for  future,  more refined 
experiments in this area of  auditor judgment. Also, the results presented here 
are based on a limited number of  responses and consequently, the number 
of  responses for  each of  the cells shown in Figure 1 is small. For this reason, 
the usefulness  of  a statistical analysis of  the data is limited. We therefore  con-
fine  our analysis primarily to a qualitative comparison of  responses rather than 
performing  extensive statistical tests. 
In the analysis that follows,  we use the following  abbreviations to denote 
the risk assessment procedure, strength of  internal controls, and planned tests 
of  controls: 
Evidence-Based Procedure - EB 
Belief-Based  Procedure - BB 
Strong Internal Controls - STR 
Weak Internal Controls - WK 
Tests of  Controls - T 
No Tests of  Controls - NT 
The responses for  participants who used, for  example, the belief-based 
risk assessment procedure and whose questionnaires contained the strong 
internal control scenario with no tests of  controls will be denoted BB-STR-
NT. This corresponds to cell g in Figure 1. 
Subjects' control risk assessments are based on a qualitative scale rang-
ing from  "Lowest" to "Highest". In order to facilitate  comparison of  risk as-
sessments across groups, we convert these responses to a numerical value 
by letting an assessment of  "Lowest" equal "1" and "Highest" equal "5". 
(Thus a control risk assessment of  "Medium" would be given a value of  "3".) 
Similarly, subjects' assessments of  evidence sufficiency  are based on a qual-
itative scale ranging from  "Completely Insufficient"  to "Completely Suffi-
cient". These are converted to a numerical value with "1" corresponding to 
an assessment of  "Completely Insufficient"  and "5" corresponding to an as-
sessment of  "Completely Sufficient". 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments 
Subjects who completed questionnaires corresponding to cells a, b, e, and 
f  in Figure 1 were asked to make a preliminary assessment of  control risk 
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prior to reviewing the results of  tests of  controls. Table 1 presents a summary 
of  the responses for  these groups. 
Table 1 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 5.00 2.00 3.07 1.371 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 3.00 4.22 0.813 
BB-STR-T e 7 4.00 1.00 2.42 0.975 
BB-WK-T f 8 4.00 2.00 3.03 0.750 
As predicted (see Figure 2), the mean response of  3.07 for  cell a is higher 
than the mean response of  2.42 for  cell e (although a one-sided t-test of  the 
difference  was not significant;  p-value = .15). This makes sense since the re-
sponses for  the evidence-based group should reflect  the level of  control risk 
that is supported by evidence and at this point in the questionnaire, there is 
little evidential support for  a risk assessment below the highest level. How-
ever, the mean risk assessment for  the evidence-based group IS significantly 
lower than the maximum level of  "5.00" (p-value = .0027). This may suggest 
that subjects viewed some of  the information  given in the description of  the 
client's operations as providing evidence to support a lower risk assessment. 
Alternatively, it may indicate that subjects let their beliefs  influence  their risk 
assessments. Since internal controls are relatively strong, we expected the 
belief-based  group's responses to reflect  a belief  that control risk is below the 
highest level. A one-sided t-test of  the difference  between the mean response 
of  2.42 and the maximum level was significant  (p-value = .0002). 
A comparison of  the responses between cells b and f  is somewhat more 
disturbing. We expected the mean responses for  each to be high given the 
weaknesses described in the questionnaire, however the mean response of 
3.03 for  cell f  is significantly  lower than both the maximum level (p-value = 
.00) and the mean response of  4.22 for  cell b (p-value = .0072). One possible 
explanation for  this result is that our description of  weaknesses was not 
salient enough to generate an overall impression of  a weak internal control 
structure. In addition, the mean response of  4.22 for  cell b is significantly  less 
than the maximum level (p-value = .01), contrary to our expectation. The dif-
ference  between the means for  cells e and f  is marginally significant  (p-value 
= .10). Also, the difference  between mean responses for  cells a and b is 
marginally significant  (p-value = .063). 
We use the standard deviation of  responses to measure consensus for  each 
group. For the strong internal control scenario, the belief-based  group's re-
sponses exhibit a higher degree of  consensus (as evidenced by a lower stan-
dard deviation) than the responses for  the evidence-based group. Likewise, 
for  the weak scenario, the belief-based  group's responses exhibit a higher 
degree of  consensus. F-tests of  the difference  between the standard devia-
tions were not significant. 
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Control Risk Assessments 
Table 2 provides a summary of  each group's control risk assessments. For 
the groups represented by cells a, b, e and f,  these assessments represent a 
revision of  their preliminary control risk assessments (described above) 
after  reviewing results for  tests of  controls. For the remaining groups (cells 
c, d, g, and h), the control risk assessments are made after  subjects are in-
formed  that tests of  controls are not going to be performed. 
Table 2 
Control Risk Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 4.00 1.90 2.81 0.848 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 2.00 3.94 1.189 
EB-STR-NT c 9 5.00 2.00 3.47 1.030 
EB-WK-NT d 9 5.00 2.00 3.95 0.947 
BB-STR-T e 7 3.45 1.25 2.43 0.885 
BB-WK-T f 8 5.00 2.00 3.68 0.946 
BB-STR-NT g 7 4.00 1.75 2.69 0.982 
BB-WK-NT h 7 5.00 3.00 4.06 0.597 
Tests  of  Controls  Groups 
For the groups receiving tests of  controls results (cells a, b, e, and f)  we 
expected the responses for  each scenario (strong vs. weak internal controls) 
to be the same across risk assessment procedures (see Figure 3). The mean 
response of  2.81 for  cell a in Table 2 is lower than the mean response of  3.07 
for  the same group's preliminary risk assessments (cell a in Table 1). This 
is expected since after  receiving the results of  tests of  controls, subjects in 
this group had a basis for  a reduction in their control risk assessment. The 
mean response of  2.81 is significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value = .00). 
The mean response for  the belief-based  group for  the strong internal control 
scenario remained about the same. The mean preliminary assessment was 
2.42 (cell e in Table 1) and the mean revised control risk is 2.43 (cell e in Table 
2). This makes sense since the evidence presented for  tests of  controls was 
consistent with a strong internal control structure. Although the evidence-
based group's mean response of  2.81 is higher than the belief-based  group's 
mean response of  2.43, this difference  is not significant  (p-value = .41). 
The mean risk assessment for  the evidence-based group in the weak sce-
nario (cell b) decreased after  subjects reviewed tests of  controls evidence, 
from  4.22 (Table 1) to 3.94 (Table 2). For this group, we expected the pre-
liminary assessment to be high and remain high after  tests of  controls evi-
dence was presented, since the evidence presented indicated that some 
controls were not operating effectively.  However, since at least one control 
was operating effectively,  this slight reduction in control risk is not surpris-
ing. For the belief-based  group, the mean control risk assessment increased 
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3.03 (cell f  in Table 1) to 3.68 (cell f  in Table 2). This upward revision in risk 
assessments may provide an indication that if  internal controls weaknesses 
were not made salient enough in our description of  the client's operations, 
subjects would recognize that internal controls were somewhat weak after 
reviewing tests of  controls evidence. However, the mean response of  3.68 is 
still significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value = .0027). The mean re-
sponse of  3.94 for  the evidence-based group is not significantly  different  from 
the mean response of  3.68 for  the belief-based  group (p-value = .61), as ex-
pected. 
In addition, the mean response of  2.81 for  cell a is significantly  lower than 
the mean response of  3.94 for  cell b (p-value = .019). Likewise, the mean re-
sponse of  2.43 for  cell e is significantly  lower than the mean response of  3.68 
for  cell f  (p-value = .011). In general, the results for  the "Tests of  Controls" 
groups are consistent with our predictions. The mean responses for  cells a 
and e are about the same and are lower than the mean responses for  cells b 
and f,  which are also approximately equal. 
Finally, a comparison of  the standard deviations for  cells a versus e and 
b versus f  indicates that consensus is higher for  the evidence-based group 
in the strong internal control scenario and higher for  the belief-based  group 
in the weak internal control scenario, although F-tests indicate that none of 
these differences  are significant. 
No  Tests  of  Controls  Groups 
For the strong scenario case, we expected the mean responses to differ 
between the evidence-based and belief-  based groups (see Figure 3). As ex-
pected, the mean response of  3.47 for  the evidence-based group (cell c) is 
higher than the mean response of  2.69 for  the belief-based  group (cell g), al-
though this difference  is only marginally significant  (p-value = .073). We ex-
pected the mean response for  the belief-based  group to be fairly  low given 
the description of  a relatively strong internal control structure and, as expected, 
the mean response of  2.69 is significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value 
= .0004). However, the mean response of  3.47 for  the evidence-based group 
is somewhat surprising (it is significantly  lower than the maximum; p-value 
= .001). This may suggest that either: 1) subjects viewed some of  the infor-
mation given in the description of  the client's operations as tests of  controls 
evidence, 2) subjects were not able to assess control risk based solely on ev-
idence sufficiency  without being influenced  by their beliefs,  or 3) subjects 
did not understand the instructions provided for  making their control risk 
assessments. 
We expected the mean responses for  the weak scenario for  both the ev-
idence-based and belief-based  groups to be high. The mean response for  the 
evidence-based group is 3.95 (cell d) and the mean response for  the belief-
based group is 4.06 (cell h). The difference  between these means is not sig-
nificant  (p-value = .79). Again, the mean response for  the evidence-based group 
is lower than expected. Since both groups' mean responses were lower than 
the highest level, this may again suggest that we did not adequately emphasize 
weaknesses in our description of  the client's operations. Notwithstanding this, 
the mean response for  the evidence-based group is surprisingly low consid-
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ering the lack of  evidence provided, and is significantly  lower than the max-
imum (p-value = .0052). The mean response of  3.47 for  cell c is not signifi-
cantly different  from  the mean response of  3.95 for  cell d (p-value = .32), as 
expected (although both are significantly  less than the maximum, contrary 
to our expectations). The mean response of  2.69 for  cell g is significantly  lower 
than the mean response of  4.06 for  cell h (p-value = .0058), as expected. 
The standard deviations presented in Table 2 for  cells c, d, g, and h indi-
cate that consensus is higher for  the belief-based  group for  both the strong 
and weak internal control scenarios, although F-tests of  the differences  are 
not significant. 
Evidence-Sufficiency  Assessments 
Table 3 provides a summary of  responses for  each group's evidence-suf-
ficiency  assessments. 
TABLE 3 
Evidence-Sufficiency  Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 5.00 2.90 3.99 0.776 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 1.00 3.29 1.510 
EB-STR-NT c 9 5.00 1.00 3.39 1.318 
EB-WK-NT d 9 4.85 1.90 3.40 0.881 
BB-STR-T e 7 5.00 2.95 4.04 0.835 
BB-WK-T f 8 4.00 2.15 3.30 0.792 
BB-STR-NT g 7 4.50 2.40 3.27 0.718 
BB-STR-NT h 7 4.00 2.00 3.43 0.787 
In the instructions for  the evidence-based risk assessment procedure, sub-
jects were told that their risk assessments should correspond to that level 
that is completely supported by evidence. Consequently, we expected ex-ante 
that all of  the sufficiency  assessments for  the evidence-based groups would 
be at or near the highest level. However, as Table 3 indicates, the mean evi-
dence-sufficiency  assessments for  these groups (cells a, b, c, and d) are well 
below the maximum level. One may argue, however, that when control risk 
is assessed at the highest level, implying that controls are not to be relied 
upon, an evidence-sufficiency  assessment is not necessary. In other words, 
must we have sufficient  evidential matter to support a decision not to rely on 
controls? For the evidence-based groups which were not given tests of  con-
trols results (cells c and d), we expected control risk assessments to be at or 
near the highest level. To the extent, however, that the mean responses 
were lower than the highest level (mean responses were 3.47 for  cell c and 
3.95 for  cell d), we should expect to see high evidence-sufficiency  assessments 
since a reduction in control risk from  the highest level should be sufficiently 
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supported by evidence. However, the mean evidence-sufficiency  assessments 
corresponding to cells c and d are 3.39 and 3.40, respectively. Both are sig-
nificantly  lower than the maximum (p-values = .0032 and .00 for  cells c and 
d, respectively). 
For the evidence-based groups who received tests of  controls evidence 
such that we might expect a lower-than- maximum control risk assessment 
(cells a and b) based on this evidence, the mean evidence-sufficiency  as-
sessments were also lower than the maximum (3.99 for  cell a and 3.29 for 
cell b). T-tests of  the differences  between these cells and the maximum level 
resulted in p-values of  .004 and .0048 for  cells a and b, respectively. These re-
sults suggest that the risk assessments made by the evidence-based groups 
do not reflect  the level that is sufficiently  supported by evidential matter. Al-
ternatively, it is possible that subjects did not understand the instructions given 
for  assessing control risk or that the procedure itself,  no matter how thor-
oughly explained, is confusing. 
We conducted t-tests of  the difference  in mean responses between cells 
a and e, cells b and f,  cells c and g, and cells d and h, all of  which yielded in-
significant  results (the p-values were .92, .99, .41 and .53, respectively). In ad-
dition, a comparison of  standard deviations between the same sets of  cells 
indicate that in all but one case, consensus is higher for  the belief-based  groups. 
F-tests of  the differences  in standard deviations were marginally significant 
(at level .10) for  cells b vs f  and cells c vs g. 
Sample Size Recommendations 
After  making their control risk assessments and evidence-sufficiency  as-
sessments, subjects in all groups were asked to recommend a sample size 
for  positive confirmations.  A summary of  these responses is provided in 
Table 4 below. 
Table 4 
Sample Size Recommendations 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 70 20 35 17.32 
EB-WK-T b 8 125 25 63 35.70 
EB-STR-NT c 9 70 15 38 17.47 
EB-WK-NT d 9 75 30 51 15.70 
BB-STR-T e 7 100 20 57 27.70 
BB-WK-T f 8 120 25 48 30.90 
BB-STR-NT g 7 100 20 56 28.60 
BB-WK-NT h 7 60 16 40 15.28 
We included the sample size recommendation task in the experiment in 
an attempt to gain some insight into whether or not the use of  alternative con-
trol risk assessment procedures has an effect  on auditors' subsequent deci-
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sions. The results in Table 4 indicate that not only are there no clear systematic 
differences  between the evidence-based and belief-based  groups, but there 
also appears to be no clear differences  between strong and weak internal con-
trol cases and tests of  controls versus no tests of  controls cases. Responses 
for  this task were highly variable and, as a result, do not provide a great deal 
of  insight. 
These results are consistent with prior studies which found  subjects' 
planning decisions subsequent to internal control judgments highly variable 
[see, for  example, Gaumnitz, Nunamaker, Surdick, and Thomas, 1982, and 
Tabor, 1983]. This variability may be due to different  philosophies between 
audit firms  with respect to substantive test planning. Consequently, these re-
sults are not surprising. However, since one might argue that differences  in 
control risk assessment procedures would have the greatest impact on the 
audit process if  they affected  auditors' subsequent decisions, this is an area 
that warrants further  investigation. A more refined  research approach may 
provide the insight that our design failed  to provide with respect to sample 
size decisions for  substantive tests. 
Timing of  Tests 
In addition to providing a sample size recommendation for  positive con-
firmations,  subjects were also asked whether they would consider sending 
confirmations  prior to year-end appropriate. The results are presented in Table 
5 below. 
Table 5 




Prior to Year-End Appropriate? 
Yes No 
EB-STR-T a 8 5 3 
EB-WK-T b 9 3 6 
EB-STR-NT c 9 3 6 
EB-WK-NT d 9 0 9 
BB-STR-T e 7 6 1 
BB-WK-T f 8 1 7 
BB-STR-NT g 7 2 5 
BB-WK-NT h 7 3 4 
These results do not indicate any systematic differences  between the ev-
idence-based and belief-based  groups with respect to the timing decision. For 
the most part, subjects' responses indicated that sending confirmations  prior 
to year-end is appropriate when internal controls are strong and tests of  con-
trols have been performed.  Thus, the control risk assessment procedure 
does not appear to affect  auditors' timing decisions. 
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5. Conclusion 
In 1988, Statement on Auditing Standards Number 55 was issued by the 
AICPA as a replacement standard for  AU Section 320 in an attempt to improve 
auditors' internal control evaluations and sharpen auditors' control risk as-
sessments. In this paper, we described what we view as significant  differences 
in the basic concepts underlying the old and new standards. 
In particular, the old standards suggested a separation of  1) a control risk 
assessment based on the auditor's beliefs  and 2) an assessment of  the suffi-
ciency of  evidence to support those beliefs.  SAS 55, on the other hand, sug-
gests combining these two assessments into one control risk assessment such 
that the assessed level of  control risk is that level that is sufficiently  supported 
by evidential matter. 
We presented results for  an experiment in which subjects were asked to 
assess control risk following  one of  two risk assessment procedures based 
on the two approaches described above. While the number of  responses eval-
uated is relatively small, the results provide some interesting insights into 
the control risk assessment process. While there was no clear "winner" in 
terms of  consensus for  the various judgments made by subjects, responses 
nevertheless seem to indicate a "procedural" effect. 
In particular, assessments made with respect to evidence sufficiency  for 
subjects following  the "evidence-based" control risk procedure were much 
lower than expected. Since this group's risk assessments should have cor-
responded to that level that subjects felt  was sufficiently  supported by evi-
dence, we expected evidence-sufficiency  assessments for  this group to be high. 
These results may have been due to weaknesses in the questionnaire or, al-
ternatively, may suggest that the approach of  combining risk and evidence-
sufficiency  assessments is confusing. 
This paper was intended as a rough first  step in the investigation of  the ef-
fects  of  using alternative procedures to assess control risk. Future experiments 
would likely add valuable insight into these effects  through refinements  in sub-
ject training, case descriptions, and experimental design with respect to sub-
stantive testing decisions. Other factors  which may have significant  impact 
on the control risk assessment process and subsequent audit decisions which 
were not addressed in this paper include making separate versus combined 
assessments of  inherent risk and control risk [Waller, 1990] and decompos-
ing control risk assessments into separate evaluations of  internal control de-
sign effectiveness  and operating effectiveness  [Morton and Felix, 1990]. 
Results presented in this paper are admittedly preliminary in nature and 
consequently, no general conclusions can be drawn. However, it is clear that 
there is no dearth of  opportunities for  expanding our knowledge and insight 
into this most intriguing area of  auditor judgment. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Assessing Control Risk: Effects  of  Procedural 
Differences  on Auditor Consensus" 
Richard W. Kreutzfeldt 
Arthur Andersen 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55 (SAS 55), "Consideration of  the 
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit," is one of  the "Ex-
pectations Gap" standards issued in 1988 that were intended to improve the 
effectiveness  of  audits. SAS 55 broadens the concept of  internal controls, ex-
pands the auditor's responsibilities with respect to internal controls, and re-
vises and attempts to clarify  a number of  long-standing concepts. With such 
ambitious objectives, it is not surprising that questions are being raised about 
the meaning of  the new standard, how to apply it in practice, and whether 
the new concepts themselves are sound. Morton and Felix [1989] express 
the concern in an earlier paper, "it appears that possibly confusing  concepts 
are being replaced with concepts which we believe may be even more con-
fusing,  contradictory and ill-defined." 
I too have concerns about SAS 55. But I also believe that SAS 55 adds a 
number of  fundamental  enhancements to the auditing literature. What is 
needed now, in my view, is not a massive overhaul of  SAS 55 but a continu-
ing dialogue among practitioners, academicians and standard-setters aimed 
at improving the understanding and application of  SAS 55 and leading ulti-
mately to revisions or interpretations of  the standard where necessary. This 
paper by Morton and Felix makes a significant  contribution to this continu-
ing dialogue. 
SAS 55: An "Evidence-Based" Approach? 
The focal  point of  this paper is the procedure to be followed  in making 
control risk assessments. SAS 55 provides the following  guidance: 
29. Assessing control risk is the process of  evaluating the effec-
tiveness of  an entity's internal control structure policies and procedures 
in preventing or detecting material misstatements in the financial 
statements. Control risk should be assessed in terms of  financial  state-
ment assertions. After  obtaining the understanding of  the internal 
control structure, the auditor may assess control risk at the maximum 
level for  some or all assertions because he believes policies and pro-
cedures are unlikely to pertain to an assertion, are unlikely to be ef-
fective,  or because evaluating their effectiveness  would be inefficient. 
30. Assessing control risk at below the maximum level involves-
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• Identifying  specific  internal control structure policies and procedures 
relevant to specific  assertions that are likely to prevent or detect ma-
terial misstatements in those assertions. 
• Performing  tests of  controls to evaluate the effectiveness  of  such poli-
cies and procedures. 
Figure 1 
SAS 55 FLOWCHART 
(Summary Version) 
A simplified  version of  the SAS 55 flowchart  is presented in Figure 1. This 
guidance is rather broad and conceptual and can lead to questions about im-
plementation. The authors' interpretation of  SAS 55 is that it requires an "ev-
idence based" approach. An illustration of  this approach is presented in 
Figure 2. While the authors did not actually include a flowchart  of  this or other 
models in their paper, I have attempted to represent their views in this man-
ner for  clarification  and contrast with other models. The authors' principal 
concern with an evidence-based approach is that the "auditor's beliefs  regarding 
the risk of  a material error getting through the client's internal controls are 
ignored under some conditions." Ignoring these beliefs  is inappropriate be-
















would share these concerns about an evidence-based approach as described 
by the authors, I do not believe that SAS 55 prescribes an evidence-based ap-
proach as illustrated in Figure 2. I believe the SAS 55 approach was intended 
to be more flexible.  I will comment further  on this later. But for  now, let's ex-
plore the alternative control risk assessment procedure described by Mor-
ton and Felix. 
Figure 2 
EVIDENCE-BASED PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING CONTROL RISK 
(1) This assessment should be at the maximum because DO evidence has yet been obtained (assumes no tests were performed 
while obtaining the understanding). 
(2) This assessment is lower reflecting  evidence obtained through tests of  controls. 
An Alternative: A "Belief-Based"  Approach 
The authors describe a "belief-based"  procedure for  assessing control risk 
that addresses some of  their concerns with an evidence-based approach. An 
initial depiction of  a belief-based  approach is presented in Figure 3. This ini-
tial depiction does not reflect  all features  of  the belief-based  approach described 
by the authors. These will be added later. However, it does provide a basis 
for  contrast with the evidence-based approach. At first  glance, some may ques-
tion whether the differences  between these two models are all that signifi-
cant. After  all, in both models, control risk is ultimately assessed after 
considering tests of  controls performed.  But, on closer review, there are dif-
ferences  in the impact on the design of  substantive tests. In the evidence-based 
approach, the auditor cannot make an intelligent design of  substantive tests 
until after  the tests of  controls are completed and an assessment of  control 
risk is made. This is not logical and places undue constraints on the auditor. 
By contrast, in the belief-based  approach, the auditor may design substan-
tive tests based on his beliefs  about control risk before  any tests are performed. 
He may then make necessary revisions to the design after  these beliefs  have 




BELIEF-BASED PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING CONTROL RISK 
(Initial Depiction) 
(1) This assessment is based on the auditor's beliefs,  regardless of  whether evidence has been (or will be) accumulated to support this 
belief  (example: "low"). 
(2) This is to update the auditor's belief  about control risk based on evidence obtained. Ordinarily, this would be the same as the inital 
assessment unless contrairy evidence has been obtained. In this case, the design of  substantive tests may need to be revised. 
(3) This approach allows flexibility  to design and perform  substantive tests either simultaneously with, or subsequent to, tests of 
controls. 
What Does SAS 55 Really Require? 
Now that the rudiments of  each approach have been described, let's ex-
plore what SAS 55 actually requires. Does it really prescribe an evidence-based 
approach and preclude a belief-based  approach? Based on my experience with 
the Task Force that developed the Audit Guide [AICPA, 1989], "Considera-
tion of  the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit," the an-
swer is "no." The evidence-based approach described by the authors is a 
too literal and too sequential an interpretation of  SAS 55. Indication of  a se-
quential view is provided by the following  comments [p. 113]: 
It follows,  then, that AFTER obtaining an understanding of  the inter-
nal control structure but PRIOR TO any tests of  controls, the control 
risk assessment should be at the maximum level (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, AFTER all testing has been completed, the final  (evidence-
supported) assessed level of  control risk is used, along with the as-
sessed level of  inherent risk, to determine the . . . . substantive tests 
to perform  (emphasis added). 
These literal descriptions of  a sequential process cannot be found  in SAS 
55. The SAS only requires that the auditor "consider results of  any tests of 
controls" in the design of  substantive tests. It does not require that the tests 
of  controls be completed before  the design of  substantive tests can begin. It 
does not preclude the auditor from  anticipating the results of  tests of  controls 
(i.e., from  considering his beliefs  about the level of  control risk that will be 






















The Audit Guide: A Clarification  of  SAS 55 
The above statements reflect  more than just my personal view of  SAS 55. 
They reflect  the approach taken in the Audit Guide. A summarized version 
of  the flowchart  included in the Audit Guide is presented in Figure 4. As de-
picted here, the Audit Guide adds a useful  concept not included in SAS 55 -
the preliminary audit strategy. 
Figure 4 
AUDIT GUIDE FLOWCHART 
(Summary Version) 
(1) This is the level of  control risk that the auditor believes can be supported by the tests of  controls he plans to perform. 
(2) This is to update the auditor's belief  about control risk based on evidence obtained. Ordinarily, this would be the same as the inital 
assessment unless contrairy evidence has been obtained. In this case, the design of  substantive tests may need to be revised. 
(3) This approach allows flexibility  to design and perform  substantive tests either simultaneously with, or subsequent to, teste of 
controls. 
The above concept is described in the Audit Guide as follows  [AICPA, 1989, 
paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3]: 
the auditor often  will be able to choose between several possible 
audit approaches 
When considering a preliminary audit strategy the auditor con-
siders knowledge of  the entity's business, the industry in which it op-
erates, the nature and materiality of  different  account balances, prior 
experience with the industry, and other factors. 
The preliminary audit strategy is not a detailed design of  audit pro-
cedures. Rather, it represents preliminary judgments about an audit 
approach that are updated as necessary during the conduct of  the audit 
as the auditor confirms  initial judgments or obtains evidence to the 
contrary. 
The preliminary audit strategy includes, among other things, a planned 
assessed level of  control risk - the level of  control risk that the auditor be-
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belief-based  approach and the Audit Guide approach have many similarities. 
Both allow, at least in part, a belief-based  control risk assessment for  audit 
planning purposes. Both allow flexibility  in the design of  substantive tests. 
In noting the similarities of  the Audit Guide approach to the belief-based  ap-
proach, it is also important to note that the approach taken in the Audit Guide 
should not be viewed as a revision of  the SAS 55 approach. The Audit Guide 
is intended only to provide guidance in the application of  SAS 55. The Au-
diting Standards Board did not consider it necessary to issue a revision or 
interpretation of  SAS 55 as a result of  the issuance of  the Audit Guide. Thus, 
the procedure covered in the Audit Guide may be viewed as representing the 
intent  of  SAS 55. Therefore,  to conclude, as the authors do, that SAS 55 pre-
scribes an evidence-based approach and precludes a belief-based  approach 
is inappropriate. This is not to say that the authors' discussion of  the belief-
based approach is without merit. It is only to say that characterizing SAS 55 
as an evidence-based approach is not appropriate. 
Assessing Control Risk at the Maximum 
At this point, I would like to pursue further  some of  the additional features 
of  the belief-based  approach. One of  the most interesting questions raised 
by this approach is: What if  the auditor does not intend to validate his beliefs 
about control risk through tests of  controls? A related, and more troublesome, 
issue involves the assessment of  control risk at the maximum for  efficiency 
reasons even though the auditor believes controls are strong. The authors 
contrast this case with one where control risk is assessed at the maximum 
because of  weak controls and ask whether the maximum assessed level of 
control risk has the same meaning in both cases. This example is illustrated 
in Figure 5. 
SAS 55 indicates that control risk may be assessed at the maximum in 
both cases. The authors argue, effectively  I believe, that the assessments do 
not have the same meaning in both cases and that using the same assess-
ment could be misleading [p. 114]: 
In the first  case [weak controls], the assessed level of  control risk is 
. . . a reflection  of  the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  material 
error getting through the client's internal control structure. In the sec-
ond case, however, the auditor's beliefs  are not reflected  at all. The 
assessed level of  control risk is arbitrarily set for  the purpose of  plan-
ning the audit. It would seem, however, that a key factor  in audit plan-
ning would be the auditor's actual  expectations regarding material error, 
yet these expectations are not reflected  in the control risk assessment 
in the second case. 
Of  even greater significance  is whether the substantive tests would be the 
same in both cases. If  one believes the substantive tests should be the same, 
then it should not matter that the control risk assessments are the same. How-
ever, if  one believes the substantive tests should be different,  then having the 
same control risk assessment may be a greater concern. SAS 55 does not specif-
ically address this issue, but because the control risk assessments are the 
137 
Figure 
ASSESSING CONTROL RISK AT THE MAXIMUM 
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same meaning? 
Resulting Substantive Tests Extensive Extensive 
same? 
same, the implication is that the substantive tests would also be the same. 
The authors argue persuasively, however, that they should not be the same 
[p. 114]: 
In the first  case [weak controls], the auditor has identified  areas of 
weakness in the client's internal control structure and should direct 
additional audit effort  to searching for  material error where he believes 
the risk of  error is high. In the second case, however, no material weak-
nesses in the internal control structure have been identified  by the au-
ditor. The course of  action indicated in this case may be quite different 
than the first,  yet because the assessed level of  control risk is the same 
for  both cases, this suggests that the nature, timing, and extent of  sub-
stantive testing would not differ  between the two. 
SAS 55 actually provides the conceptual foundation  to deal more effec-
tively with this issue through the guidance provided in paragraph 16. This 
paragraph indicates that knowledge about the internal control structure 
should be used to -
• Identify  types of  potential misstatements. 
• Consider factors  that affect  the risk of  material misstatement. 
• Design substantive tests. 
It is the first  two bullet points that provide the means to differentiate  be-
tween the two cases discussed above. In the case of  weak controls, there may 
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be one or more types of  potential misstatements that present a significantly 
greater risk than where controls are strong. There may also be a number of 
additional factors  affecting  the risk of  misstatement These conditions would 
probably warrant an expansion of  substantive tests. For example, the audi-
tor may make additional inquiries or perform  additional substantive tests in 
response to these added areas of  risk. These risk conditions may be incon-
sequential in the case of  good controls and not warrant any additional response 
beyond the "basic" procedures. Some may assert that the procedures should 
be the same because the risk is assessed at maximum. While this may be 
true in some cases, I would not agree with it as a general assertion. This as-
sertion would seem to suggest that the myriad of  risk factors  present in any 
given situation can be reduced to a single-word expression of  risk and that 
the audit procedures should be driven by this singular expression. I believe 
such an approach would be overly mechanical, limiting, and unrealistic. 
Clearly there is value to an explicit assessment of  risk. But I do not view it 
as the sole determinant of  audit procedures. Auditors also consider the com-
plexities and subtleties of  the risk factors  present in determining the substantive 
tests to be performed.  Any "model" of  the auditing process should accom-
modate such an approach. I believe SAS 55 would accommodate this if  one 
considers its emphasis on control risk assessments together with its discussion 
of  risk factors  in paragraph 16. With such an approach, I believe auditors could 
draw the appropriate distinctions between the strong controls and weak con-
trols cases described earlier. 
Some effort  was made in the Audit Guide to distinguish between these 
cases. The following  discussion is included in paragraph 3.5: 
The auditor should recognize that, although the level of  assurance 
needed from  substantive tests remains the same whether control risk 
is assessed at the maximum because of  efficiency  reasons or because 
of  ineffective  policies and procedures, the fact  that the auditor concludes 
that policies or procedures are ineffective  may raise concerns about 
auditability and other questions. Assuming that the auditor is able to 
overcome auditability concerns, he or she may respond by heighten-
ing the degree of  professional  skepticism, assigning more experi-
enced staff,  and changing the nature, timing and extent of  substantive 
procedures. 
While this is an attempt to recognize the differences,  some auditors may 
find  it confusing,  particularly the apparent inconsistency between "level of 
assurance needed from  substantive tests remains the SAME" and "CHANG-
ING the nature, timing and extent of  substantive procedures (emphasis 
added)." No further  explanation is provided in the Audit Guide. Thus, I be-
lieve this is an area for  further  guidance and clarification  by the Auditing Stan-
dards Boards. 
How Do the Alternative Models Handle "Maximum" 
Control Risk Cases? 
But how well do the models presented earlier address the two cases 
where control risk is assessed at the maximum? Let us first  consider the be-
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lief-based  approach, the initial depiction of  which is presented in Figure 3. 
This model would not be a logical approach for  the strong controls case. Here, 
the auditor's "initial" control risk assessment would be "low" and this would 
be reflected  in the initial design of  substantive tests. However, this would re-
sult in under-auditing because the auditor does not plan to validate his con-
trol risk assessment belief  through tests of  controls. This under-auditing 
would be corrected later when the auditor makes his "final"  control risk as-
sessment. Such an approach is not logical or efficient. 
What is needed is a model that enables the auditor to design substantive 
tests based on both his control risk assessment beliefs  as well as his plans 
for  validating these beliefs.  The model presented in the Audit Guide - and 
summarized in Figure 4 - provides one approach for  doing this. The "planned 
assessed level of  control risk" combines, in a single expression, the auditor's 
belief  about control risk and his intent to validate this belief. 
Where the auditor plans to validate his belief  (or where no validation is 
necessary because the auditor believes risk at the maximum), the planned 
assessed level of  control risk is the same as the auditor's belief  about control 
risk. However, where the auditor believes risk is low but does not plan to val-
idate this belief,  the planned assessed level of  control risk would be at the 
maximum. Thus, this is not a purely belief-based  approach. It is subject to 
the same concerns expressed earlier about treating the two maximum con-
trol risk assessment cases in the same manner. 
The authors' belief-based  approach includes additional features  (not re-
flected  in Figure 3) that would enable the auditor to consider separately his 
plans for  validating his control risk beliefs.  They discuss the "reliance" con-
cept which was dropped from  the standard because of  "perceived confusion 
over its meaning" and replaced with the control risk assessment concept How-
ever, the authors do not agree that the control risk assessment concept 
should be viewed as a substitute for  the reliance concept. In fact,  they see 
complementary roles for  a belief-based  control risk assessment and the re-
liance judgment. Certainly the auditor's control risk belief  is relevant for 
audit planning. The authors argue that the auditor should also consider 
whether he plans to rely on this belief  (i.e., the reliance judgment). This en-
hancement of  the belief-based  approach is illustrated in Figure 6. 
The belief-based  approach is an appealing model because it enables the 
auditor to separately consider his control risk beliefs  as well as his plans for 
validating these beliefs.  This model provides a better way of  dealing with the 
two control risk assessment cases noted earlier. Using the evidence-based 
or Audit Guide models, control risk would be assessed at "maximum" in both 
cases, which does not recognize the differences  in these situations. Using 
the model in Figure 6, however, there are differences  in the assessments made. 
While both would place "no reliance" on internal controls, the control risk 
assessment in one case would be "maximum" while in the other it would be 
"low." These different  assessments provide a direct, explicit means to rec-
ognize the differences  between these cases and to produce a design of  sub-
stantive tests that recognizes these differences.  In my view, this "marriage" 
of  the control risk assessment concept with the reliance concept is the most 
significant  contribution of  this paper and warrants serious consideration by 
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Figure 6 
BELIEF-BASED PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING CONTROL RISK 
(Including Reliance Judgement) 
the Auditing Standards. Unlike other discussions, it does not require an 
"either-or" choice between the concepts, but recognizes their complemen-
tary relationship between the two. 
The "Evidence Sufficiency"  Judgment 
The authors' belief-based  approach has one additional feature  not re-
flected  in Figures 3 or 6. They believe it is also important for  the auditor to 
evaluate the sufficiency  of  evidence obtained in performing  tests of  controls. 
They make the following  arguments: 
Ideally, a risk model should accommodate separate assessments of 
risk and evidence sufficiency  [p. 115]. 
Although professional  standards do not explicitly 'model' separate 
belief  assessments and evidence sufficiency  assessments, this basic 
concept was nevertheless reflected  in the old standards [p. 115]. 
The control risk assessments should be based on the auditor's beliefs 
and a separate assessment made regarding the sufficiency  of  the 
evidence collected to rely on those beliefs  [p. 118]. 
The addition of  this "evidence sufficiency  judgment" is reflected  in the il-
lustration in Figure 7. While I agree that this is a judgment that should be 
and is made by auditors, I do not agree with including it explicitly in the model. 
The reliance judgment that comes earlier in the model provides the auditor's 
























(1) This assessement is based on the auditor's beliefs,  regardless of  whether evidence has been (or will be) accumulated to support this 
belief  (example: "low"). 
(2) This decision is the degree to which the auditor intends to rely on, and obtain evidence to support, his belief.  Thus, while the auditor 
may believe control risk to be low, he may decide to obtain evidence to support only a "moderate" or "slightly below maximum" leveL 
This decision is based on the relative effectiveness  and efficiency  of  alternative audit procedures. 
(3) This is to update the auditor's belief  about control risk based on evidence obtained. Ordinarily, this would be the same as the inital 
assessment unless contrairy evidence has been obtained. In this case, the design of  substantive tests may need to be revised. 
(4) This approach allows flexibility  to design and perform  substantive tests either simultaneously with, or subsequent to, tests of 
controls. 
ther, the revised control risk assessment made later in the model would re-
flect  what the auditor actually found  with respect to the sufficiency  of  evidence. 
Thus, I do not believe an additional explicit judgment is necessary and would 
merely add additional complexity to the model. 
Figure 7 
BELIEF-BASED PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING CONTROL RISK 
(Including Reliance and Sufficiency  judgments) 
(1) This assessment is based on the auditor's belief,  regardless of  whether evidence has been (or will be) accumulated to suppport this 
belief  (example: "low"). 
(2) This decision is the degree to which the auditor intends to rely on, and obtain evidence to support, his belief.  Thus, while the auditor 
may believe control risk to below, he may decide to obtain evidence to support only a "moderate" or "slightly below maximum" level. 
This decision is based on the relative effectiveness  and efficiency  of  alternative audit procedures. 
(3) This decision is to evaluate whether the intended degree of  reliance has been supported by evidence obtained through tests of  controls. 
If  not, the auditor may need to revise his belief  about control risk and revise the design of  substantive tests. 
(4) This is to update the auditor's belief  about control risk based on evidence obtained. Ordinarily, this would be the same as the initial 
assessment unless contrary evidence has been obtained. 
(5) This approach allows flexibility  to design and perform  substantive tests either simultaneously with, or subsequest to, tests of  controls. 
What About Inherent Risk? 
An important area that is not addressed by the authors is the considera-
tion of  inherent risk. The authors recognize the importance of  this issue but 
do not deal with it in this paper: 
SAS 55's expansion of  factors  to be considered in obtaining an un-
derstanding of  a client's internal control structure may lead to in-
creased confounding  of  the inherent risk and control risk assessments. 
This issue (albeit critical) is beyond the scope of  this paper [p. 113, 
footnote  5]. 
By "confounding,"  the authors refer  to the overlap of  inherent risk and 
control risk factors.  Because the standards provide little guidance on defin-
ing inherent risk factors,  SAS 55 has included a number of  control risk fac-
tors which many would say are inherent risk factors.  An equally serious or 
perhaps more serious concern is with the risk assessments. SAS 55 dis-
cusses almost exclusively the control risk assessment, as if  that assessment 
alone is responsible for  driving the scope of  substantive tests. However, the 
control risk assessment can be very misleading if  not considered together 
with the inherent risk assessment. To illustrate, let's review two cases where 




























Consideration of  Inherent Risk 
Inherent Control Control Extent of 
Risk Risk Risk Substantive 
Factors Factors Assessment Tests 
Receivables o High Level o Limited 
Valuation of  Past-Due Management 
Case# 1 Accounts Reviews 
o Significant o No 
Writeoffs "Reliance" 
Receivables o Low Level o Limited 
Valuation of  Past-Due Management 
Case#2 Accounts Reviews 
o Limited o No 
Writeoffs "Reliance" 
o Maximum o Extensive 
o Maximum o Moderate 
In each of  the illustrated cases, control risk would be assessed at the max-
imum using the SAS 55 procedure. But it is very evident that the design of 
substantive tests would not be the same because of  the differences  in inher-
ent risk. These cases illustrate that the design of  substantive tests should be 
driven not just by the assessment of  control risk but by assessment of  both 
inherent risk and control risk. SAS 55 actually refers  to such an approach in 
paragraph 37: 
The auditor uses the assessed level of  control risk (together with the 
assessed level of  inherent risk) to determine the acceptable level of 
detection risk for  financial  statement assertions. 
While this appears to provide the appropriate guidance, no further  guid-
ance or examples are provided. The SAS 55 guidance with respect to inher-
ent risk is reflected  in a simple model in Figure 9. This model reflects  the 
limited guidance in the standards on inherent risk factors  and inherent risk 
assessments. Any future  attempts to improve upon the SAS 55 or Audit Guide 
models should also consider inherent risk. 
One approach would be to provide additional, essentially separate, guid-
ance on the identification  of  inherent risk factors  and the assessment of  in-
herent risk. However, I would propose a more integrated approach. Under 
this approach, rather than making separate assessments of  inherent risk 
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Figure 
CONSIDERATION OF INHERENT RISK 














(1) Only limited guidance is provided in the standards for  identifying 
inherent risk factors  and assessing inherent risk 
and control risk, the auditor would make a single combined risk assessment. 
This single assessment would represent the level of  risk that remains after 
considering the level of  risk that is created by inherent risk factors  and re-
ducing this by the effect  of  the internal control structure. A single model re-
flecting  this "remaining" risk assessment is presented in Figure 10. Making 
a combined assessment has several advantages over separate assessments 
of  inherent risk and control risk. In practice, it is difficult  if  not impossible to 
separate the consideration of  control risk from  inherent risk. These consid-
erations are inextricably linked. Making separate assessments is more an ex-
ercise in theory than in reality. Further, a combined model would encourage 
direct consideration of  inherent risk factors,  rather than assuming the risk 
to be irrelevant or at the maximum. 
Summary 
The following  is a summary of  my remarks. First, SAS 55 can be difficult 
to understand and apply. While it makes some significant  conceptual im-
provements in the literature, it is rather complex and it will take time before 
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Figure 10 
Consideration of  Inherent Risk 
(An Alternative Approach) 
it is well understood. Papers such as this that contribute to understanding 
and improving this standard are appreciated. Second, literal interpretations 
of  SAS 55 can be misleading. This SAS should be viewed more as a concep-
tual document rather than one that can be read literally. The Audit Guide is 
more useful  for  understanding the procedures to be followed.  Third, the be-
lief-based  approach introduced by the authors is a very good model particu-
larly in its separation of  the control risk assessment from  the reliance 
judgment. Finally, any effort  to improve the SAS 55 model should also inte-
grate the consideration of  inherent risk. 
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Illegal Acts: What is the Auditor's Responsibility? 
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Society has always been concerned with violations of  laws and regulations 
by all types of  entities - business enterprises, nonprofit  organizations, and 
governmental units. Highly publicized accounts of  management improprieties 
reported over the last two decades have caused this concern to increase sig-
nificantly.  Several congressional committees, regulatory agencies, and oth-
ers have suggested that auditors should assume more responsibility for 
detecting and disclosing violations of  laws or regulations, commonly referred 
to as illegal acts. 
Developing standards that articulate the auditor's responsibility for  ille-
gal acts has proven to be a very challenging task for  several reasons. First, 
a large diversity of  laws and regulations affects  most entities, and identifying 
violations of  many of  those laws and regulations requires legal expertise. Sec-
ond, even with this expertise, the complexity of  some laws and regulations 
makes identifying  a violation very difficult.  Finally, even after  an illegal act 
has been identified,  evaluating management's assessment of  its potential ef-
fects  on the entity's financial  statements is also very difficult. 
This article analyzes the auditing standards that describe the auditor's re-
sponsibilities for  detecting and reporting illegal acts. It also reviews the his-
torical developments that have brought the profession  to where it is today. 
Finally, we introduce some future  issues and research needs in this area. 
Historical Developments 
The issue of  the auditor's responsibility for  illegal or questionable acts by 
clients is not new. It first  made front-page  news in the mid 1970's as a result 
of  the Watergate scandal. Investigations led to initial disclosures of  illegal po-
litical contributions by many large corporations. These initial disclosures 
opened the door to a host of  other revelations involving questionable payments 
by corporations to domestic and foreign  government officials.  As a result, the 
profession  formally  addressed the issue of  the auditor's responsibility to de-
tect and report illegal acts by clients. The issue was initially studied by the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission). Based 
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on the Cohen Commission's preliminary recommendations, the AICPA Au-
diting Standards Executive Committee issued SAS No. 17, Illegal  Acts by 
Clients,  in 1977. This statement was the first  professional  standard that specif-
ically addressed the auditor's responsibilities to detect and disclose illegal acts. 
Many of  the concepts in current professional  standards were developed 
by the Cohen Commission. It concluded that the auditor cannot reasonably 
be expected to assume the responsibility to detect and disclose an entity's 
violations of  laws in general because: (1) auditors do not possess the legal 
training to recognize all the complex circumstances and processes that give 
rise to litigation and that suggest its outcome, and (2) many illegal or ques-
tionable acts involve small amounts in relation to the financial  statements. If 
society needs assurance on matters that are principally legal, the Cohen 
Commission concluded that this assurance should be provided by those 
most capable of  doing so, management assisted by its lawyers. 
In discussing the auditor's responsibility, the Cohen Commission ac-
knowledged that certain illegal acts, such as tax evasion, have been well de-
fined  and are easily recognized by experienced auditors. It also introduced 
the concept of  illegal acts that have a direct and material effect  on the amounts 
in the financial  statements, and stated that auditors normally consider the pos-
sibility of  such acts when planning and conducting their audits. 
Consistent with the recommendations of  the Cohen Commission, SAS No. 
17 [AICPA 1977] begins by stating that: 
An examination made in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards cannot be expected to provide assurance that illegal acts will 
be detected. In reporting on financial  statements, an auditor holds him-
self  out as one who is proficient  in accounting and auditing. The de-
termination of  whether an act is illegal is usually beyond his professional 
competence [para .03]. 
The statement goes on to indicate that procedures performed  primarily 
for  the purpose of  expressing an opinion on the financial  statements may bring 
possible illegal acts to the auditor's attention. But the further  removed an il-
legal act is from  the events and transactions specifically  reflected  in the fi-
nancial statements, the less likely the auditor is to become aware of  the act 
or recognize its possible illegality. 
SAS No. 17 also discusses violations of  laws and regulations that have a 
direct effect  on the amounts in the financial  statements. It states that the au-
ditor considers such laws and regulations when planning and conducting the 
audit, and includes as examples tax laws, and laws and regulations affecting 
the amount of  revenue accrued under government contracts. However, SAS 
No. 17 does not set forth  any affirmative  detection responsibility. 
Finally, SAS No. 17 contains guidance for  the auditor when he or she be-
lieves that an illegal act has occurred. The auditor is to obtain an understanding 
of  the nature of  the potential financial  statement effect  by inquiry of  man-
agement, by consultation with legal counsel and, if  necessary, perform  ad-
ditional procedures to investigate the act. If  an act is determined to be illegal, 
the auditor is required to report the circumstances to management person-
nel at a high enough level of  authority so that appropriate action can be 
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taken. In some circumstances, that might be the audit committee of  the 
board of  directors. 
In the mid-to-late 1980's, the issue of  the auditors' responsibility for  ille-
gal acts by clients resurfaced  during the development of  the "expectation gap" 
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The public and financial  statement 
users believed that auditors should assume more responsibility for  detect-
ing errors and irregularities. This resulted in the Auditing Standards Board's 
reexamination of  the auditor's responsibility for  illegal acts, and the issuance 
of  SAS No. 54, Illegal  Acts by Clients,  which superseded the guidance in SAS 
No. 17. 
Detection Responsibility 
In defining  the auditor's responsibility for  detecting illegal acts, SAS No. 
54 takes the approach of  dividing illegal acts into two broad categories or types. 
For the first  type, illegal acts that have a direct  and material  effect  on line-
item amounts in the financial  statements, the auditor has the same respon-
sibility as for  errors and irregularities. That is, the auditor should design the 
audit to provide reasonable assurance that the financial  statements amounts 
are free  from  material misstatement resulting from  these direct  effect  illegal 
acts. This responsibility is described in SAS No. 53, The  Auditor's  Responsi-
bility to Detect and  Report Errors  and  Irregularities.  In contrast to SAS No. 17, 
SAS No. 54 establishes an affirmative  detection responsibility for  direct  effect 
illegal acts that are material. 
For the second type, SAS No. 54 states that an audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) normally does not include audit 
procedures specifically  designed to detect illegal acts having an indirect  ef-
fect  on financial  statements. The auditor is responsible for  evaluation of  such 
acts only when information  comes to his or her attention suggesting the pos-
sibility that they have occurred. However, SAS No. 54 does note that the au-
ditor should make inquiries of  management about the entity's compliance with 
laws and regulations. When appropriate, the auditor should also inquire of 
management about (1) the entity's policies relative to the prevention of  in-
direct effect  illegal acts, and (2) the use of  directives and periodic represen-
tations obtained from  management about compliance with laws and regulations. 
If  the auditor becomes aware of  information  that raises suspicions, the au-
ditor is obligated to apply additional procedures to determine whether an il-
legal act has, in fact,  occurred. SAS No. 54 reaffirms  the presumption that an 
audit made in accordance with GAAS provides no assurance that indirect  ef-
fect  illegal acts will be disclosed. 
Differentiating  the Types of  Illegal Acts 
Although the concept of  direct and material illegal acts was developed in 
the mid 1970's, auditors are for  the first  time attempting to operationalize the 
concept in audit engagements. SAS No. 54 provides examples of  both direct 
effect  and indirect effect  illegal acts. Apart from  these examples, SAS No. 54 
leaves the issue of  differentiating  direct effect  illegal acts from  indirect effect 
illegal acts largely to auditor judgment. As the AICPA industry committees 
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have attempted to develop guidance about illegal acts for  industry audit and 
accounting guides, it has become apparent that distinguishing direct effect 
from  indirect effect  illegal acts is a challenging practice problem. 
The examples in SAS No. 54 of  direct effect  illegal acts are the same as 
those included in SAS No. 17 - violations of  tax laws that affect  the amount 
of  expense recognized for  the period and violations of  laws and regulations 
that affect  the amount of  revenue accrued under government contracts. Ad-
ditional examples for  entities receiving federal  financial  assistance are pro-
vided in SAS No. 63, Compliance  Auditing  Applicable  to Governmental  Entities 
and  Other Recipients of  Governmental  Financial  Assistance. That statement 
identifies,  in broad categories, the types of  legal requirements that may have 
a direct effect  on the entity's financial  statements. Such laws and regulations 
generally deal with the following  matters: 
• The types of  services that may or may not be purchased with financial 
assistance. 
• The characteristics of  individuals or groups to whom entities may 
give financial  assistance. 
• The amounts entities must contribute from  their own resources to-
wards projects for  which financial  assistance is provided. 
Indirect effect  illegal acts are characterized as being more related to the 
entity's operating aspects than to its financial  and accounting aspects. Examples 
include violations of  laws and regulations related to securities trading, oc-
cupational safety  and health, food  and drug safety,  environmental protection, 
equal employment, and antitrust. The financial  statement effect  of  violations 
of  these acts is normally the contingent liability that may need to be disclosed 
in the financial  statements. For example, securities may be purchased based 
on insider information.  If  the purchase is appropriately recorded, there is no 
direct effect  on the financial  statements. But the indirect effect  - the poten-
tial contingent liability in the form  of  fines  or penalties - may not be disclosed. 
This contingent tail does not make this violation a direct effect  illegal act, even 
if  it meets the criteria for  accrual under Statement of  Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5, Accounting for  Contingencies. 
All direct effect  laws and regulations have one characteristic in common -
requirements that dictate the manner in which a financial  statement amount 
should be measured or presented. They have provisions that relate to the val-
uation or classification  of  financial  statement revenues or expenses and re-
lated assets or liabilities. Such requirements are akin to those in a royalty 
contract that specify  the way in which royalty expenses and liabilities should 
be measured. According to SAS No. 54, the auditor's concern with compli-
ance with these laws and regulations is derived from  their effect  on financial 
statement amounts, not from  their legality per se. Thus, the auditor's re-
sponsibility runs only to the specific  requirements that affect  the financial  state-
ment amounts. This concept can be illustrated with tax laws and regulations. 
Certain provisions of  the tax code affect  the manner in which an entity's tax 
provision is measured. They have a direct effect  on the financial  statements. 
Other provisions relate to the accurate completion and timely filing  of  tax forms. 
The effect  of  violations of  these provisions is indirect - the contingent 
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liability for  tax penalties. The auditors' responsibility for  this contingency is 
the same as for  other illegal acts that have an indirect effect  on the financial 
statements. 
Auditing the Contingent Tail 
Certain audit procedures performed  for  the purpose of  forming  an opin-
ion on the financial  statements may bring possible violations of  laws and reg-
ulations to the auditor's attention. Examples of  such procedures include 
reading minutes of  meetings of  stockholders and directors and correspon-
dence from  taxing or other governmental agencies, and inspecting documents 
supporting transactions. In auditing litigation, claims, and assessments, the 
auditor performs  the following  procedures that also might disclose illegal acts: 
• Making inquiries of  and discussing with management the policies 
and procedures adopted for  identifying,  evaluating, and accounting 
for  litigation, claims, and assessments. 
• Obtaining from  management a description and evaluation of  litiga-
tion, claims, and assessments, and assurances that all such matters 
have been disclosed in accordance with Statement of  Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 5 (FASB No 5). 
• Examining documents in the client's possession concerning litiga-
tion, claims, and assessments, including correspondence and invoices 
from  lawyers. 
• Obtaining assurance from  management that it has disclosed all 
unasserted claims that the lawyer has advised them are probable 
of  assertion and must be disclosed in accordance with FASB No. 5. 
• Obtaining a response from  the entity's lawyer to a letter of  audit in-
quiry about litigations, claims, and assessments. 
These procedures for  litigation, claims, and assessments provide limited 
evidence of  compliance with laws and regulations. They rely heavily upon man-
agement becoming aware of  a violation and making information  about the 
matter known to the entity's lawyer and the auditor. Other evidence might 
not be available until a governmental agency undertakes an investigation of 
the violation. 
Evaluating the Results of  the Procedures 
If  the auditor's procedures provide an indication that indirect effect  ille-
gal acts may have occurred, SAS No. 54 states that the auditor should obtain 
sufficient  information  about the nature of  the act to evaluate its effect  on the 
financial  statements. Obtaining this information  begins with inquiries of  man-
agement at least one level above those involved. If  satisfactory  information 
is not obtained from  that source, the auditor should consult with the client's 
legal counsel, and apply any additional procedures necessary to obtain an un-
derstanding of  the nature of  the acts. When the auditor concludes, based on 
the information,  that illegal acts have or are likely to have occurred, he or 
she should consider their effects  on the financial  statements as well as the 
implications for  other aspects of  the audit. 
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Indirect effect  illegal acts typically result in unasserted claims against the 
entity. In determining the appropriate financial  statement presentation of  an 
unasserted claim, management refers  to FASB No. 5. That statement re-
quires management, assisted by legal counsel, to assess the probability of  a 
claim being asserted and the probability of  an unfavorable  outcome. Based 
on these assessments, the financial  statements may include accrual of  an es-
timated loss, or disclosure of  the matter in notes to the financial  statements. 
The auditor's ability to evaluate the financial  statement presentation of  the 
indirect effects  of  an illegal act is limited. The auditor generally does not have 
the legal training or experience to second guess the opinion of  management 
and legal counsel. Therefore,  to a large extent the auditor acts as a broad con-
trol over the information  by evaluating management's disclosure of  the mat-
ter in relation to the lawyer's representations and the criteria in FASB No. 5. 
Other Compliance Auditing Requirements 
In performing  audits of  governmental units, not-for-profit  organizations, 
and certain other regulated companies, the auditor may perform  additional 
procedures to test compliance with laws and regulations. These additional 
procedures are beyond those required to comply with generally accepted au-
diting standards and are imposed by rule, law, or regulation. An example is 
the Single Audit Act of  1984 and Circular A-128, Audits  of  State  and  Local 
Governments,  issued by the Office  of  Management and Budget (OMB), 
which requires certain governmental units and non-governmental entities that 
receive federal  financial  assistance to engage an auditor to test and report on 
compliance with certain laws and regulations. Circular A-133, Audits  of  In-
stitutions  of  Higher  Education  and  Other Nonprofit  Institutions,  includes sim-
ilar requirements for  not-for-profit  organizations. These additional compliance 
auditing procedures are similar to agreed-upon procedures under the State-
ment on Standards for  Attestation Engagements [AICPA 1989]. The regu-
latory agency or legislative body decides which provisions of  laws and 
regulations need to be tested and the nature and extent of  the related pro-
cedures. The laws and regulations selected for  testing may not even have an 
indirect effect  on the entity's financial  statements. Examples of  laws and reg-
ulations that have no effect  on the financial  statements are contained in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of  1974. That act includes provi-
sions, such as bonding requirements, that govern the administration of  an 
employee benefit  plan. Violations of  such provisions have no direct or con-
tingent effect  on the financial  condition of  the plan. Any penalties are levied 
against the trustees. 
This agreed-upon procedures approach appears to represent the most cost-
beneficial  approach to developing expanded auditing requirements for  com-
pliance with laws, and regulations. Regulatory agencies or legislative bodies 
can contract for  the level of  assurance that is desired. 
Reporting Responsibilities 
What impact do illegal acts have on the auditor's reporting responsibili-
ties? The answer to this question is complex and may involve a number of 
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reporting vehicles. The reporting vehicle typically thought of  first  is the audit 
report. Generally, there is no need for  the auditor to modify  the audit report 
for  illegal acts, provided that the effects  of  those acts are appropriately pre-
sented or disclosed in the financial  statements. On the other hand, if  the au-
ditor concludes that illegal acts have a material effect  on the financial 
statements, and that effect  is not appropriately reflected,  the auditor should 
express a qualified  or adverse opinion because of  the lack of  conformity  with 
GAAP. If  management refuses  to accept the auditor's modified  report, the au-
ditor should withdraw from  the engagement and notify  the audit committee 
or the board of  directors of  the reasons for  withdrawal. 
One of  the objectives of  the expectation gap SASs was to improve the com-
munications to boards of  directors and audit committees to help them fulfill 
their financial  reporting and oversight responsibilities. Accordingly, SAS No. 
54 includes a requirement for  the auditor to make sure that the audit com-
mittee of  the entity is adequately informed  of  all but inconsequential illegal 
acts. Management may make the communication unless the act involves se-
nior management in which case the matter should be communicated directly 
by the auditor. Communication to regulatory agencies or other parties out-
side the entity is ordinarily not required under U.S. auditing standards, but 
there are the following  exceptions: 
• To a funding  agency or other specified  agency based on audit and 
reporting requirements of  law or regulation. 
• When the auditor responds to a Form 8-K filed  by the entity to re-
port a change in auditor. 
• To a successor auditor who makes inquiries in accordance with SAS 
No. 7, Communications  Between Predecessor  and  Successor  Auditors. 
• In response to a subpoena. 
The first  two of  these exceptions establish forms  of  direct reporting of  il-
legal acts to regulatory agencies. The first  allows regulatory agencies to di-
rectly receive information  regarding an entity's compliance with laws and 
regulations. Regulated entities can be required by law or regulation to en-
gage an auditor to issue compliance reports for  filing  with the agency. The 
reports may be based upon specified  procedures or procedures performed 
in the audit of  the entity's financial  statements. The reporting requirements 
of  an audit in accordance with Governmental  Auditing  Standards  (GAAS) is 
a prominent example of  this form  of  direct reporting. In these types of  en-
gagements, the auditor is required to issue an additional report on compli-
ance with laws and regulations based solely on the procedures required by 
GAAS. The report discloses all instances of  noncompliance that are esti-
mated to be material to the entity's financial  statements and all indications 
of  illegal acts that could result in criminal prosecution. Since the auditor or-
dinarily does not possess the expertise to evaluate whether an illegal act could 
result in criminal prosecution, he or she will normally report all illegal acts 
or possible illegal acts noted. 
The second exception results in a form  of  direct reporting when the au-
ditor decides to withdraw from  the engagement, because management's re-
sponse to an illegal act is not considered appropriate. If  management does 
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not accurately describe the relationship of  the illegal act to the change in au-
ditor in the Form 8-K, the auditor is required to describe the matter in a re-
sponse to the SEC. 
Future Issues 
Given the interest of  Congress and regulators in others' compliance with 
laws and regulations, the auditor's responsibilities for  illegal acts will no 
doubt be addressed again. Several issues appear relevant to any future  con-
sideration of  these responsibilities. These issues and their research implications 
are presented below. 
Can the Auditor's Detection Responsibilities be Expanded 
Under GAAS? 
Current professional  standards contain a relatively clear delineation of 
those illegal acts for  which the auditor has detection responsibility. The au-
ditor has a responsibility to design the audit to provide reasonable assurance 
of  detecting violations of  laws and regulations having a direct and material 
effect  on financial  statement amounts. Expanding the auditor's responsibil-
ity under GAAS would likely result in a level of  responsibility that is more 
difficult  to interpret. 
Any approach to expanding the auditor's responsibility must involve in-
creasing the auditor's responsibility for  the contingent tail. But this runs 
headlong into the auditor's limited legal expertise. It's clear that the auditor 
could design procedures to obtain reasonable assurance of  detecting viola-
tions of  certain laws and regulations that might have an indirect effect  on an 
entity's financial  statements. For example, the auditor of  a financial  institu-
tion could design effective  procedures for  testing compliance with the re-
quirement to submit currency transaction reports for  all large cash deposits. 
Designing effective  tests of  compliance for  indirect effect  laws and regula-
tions that have no reasonably objective criteria for  identifying  violations, sim-
ply would not be feasible.  Therefore,  any expanded responsibility would vary 
from  industry to industry and perhaps, even from  client to client in the same 
industry, depending on nature of  the laws and regulations that affect  the en-
tity. Using this approach, a clear-cut definition  of  the auditor's responsibility 
under GAAS could be achieved only by developing professional  standards 
or laws and regulations that set forth  specifically  those laws and regulations 
that the auditor would be required to test for  compliance. 
Another way to define  this expanded responsibility would be to include 
in professional  standards factors  that affect  the likelihood that the auditor will 
detect particular indirect effect  illegal act Such factors  would probably include 
the following: 
• The auditor's assessment of  the materiality of  the contingent effect 
of  the act on the entity's financial  statements (i.e., the materiality of 
the potential fine  or penalty). 
• The auditor's assessments of  the joint probability that the entity com 
mitted the act and a claim will be successfully  asserted. 
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• The auditor's ability to recognize the act (i.e., the extent of  the au-
ditor's knowledge of  the subject matter of  the law or regulation, and 
the complexity of  the law or regulation). 
• The extent of  the evidence that is available that would provide an 
indication that the act has occurred. 
This approach would leave the laws and regulations selected for  testing, 
as well as the nature and extent of  the procedures performed,  largely to the 
judgment of  the auditor. Therefore,  a "fuzzy"  definition  of  the auditor's de-
tection responsibility would result. 
Both of  these approaches to expanding the auditor's responsibility under 
GAAS suffer  from  another limitation. The degree of  assurance about the dis-
closure of  the effects  of  a violation of  a law or regulation would vary de-
pending on the nature of  the law or regulation. More assurance would be 
provided for  those laws and regulations for  which the auditor could design 
effective  compliance procedures. It's questionable whether these varying 
levels of  assurance could be effectively  communicated to users of  the audit 
report. One might also question whether it is cost-beneficial  to provide ad-
ditional assurance for  only certain types of  contingencies. However, research 
addressing these questions would be useful.  From a broad research per-
spective, it would also be useful  to have information  regarding the expecta-
tions of  users about the auditors responsibility to detect illegal acts. What 
assurances about compliance with laws and regulations do investors and reg-
ulators expect from  the audit in accordance with GAAS? 
Can the Auditor's Detection Responsibility be Expanded 
Outside of  GAAS? 
Expanding the responsibility of  the auditor outside of  GAAS is the approach 
that some regulatory agencies are currently taking or considering. As described 
above, laws and regulations are being developed that establish requirements 
for  reports by auditors on the application of  agreed-upon compliance proce-
dures. This approach to expanding the auditor's responsibility would appear 
to be more effective  and efficient  than expanding the auditor's responsibility 
under GAAS. Regulators can contract for  the level of  auditing desired regardless 
of  the effects  of  the laws or regulations on the entity's financial  statements. 
Also, all expansions of  audit requirements would go through normal legislative 
or administrative due process. 
This regulatory market for  compliance auditing would also appear to be 
a fruitful  subject for  research. The use of  agreed-upon procedures as a method 
to contract for  these services creates a unique market in which the user can 
contract for  a specific  level of  auditing. It provides a new setting for  exami-
nation of  agency relationships. 
Is There a Need to Expand the Auditor's Responsibility 
for  Direct Reporting of  Illegal Acts? 
As indicated above, the auditor already has a limited responsibility to re-
port illegal acts directly to regulators. Still, some regulatory agencies are re-
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questing that auditors assume more direct reporting responsibility. As a part 
of  the Financial Institutions Reform,  Recovery and Enforcement  Act of  1989, 
the Secretary of  the Treasury was instructed to study the feasibility  of  adopt-
ing regulations similar to those of  England's Banking Act 1987. That act 
charges the U.K. accounting profession  with the task of  developing standards 
that define  when the auditor should report management improprieties directly 
to the Bank of  England. If  auditors in the U.S. are required to communicate 
certain matters directly to regulators, how would this affect  their relationship 
with management? Would it affect  the level of  communication between the 
two parties? These would also appear to be interesting research questions. 
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Discussants' Response No. 1 to 
"Illegal Acts: What is The Auditor's Responsibility?" 
Editor's Note: As mentioned in the preface,  we have two discussants' 
responses for  this paper. The first  response represents the comments 
by three students from  the accounting program at the University of 
Kansas. These students were selected as the 1990 Deloitte & Touche 
Symposium Fellows. The other response is the usual academician's 
remarks by Professor  McNair, Mississippi State University. The two 




University of  Kansas 
Our objective in critiquing the paper by Mr. Guy, Mr. Whittington and 
Mr. Neebes is to find  ways of  improving SAS 54 [AICPA, 1988]. Our com-
ments will deal with issues related not only to reducing ambiguities in the 
interpretation and implementation of  the SAS by different  auditing firms  but 
also with expanding the scope of  SAS 54 to other issues that have not been 
considered by the profession.  Our discussion will be directed towards SAS 
54 because much of  the paper is a restatement of  the SAS. 
We will address the following  issues in our paper: 
• The distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts. 
• The auditor's competence in detecting illegal acts. 
• SAS 54's "if  necessary" clause. 
• Auditor's neutrality towards industry in detecting illegal acts. 
• Qualitative materiality. 
• Auditor's responsibility towards communicating audit findings. 
The first  issue is direct versus indirect illegal acts. In order to accomplish 
the objective of  consistent application of  the SAS, there needs to be a more 
clear distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts within the SAS. In 
the case of  direct effect  illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for  designing 
the audit to provide reasonable assurance that the financial  statement amounts 
are free  from  material misstatement resulting from  such acts. However, in 
the case of  indirect effect  illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for  the de-
tection of  such acts only when information  comes to his or her attention con-
cerning their possible existence. The last sentence of  paragraph seven of  SAS 
54 more clearly states the auditor's responsibilities for  indirect illegal acts: 
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"... an audit made in accordance with GAAS provides no assurance that il-
legal acts will be detected or that any contingent liabilities that may result 
will be disclosed." Given this wide disparity in the treatment between direct 
and indirect illegal acts, it is crucial that the auditor is provided with a clearer 
distinction between these two types of  illegal acts. What if  the auditor did not 
detect any illegal acts and therefore,  according to SAS 54, assumed that any 
illegal acts that actually existed were indirect in nature and not within the au-
ditor's responsibilities? Then, in retrospect, assume that a direct effect  ille-
gal act did occur. Since the auditor did not detect nor disclose this act, he or 
she would be liable to the users of  the financial  statements. 
It is clear that the difference  in responsibility for  direct and indirect ille-
gal acts is critical in determining the auditor's liability. The paper and SAS 
54 define  direct and indirect illegal acts primarily by example. We contend 
that their use of  only one example to describe indirect illegal acts, which is 
simplistic compared to the complexities that can and do arise in reality, is in-
sufficient  in leading auditors to consistent application of  the standard. The 
example used in the paper is the same one that was used in SAS 54. To il-
lustrate these complexities consider the following  situation. A chemical man-
ufacturer  is operating at a gross margin of  ten percent while other companies 
in the industry are operating at an average of  five  percent. Suppose that this 
higher gross margin is due to the fact  that the company has failed  to acquire 
the requisite environmental protection equipment. One could argue that the 
difference  in the gross margin has a direct effect  on the financial  statements, 
while another could argue that the effect  of  the illegal act is indirect due to 
fines  or other contingent liabilities that might arise due to the company's fail-
ure to follow  the requirements of  the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). 
A second important issue relates to the auditor's competence in detect-
ing illegal acts. As the authors state in the paper, SAS 54 professes  that au-
ditors do not possess the legal training necessary to recognize all circumstances 
leading to litigation. Also, the SAS contends that the determination as to whether 
or not a particular act is illegal is generally based on the advice of  an informed 
expert qualified  to practice law. Given the auditor's lack of  legal expertise, 
SAS 54 directs the auditor towards management in the search for  illegal 
acts. Further, the paper states that audit procedures rely heavily upon the 
cooperation of  the client's management. However, this heavy reliance on the 
client's management provides only limited evidence of  compliance with laws 
and regulations. And, while this limitation is discussed in the paper, no al-
ternative audit procedures are provided. We believe that the paper should 
highlight procedures outside of  receiving management representations, such 
as examining regulatory approval letters or political contributions. 
The third issue we wish to discuss deals with the "if  necessary" words 
that appear in paragraph twelve of  SAS 54. We believe that SAS 54 is con-
tradicting itself  with this paragraph. It first  disclaims the auditor's competence 
in the area of  illegal acts, and then directs the auditor towards management 
for  information  concerning any such acts. But in paragraph 12, the auditor's 
responsibilities are increased by the "if  necessary" language. This clause takes 
the responsibility off  of  the client, where it rightfully  belongs, and instead al-
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lows the client to force  the auditor to decide the legality of  the client's acts. 
The client should be the one who makes any decisions and arrives at any con-
clusions necessary in regards to alleged illegal acts. The auditor should only 
be required to act upon the decisions of  management. It is our belief  that the 
"if  necessary" clause should be removed from  the SAS 54 and that auditors 
should be required to consult with a legal counsel when any and all illegal 
acts are discovered. 
We are also concerned about one of  the paper's recommendations. The 
authors argue that the auditor's detection responsibility for  illegal acts can-
not be expanded because the auditor is not an expert in the area. This is quite 
true, but auditors are often  forced  to use outside experts in the conduct of 
an audit when they lack the necessary expertise. In fact,  SAS No. 11, Using 
the work  of  a specialist  [AICPA, 1975, and 1989], addresses this subject. 
So why not require the use of  lawyers as outside experts during an audit? 
We are not suggesting that lawyers work alongside auditors throughout the 
audit or be used on every audit. Instead, a lawyer could be required if  the au-
ditor is not satisfied  after  inquiry of  management counsel (the "if  necessary" 
point). At the very least, a reference  should be made to SAS No. 11. 
A fourth  issue deserving of  comment on deals with auditor's neutrality 
towards industry in detecting illegal acts. Seeing no discussion of  this issue 
in the paper and SAS No. 54 implies that the auditor should maintain a neu-
tral attitude across industries. It is our contention that auditors should have 
greater skepticism before  beginning audits in certain industries where ille-
gal acts may be prevalent. The defense,  savings and loan, and securities in-
dustries are prime examples. 
Our fifth  concern about SAS No. 54 deals with the definition  of  qualita-
tive materiality. This issue was not addressed in the paper. SAS No. 54 re-
quires the auditor to evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative materiality 
of  an illegal act that comes to his or her attention. Qualitative materiality is 
defined  by example with a reference  to SAS No. 47 [AICPA, 1983]: "an ille-
gal payment of  an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if  there is 
a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or 
a material loss of  revenue." We believe that such a definition  is inadequate. 
An illegal act could be "qualitatively material" even if  its quantitative ef-
fect  on the financial  statements is not material now or even several periods 
later. The term "qualitatively material" suggests an illegal act that, if  committed 
by top management or with the knowledge of  top management, would affect 
the decision of  a reasonable user of  the financial  statements. Examples of  such 
illegal acts are: violations of  securities laws, environmental laws, and bidding 
regulations for  government contracts. By not adequately defining  the term, 
SAS 54 may be allowing auditors not to require management disclosure of 
illegal acts which users would be genuinely concerned about. Illegal acts of 
this nature directly reflect  the integrity of  management. 
Investors do actually care about more than merely the quantitative aspects 
of  companies they invest in. The presence of  "clean" mutual funds,  which do 
not invest in companies with major ties to South Africa  or companies with 
operations which harm the environment, is one indicator that investors are 
concerned about the qualitative aspects of  companies they invest in. 
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We believe that qualitative materiality could be better defined.  Of  course, 
it is very difficult  to define  such an ideal standard which could be applied con-
sistently across audits and among auditors. Any new definition  would, of  course, 
require future  research. But a good definition  of  qualitative materiality as it 
applies to illegal acts might include the following  points: 
• The illegal act is a felony. 
• A member of  top management has been convicted of  or charged with, 
or a member of  top management knew of  and could have prevented 
the act. 
• Purely personal acts unrelated to the financial  statements should be 
excluded. 
In regards to our last issue that deals with auditor's responsibility towards 
communicating audit findings,  the authors state: 
One of  the objectives of  the expectation gap SAS's was to improve 
the communications to boards of  directors and audit committees to help 
them fulfill  their financial  reporting and oversight responsibilities. 
While we feel  that SAS 54 does an adequate job improving communica-
tions between auditors and their clients, it falls  short in the task of  closing the 
expectation gap that exists between the public and the auditor in regards to 
the detection of  illegal acts. Many people in the public incorrectly view an au-
ditor as an expert on every matter relating to a client's financial  statements. 
However, according to paragraph three of  SAS 54, an auditor is "one who is 
proficient  in accounting and auditing," not in the detection of  illegal acts. 
One way to close this expectation gap would be to modify  the standard 
unqualified  audit report to include an additional paragraph that deals with the 
client's system of  internal control. Currently, the AICPA has formed  a task 
force  to examine this possibility. An internal control paragraph would serve 
two purposes. First, it would clearly communicate to users that management 
is responsible  for  establishing a system of  internal control. The paragraph might 
also include the following  items that the client's system is supposed to ac-
complish: 
• Provide reliable data, 
• Safeguard  assets, 
• Promote operational efficiency, 
• Encourage adherence to proscribed management policies, 
• Comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
• Prevent  and detect  illegal acts. 
In addition, the paragraph should state that management is responsible 
for  the design,  installation,  and effectiveness  of  the company's internal control 
system as discussed in SAS 30. Also, the additional paragraph should include 
the auditor's opinion about how the client's internal control system is meet-
ing the above objectives. According to the second standard of  field  work, the 
auditor is only required to obtain an "understanding" of  the client's internal 
control system. In order for  an auditor to express an opinion on the quality 
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of  a client's internal control, more audit procedures may be required. The 
AICPA and auditing firms  would be required to determine the appropriate 
amount of  procedures that are necessary in order to issue an opinion. SAS 
63 [AICPA, 1988] on auditing of  governmental entities may be useful  in de-
signing any standard on the internal control reporting requirements for  pub-
licly traded firms.  Auditors are required to report on the quality of  a 
governmental entity's internal control structure. 
While we believe that the modification  of  the standard audit report to in-
clude an opinion on the client's internal control would help close the expec-
tation gap, it may not be necessary for  all types of  clients. For example, for  a 
small, sole proprietorship with a small number of  financial  users the additional 
cost of  evaluating their internal control system would probably be impracti-
cal. The additional procedures and fourth  paragraph would be most appro-
priate for  publicly traded companies with a large number of  financial  users. 
In conclusion, a conversation that we had with Tom Bintinger, a partner 
with Deloitte & Touche and a member of  the Auditing Standards Board at 
the time SAS 54 was adopted, summed up our reasons for  suggesting a 
change in the standard audit report. He said that it would be far  more con-
structive to establish preventive measures than to increase the auditor's de-
tection responsibilities. After  all, it would be better to stop illegal acts before 
they occur rather than simply discovering them after-the-fact. 
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Discussant's Response No. 2 to 
"Illegal Acts: What is The Auditor's Responsibility?" 
Frances M. McNair 
Mississippi State University 
When I agreed to discuss the paper by Dan Guy, Ray Whittington, and 
Don Neebes, I did not realize the task would be so difficult.  Commenting on 
a paper about SAS No. 54, written by drafters  of  the statement, is difficult 
enough, but then to follow  discussions by three of  the brightest accounting 
students at the University of  Kansas is really a chore. 
Even with the enactment of  SAS No. 54, the question of  what the auditor 
is responsible for  is still difficult  to answer. Does this standard answer the 
question or does it raise the question, "What is the Auditor Responsible 
For?" The standard increases the auditor's responsibility for  detection of  a 
client's illegal acts and it may be difficult  to determine where the responsi-
bility stops. 
Some of  the work that I have done recently has been in the area of  the 
accountant's liability and responsibility. Consequently, some of  my com-
ments concern the potential effect  that this new SAS No. 54 could have on 
the auditor in terms of  additional duties and liabilities. I would like to address 
four  areas of  concern: (1) the classification  of  illegal acts as direct or indirect; 
(2) potential increased liability; (3) interaction with other SASs; and (4) dis-
closure. 
Direct vs. Indirect Illegal Acts 
As discussed in the paper by the authors, illegal acts are divided into two 
categories. The auditor is prescribed different  degrees of  responsibility 
based upon the category in which the illegal act falls.  The prescribed degree 
of  care is much higher for  the first  category of  acts - those illegal acts that 
have a direct  and material  effect  on the financial  statement amounts. Since 
this category of  illegal acts would affect  the financial  statement amounts, the 
auditor should assess the risk that an illegal act may cause the financial  state-
ments to contain a material misstatement. Consequently, the auditor must 
design audit procedures to provide reasonable assurance of  detecting the il-
legal act. 
Much recent litigation has been based on the auditor's negligence when 
there was a failure  to discover and report management's errors and irregu-
larities, i.e., management fraud.  This same standard of  care required for  dis-
covery of  management's errors and irregularities is now required for  the 
discovery of  the client's direct effect  illegal acts. This means the auditor will 
have to understand the legal environment in which the client is operating in 
order to design procedures that would detect such offenses.  This will have 
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a direct impact on the auditing procedures, especially those designed to test 
the internal control procedures of  the client 
The detection of  the indirect effect  illegal acts as defined  in SAS No. 54 
may be much more difficult  than the detection of  the direct effect  illegal acts. 
These are acts that normally do not have a material effect  on the financial 
statement amounts. The auditor has a responsibility for  their discovery, but 
to a lesser degree than for  the discovery of  the direct effect  illegal acts. As is 
noted in the paper, except for  a few  examples given in the statement, differ-
entiating direct effect  illegal acts from  indirect effect  illegal acts is largely a 
matter of  auditor's judgment. There appears to be a very fine  line between 
the two types of  illegal acts, and in some cases the distinction may be nonex-
istent. For example, if  a contingent liability is identified  as a result of  an in-
direct effect  illegal act and a portion of  it is required to be accrued, then does 
it not become a direct effect  illegal act with the higher standard of  care? After 
all, this type of  act does have a direct effect  on the financial  statement amounts. 
It appears that the distinction between a direct effect  illegal act and an in-
direct effect  illegal act may be a source of  confusion  both to the accountant 
and to the public. If  an illegal act has occurred (regardless of  type), and it has 
a material effect  on the financial  statements, then it must be reflected  in the 
financial  statements. If  the illegal act is immaterial, then no disclosure of  the 
act is required to an outside party. However, can there be an illegal act of  any 
consequence not requiring disclosure? Even if  the act pertains to the opera-
tion of  the organization, the commission of  the illegal act can cause a legal li-
ability to accrue. The probability of  the act being discovered is not relevant; 
if  the act has been committed then the consequences must be considered. 
Some acts may not affect  a specific  line item on the financial  statements, 
but they could affect  the continuation of  the business. For example, if  an act 
has been committed that might cause an operating license to be revoked, this 
would affect  the ability of  the business to continue. If  this were the situation, 
then a going concern assessment must be made and disclosed if  the conse-
quences were severe enough. Defining  two categories of  illegal acts may serve 
to confuse  the auditor and possibly lead to more litigation. It appears that the 
auditor should look at the effect  of  the illegal act on the financial  statements 
and whether disclosure could affect  an investor's opinion. 
Although the standard prescribes a higher standard of  care than did SAS 
No. 17, one of  the purposes of  identifying  two classes of  illegal acts was to 
try to limit the auditor's responsibility. But has this been accomplished? The 
standard actually makes the auditor more responsible. Even if  the illegal act 
is related to the operating environment, if  it can have material effect  on the 
financial  statements or on the entity's operation, then is the auditor not re-
sponsible for  detection? Is the distinction between a direct effect  illegal act 
and an indirect effect  illegal act really helpful,  or does this provide a false  sense 
of  security for  the auditor? Could a more useful  test be developed? 
Legal liability 
How does this increased responsibility fit  with potential liability? SAS No. 
54 prescribes the same standard of  care for  direct effect  illegal acts as it does 
for  client's errors and irregularities in SAS No. 53. The litigious nature of  today's 
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environment makes the auditor more susceptible if  he is careless in his re-
sponsibility to detect client's illegal acts. The problem of  third party liability 
is a very real problem, as many accounting firms  know. 
The more liberal view of  auditor responsibility adopted by many of  the 
courts in the 1970s and 1980s proved to be costly to many accounting firms. 
While the opinions of  the courts do vary from  state to state, in general, a more 
liberal view was adopted with respect to third party liability. Many of  the courts 
took the position that clients had a duty to third parties, particularly if  the group 
was identifiable  and limited. This standard has the potential for  making the 
auditor liable for  the client's injurious illegal acts. 
One positive note however, is that a few  of  the court decisions in the late 
1980s and early in 1990 have tended to take a more conservative view of  third 
party liability. The Credit  Alliance  decision is one of  the more important de-
cisions in the 1980s.1 In Credit  Alliance,  the court took a more conservative 
approach and limited liability to third parties that were identified  prior to the 
engagement. A number of  other state courts have adopted this view in 1988 
and 1989. Also, early in 1990, in the Caparo 2 decision, the English House of 
Lords adopted a more conservative view similar to that taken in Credit  Alliance. 
Another interesting question that SAS No. 54 raises is the potential in-
volvement of  legal counsel in the audit process. Some actions may call for  an 
expert opinion as to whether a law has actually been violated and the impli-
cations of  the violation. While the accountant is not necessarily concerned 
with whether a specific  act is illegal per se, there must be a determination to 
measure impact on the financial  statements. For example, some of  the pro-
visions of  the Securities Act of  1933 are complex and violations may be very 
technical. 
The auditors' expertise also is at issue here. How familiar  with law and 
regulations must the auditor be in order to make a judgment about violations? 
If  the auditor does not have the degree of  competency required, does this 
mean the employment of  counsel may become a regular part of  the audit pro-
cedure in firms  where complex regulations apply? It appears that the poten-
tial is there to have legal counsel as a regular member of  the audit team. 
Interaction with Other SASs 
SAS No. 54 is related specifically  to a number of  the new SASs that were 
issued in 1988. The auditor's responsibility for  the detection of  client direct 
effect  illegal acts is the same as is required for  the detection of  client's errors 
and irregularities in SAS No. 53. As you know, SAS No. 53 has increased au-
ditor responsibility by requiring the auditor to design audit procedures to pro-
vide reasonable assurance of  detection. 
The duty of  the auditor to detect material misstatement as a result of  client's 
illegal acts and the risk assessment (both control and inherent risk) have a 
direct bearing on the substantive test that are to be performed.  If  the audi-
1Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E. 2d 110, N.Y. App. (1985). 
2CAPARO Industries v. Dickman, et al. (Touche Ross), English House of  Lords (1990). 
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tor fails  to consider the possibility of  illegal acts and their impact on the 
financial  statements, then the auditor may be setting himself  up for  a negli-
gence charge in the event of  subsequent problems. 
SAS No. 55, Considerations  of  the Internal  Control  Structure  in a Finan-
cial Statement  Audit,  is also impacted by SAS No. 54. The new internal con-
trol procedures require a higher degree of  understanding of  the company's 
internal control structure. The understanding of  the control environment is 
especially important in relation to detecting illegal acts. The control environment 
includes such factors  as management philosophy, the entity's organizational 
structure, and various external influences  that affect  the entity's operations 
and practices (such as requirements by legislative and regulatory bodies). 
As I mentioned earlier, a client illegal act could affect  the firms  ability to 
continue business which will cause a going concern evaluation under SAS 
No. 59. Obviously, a client illegal act will affect  audit procedures required by 
other SAS's, i.e., the design of  substantive procedures. These examples illustrate 
the far  reaching effect  of  SAS No. 54. 
Disclosure 
Normally the responsibility of  notifying  parties outside the clients orga-
nization of  an illegal act not reported in the financial  statements is the re-
sponsibility of  management. However, SAS No. 54, as well as recent court 
decisions, indicate that the auditor has a higher level of  responsibility for  re-
porting certain kinds of  misconduct. The new statement seems to fall  short 
in clarifying  the auditor's responsibility for  disclosure. It notes that in gen-
eral, the auditor has no responsibility to notify  parties outside of  the client's 
organization of  the illegal acts. However, it does suggest that circumstances 
may exist that would require disclosure to an outside party. The statement 
then lists several situations that may require disclosure, but still leaves the 
decision up to the judgment of  the auditor in the specific  situation. Some court 
decisions in the 1980s reinforce  and strengthen the disclosure requirement. 
For example, in the Rudolph  case, the court established its own disclosure 
standard.3 The court reasoned that it is not unreasonable to expect an ac-
countant to expose fraud  in certain circumstances. In Rudolph, the accoun-
tant had knowledge of  fraud  subsequent to the audit. The court stated "the 
accountant's information  is obviously superior to that of  the investors" and 
the auditor may have a duty to disclose. 
Other courts contend that absent some duty to disclose, accountants are 
not required to tattle on their clients. As the court noted in Baker, 4 liability 
depends on an existing duty to disclose. One question to be answered is does 
SAS No. 54 create a legal duty to disclose and if  so to what circumstances 
does it apply? Again, it would appear that if  the illegal act would impact the 
financial  statement amounts or change an investor's decision, then there 
3Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F. 2d 1040 (11 Cir. 1986), rehearing denied at 806 F. 
2d 1070 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1604 (1987). 
4Baker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes and Hart, 757 F. 2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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already is a duty to disclose. In a 1988 case, allegations that the accounting 
firm  knew of  fraud  in partnership offering  material, but allowed use of  its name, 
led to a claim for  aiding and abetting.5 Could this also apply to illegal acts of 
clients known by the auditor but not disclosed? Auditors can also subject them 
selves to RICO suits for  merely being "associated with" an organization in-
volved with RICO violations.6 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the implication of  this new SAS does raise some interest-
ing questions. As the authors point out, one way to handle the problem may 
be to contract separately for  compliance procedures. It appears that SAS No. 
54 has raised the level of  responsibility for  the detection and  disclosure of  a 
client's illegal act. This higher standard of  care has the potential of  creating 
an even more litigious environment for  the accountant. 
5Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F. 2d 646 (9th Cir. 9/19/88). 
6Schact v. Brown, 711 F. 2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983). 
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8 
Panel Discussion on 
"The Impact of  Mergers of  Accounting Firms on 
the Auditing Profession" 
Editor's Note: The panel consisted of  the following  members: 
Stephen J. Aldersley, Ernst & Young, Canada 
David W. Hunerberg, Deloitte & Touche 
Jonathon E. Killmer, Coopers & Lybrand 
Julia A. Lelik, Peat Marwick Thorne, Canada 
Roger R. Nelson, Ernst & Young 
James K. Loebbecke, University of  Utah 
The practitioner's comments were based on their personal experience 
and philosophy along with the firm's  experience and philosophy. The 
academic member of  the panel, Professor  James Loebbecke, con-
cluded the discussion with his views on the subject. The comments 
are given below in the order they were presented. 
Stephen J. Aldersley 
Ernst & Young, Canada 
I would like to begin my comments with a short parable outlining some 
of  the factors  that led to the accounting firm  mergers. Many of  these were 
mentioned yesterday by Ed Kangas in his luncheon address. 
The Parable of  the Geese 
(Or, What to do when your goose is cooked!) 
Once upon a time there were eight large  flocks  of  colored  geese. We'll refer 
to each flock  by its color: Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Purple, White 
and Black. Geese from  these flocks  ate Kentucky Blue Grass, which was con-
sidered a delicacy amongst the geese species. 
At the same time there lived a wide variety of  hunters who grew grain to 
eat. Because they all believed that goose droppings were beneficial  to their 
crops, the hunters always planted patches of  Kentucky Blue near their crops 
so the geese would fly  by. Occasionally, when there was a crop failure,  there 
would be a local food  shortage and the hunters would shoot the geese they 
had attracted with their Kentucky Blue. 
167 
Over time, each of  the geese flocks  developed relationships with smaller 
flocks  of  ducks who would take on the goose flock  color, leading to big flocks 
of  geese and ducks. Ducks, of  course, couldn't eat Kentucky Blue, but they 
could eat almost anything else, or at least that's what they said. Hunters some-
times liked having ducks around because they would eat some of  the weeds 
in the grain fields.  Sometimes the ducks would get out of  control and eat some 
of  the grain. Since the hunters weren't that bright, they didn't always notice, 
but if  they realized what the ducks were doing, they'd shoot them too. But 
this didn't happen very often. 
One of  the reasons the geese wanted to be with ducks is that a large com-
bined flock  around a patch of  Kentucky Blue would keep other flocks  away. 
The ducks liked the opportunities the geese provided and could usually 
scrounge some food  even when there were no weeds. The only major diffi-
culty they had was that sometimes ducks and geese would try to mate. Such 
attempts weren't always successful,  and when they were, gucks were created. 
By the way, a guck doesn't know what its there for  and he or she will oscil-
late between goose-like and duck-like behavior. This confused  the hunters. 
For the longest time the world seemed to be a nice place for  the geese, 
the ducks and the hunters. There were the occasional little spats and a few 
geese and ducks were shot and eaten, but generally, things went along fairly 
smoothly. The different  flocks  got along pretty well, each one sticking to its 
patches of  Kentucky Blue. Then things started to get complicated. Local hunters 
began to plant grain in other worlds and foreign  hunters began to buy local 
fields.  The big flocks  began to grow and needed more Kentucky Blue. New 
rules of  goose etiquette were proclaimed, making it harder for  the geese to 
get at the Kentucky Blue. Hunters were given more powerful  guns, Dingells 
for  example. Hunters were also forming  cooperatives and some were even 
going out of  business. 
The geese and their duck partners of  course, were caught in the middle. 
All the colored flocks  were making agreements with flocks  in other worlds. 
They were also absorbing some of  the lesser uncolored flocks.  But the big 
problem they were all facing  was that the hunters weren't prepared to plant 
as much Kentucky Blue to attract the geese. The geese, being birds, didn't 
help matters. One flock  was always prepared to visit grain fields  served by 
another flock  for  less grass. The overall result was that the growth in the amount 
of  Kentucky Blue Grass was less than the desired growth in the size of  the 
flocks,  a real population crunch. 
The solution, which came gradually, was to rationalize the flocks.  The be-
lief  was that the largest flocks  could muscle in on comparatively smaller flocks 
and grow through aggressive behavior by taking a larger portion of  a smaller 
pie. First, the Red flock  merged with a very large uncolored flock  to become 
the Crimson flock.  Then an attempt was made to merge the Blue flock  with 
the Green flock,  but they blew it when their affiliates  in another world couldn't 
agree. Then came the big one. The Yellow flock  merged with the White flock 
to become the Gingham flock.  Very soon afterwards,  the Green flock  merged 
with the Black flock  and the Blue flock  tried to merge with the Orange flock. 
The last one didn't work nor were the others successful  in all worlds. But the 
damage was done. Instead of  eight colored flocks  there were now only six. 
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It would be nice to be able to say that they all lived happily ever after,  but 
unfortunately,  it was not to be. Lord Caparo came along and said that hunters 
could not use bullets in their guns. It took a while for  it to sink in, hunters 
are a little slow you see, but in the end they realized there was no point in 
giving the geese so much Kentucky Blue. If  you couldn't shoot them, you 
couldn't eat them. They didn't taste very good anyway. Finally, the geese had 
to learn to eat weeds. So ends the parable of  the geese. 
What Does the Future Hold? 
The parable deals with most of  the factors  that led to the mergers except 
perhaps for  the competitive advantage that stronger industry specialization 
brings to the merged firms.  The future  still holds many challenges for  the 
profession.  The market for  audit services will not grow faster  than the 
economies of  the countries in which the public accounting profession  is well 
developed. (There are of  course opportunities in Eastern Europe and in Asia, 
but the North American market is saturated.) In some cases it will not grow 
as fast.  In the absence of  mergers, all large firms  (the Big Six) will grow at 
the same basic rate. There will be a period of  trading, discounting etc., but 
in the end there will be relatively less for  everyone in the business. 
The middle market will gradually disappear as the mid-sized firms  are 
caught in the squeeze between the large international firms  and the small 
local practices. This has already begun in Canada with the complete or par-
tial disintegration of  Eisenberg, Collins Barrow, and Laventhol and Horwath. 
Firms which have only a regional or national scope will not be able to com-
pete unless they find  a niche. 
Another critical challenge will be the relevance of  the audit service itself. 
We need to respond to the Caparo1 decision in the House of  Lords in which 
the duty of  care issue has been revisited. If  this decision becomes an important 
precedent for  other auditor litigation, there may be less exposure to liability 
but it would also challenge the utility of  our services. 
The expectation gap will continue to haunt the profession.  The substan-
tial auditing standards activity in the US will not prevent the future  occurrence 
of  "audit failures".  These events have always been relatively rare and will con-
tinue to occur for  the same reason they've occurred in the past. There is a 
limit to what can be accomplished in an audit, something that has been ac-
knowledged in professional  standards but has not been well understood by 
the public. The mergers do little to benefit  the profession  in this area and in 
some cases make matters worse as clients, and the public, fail  to perceive 
any benefits  to them. 
The increasingly complex environment is making it hard to attract new 
students into the profession.  In Canada, the qualification  process that is 
added on to a fairly  hefty  educational requirement is a major ordeal for  the 
students. As a profession,  we are not always getting the best and brightest 
of  the available graduates and it is now extremely difficult  to attract students 
with non-accounting university education. This will certainly challenge our 
ability to grow our business in the future. 
1See World  Accounting Report, May 1990. 
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Audit Approach in a Merger Environment 
An interesting issue in a major merger situation is the audit approach that 
is adopted by the merged firm.  It may surprise some that this issue is not a 
major factor  in merger discussions. One would think that the process used 
for  the primary business activity would be of  considerable importance to the 
merger participants. But this doesn't seem to be the case. If  all else is agree-
able, then disagreements over methodology will not stop the merger. A com-
promise will be made. 
Once merged, however, the audit methodology becomes a critical issue. 
When you throw staff  from  each predecessor firm  into the same office  so they 
work on the same clients, the daily work process is perhaps the most important 
issue. Given this motivation, there is tremendous pressure to quickly develop 
a merged audit methodology. 
In many respects, the claims of  the merged firms  that their combined audit 
approaches are or will be superior to the approaches each used previously 
may well be valid. Since all big eight firms'  audit approaches resulted in a high 
level of  quality, one would expect that the effect  of  combining two approaches 
would not undermine their effectiveness.  In practice what happens is the com-
bined approach is developed by adopting what are perceived to be the strong 
points in each of  the predecessor approaches. In what I've seen, the more 
extreme aspects of  the predecessor methodologies have been eliminated in 
the merged approach, leading to a more efficient  overall process. 
Despite this efficiency  improvement, there will remain aspects of  the 
combined approach which are inefficient  if  only because adopting a more ef-
ficient  method would introduce something neither predecessor firm  was fa-
miliar with. Such situations can arise during the analysis of  the predecessor 
approaches when opportunities to adopt more efficient  approaches than ei-
ther of  the predecessors are identified.  Implementation practicality issues also 
need to be considered. Everyone in the merged firm  will need to learn some-
thing new but if  the combined approach uses features  similar to at least one 
of  the predecessors, half  the staff  will be familiar  with any one aspect of  the 
approach. Something entirely new would affect  everyone with no one having 
previous experience. The objective is efficiency  and effectiveness  of  the en-
tire process including the human factors.  So the result of  the combining proc-
ess is not perfect,  but in my view, it is surprisingly good given the time 
pressure involved. 
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David W. Hunerberg 
Deloitte & Touche 
Introduction 
Good afternoon.  I am David Hunerberg from  the Kansas City office  of 
Deloitte & Touche. As are my fellow  panel members, I am here to present 
my perspectives of  the impact of  mergers of  accounting firms  on the audit-
ing profession. 
Before  I present my views, I believe it's important for  you to understand 
the perspective from  which I am speaking. As you all know, Deloitte & Touche 
is currently experiencing, first  hand, the results and the impacts of  a merger 
from  both a professional  and business standpoint I have been actively involved 
in the merger activities from  my position as Office  Managing Partner of  the 
former  Touche Ross Kansas City office,  a position I have held since 1983. 
I am currently serving as the Office  Managing Partner in the new firm,  De-
loitte & Touche, for  the Kansas City office.  I was a member of  the Board of 
Directors of  Touche Ross & Co. and, accordingly, was actively involved in many 
of  the discussions and considerations which arose as a result of  the merger. 
In addition, I currently serve as a Group Managing Partner for  nine Deloitte 
& Touche offices  in the central and the southwest portion of  the country. And, 
I am a member of  the Deloitte & Touche Management Committee. As a mem-
ber, I actively participate in many of  the management decisions and the de-
velopment of  policies and practices that are being established as we form  our 
new firm.  So, that's a little background on my perspective. 
Base line Assumptions 
As we talk about the impact of  mergers on the auditing profession,  I 
think it's also important to comment briefly  on why we have mergers in the 
profession.  I believe that the mergers have been driven by both inside and 
outside demands and pressures. The outside pressures tend to focus  around 
one key element - client service. Clients are continuing to demand, as they 
always have, a high level of  professional  quality service from  their auditing 
firm.  Clients should, as they always have, expect that much from  an auditing 
professional.  These expectations, however, have continued to change over 
the past several years as our clients have broadened their perspective and 
we looked (and found)  additional ways to serve them. Our economy has be-
come a global marketplace in which there are strong economic business cen-
ters in North America, Europe and the Pacific  rim. As an example, more and 
more of  our clients are finding  themselves operating in this global environ-
ment and no longer focusing  on merely local or regional economic develop-
ments, even in Kansas. This is true not only of  the larger clients of  any office, 
but is perhaps surprisingly true for  many of  the smaller clients of  any office 
that find  themselves purchasing from  foreign  vendors and even acquiring 
foreign  subsidiaries or opening purchasing offices  or distribution centers over-
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seas. Because of  these pressures, the profession  is changing in reaction to 
the worldwide global marketplace perspective gained by our clients. To be 
effective,  a professional  auditing firm  must have a strong presence in these 
significant  global marketplaces - North America, Europe and the Pacific 
rim. The inside reasons are a lot about economics, leverage and profitabil-
ity. Clearly, the very large firms  understand and tout the benefits  of  their size. 
We see it in the efforts  they put into research, contributions and in recruit-
ing, as just three examples. 
Impact of  Mergers on the Professional 
The number one asset of  any professional  firm  is its people. The contin-
ued development and growth of  these resources is critical to the survival of 
any professional  firm  and is essential to insure continued quality service. I 
believe mergers of  accounting firms  will have a positive impact on research, 
education and technical developments. But the mergers will also provide op-
portunities to the individual professional  in terms of  his or her personal and 
professional  growth. As firms  become larger and broader in perspective, in-
dividuals within those firms  will have more opportunities to specialize in var-
ious industries or to develop and refine  expertise in various technical areas. 
With the expansion of  the client base and the combination of  human resources 
created by the mergers, the individual professional  is better able to focus 
his or her efforts  and development in his or her own area of  interest and ex-
pertise. As an example, in Kansas City, the professionals  who previously served 
ten different  clients in five  or six different  industries will now be able to con-
centrate their skills in one or two different  industries - enabling them to grow 
professionally  at a faster  rate and deliver a higher level of  client service to 
our customers. Mergers will have the same impact on the technical re-
source professionals  who are typically based at national offices  of  the firms. 
These professionals  are able to regroup and refocus  on more specialized lines 
or functional  responsibilities as the national offices  of  merged firms  are 
brought together. 
Our primary practice focus  has not been changed by the merger. The audit 
partner continues to be responsible for  insuring that the audit services meet 
the client expectations and firm  and professional  standards. The merger will 
better equip the partner to fulfill  his responsibilities by providing increased 
and more specialized resources. 
As I mentioned earlier, the exterior reason to merge is to provide quality 
client service. That has always been a very high priority for  any professional 
services firm.  Client service should be driven by the needs of  the client. The 
realities of  today's economy such as the increasing importance of  business 
in Japan, the unification  of  Europe, free  trade with Canada and the emergence 
of  Eastern Europe are fairly  obvious changes in our current economic real-
ity and require a change in our focus  and an increased emphasis in our serv-
ice delivery capabilities. 
Consulting 
All the major firms  have become consulting firms.  Each firm  reports that 
50-60 percent of  their revenues come from  auditing but only two-thirds of  that 
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amount come from  "standard auditing". That may mean that only approxi-
mately 40 percent of  the business is the standard recurring audit. Clients hire 
consultants for  their ability to identify  and help solve problems in specific  areas 
of  their business. They want to know, most likely, if  you have ever done this 
specific  job before.  We have vast networks to identify  these experts through-
out the firm  and now have more of  them. 
The nature of  the "standard audit" has changed, too. Companies continue 
to look for  advice outside of  the opinion area. In proposal situations, a win-
ning proposal often  is one that contains substantive consulting comments about 
operations or tax planning ideas. 
This consultive focus  is not an impact of  mergers, but the audit profes-
sional will find  himself  better prepared to face  the challenge as a result of  the 
larger firm  networks and improved resources created by the mergers. 
Impact on Audit Practice and Technical Developments 
The mergers of  accounting firms  are creating opportunities to refine, 
streamline and modernize the audit process. As firms  combine, audit 
methodologies will be developed that will draw from  the best of  the merged 
firms.  In fact,  at Deloitte & Touche we are currently in the process of  in-
troducing a new audit approach that will take the best of  the two predecessor 
firms.  In fact,  when asked whether the new audit approach most resembles 
the Deloitte approach or the Touche approach, the head of  the audit method-
ology task force  said the new D&T audit approach would be drawn 75 per-
cent from  the Deloitte approach and 75 percent from  the Touche approach. 
We hope that this is an instance where the sum of  the two parts taken to-
gether will result in a process that is well beyond where either firm  had been 
in the past. 
In today's business environment having the best audit approach is no 
longer enough. It must be supported by powerful  and flexible  mainframe  and 
microcomputer software.  Today's audit professionals  will have at their com-
mand an impressive array of  computer-assisted audit systems and tools. We 
have a development center located in Princeton, New Jersey dedicated to 
keeping us on the leading edge of  technology. With our clients' information 
processing systems becoming more complex, we need specialists, at the di-
rection of  the audit engagement team, to evaluate the controls within that 
environment. 
The development of  new auditing processes and technological advance-
ments are not unique results of  the mergers of  accounting firms.  All firms, 
in the past, have revised and updated their audit process almost continually 
in order to remain competitive and to react to changes in the environment 
and the economy. These refinements,  however, have typically been slow 
and have taken a great deal of  time to develop, implement and refine.  Com-
petitive pressures brought upon other firms  through the creation of  these new 
audit processes will force  other auditing firms  to critically evaluate and per-
haps revise their audit techniques sooner than they may have without the 
impact of  the mergers. 
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Support for  Education and Research 
I also hope that mergers of  accounting firms  will create opportunities for 
improvements in research, education and technical developments. As the na-
tional offices  of  the merged firms  are combined, the result is clearly a sum 
greater than the total of  the two parts. The combination of  pools of  technical 
resource people enables these people to focus  on specialized accounting 
areas, the development of  top quality educational programs and continued 
research on accounting and auditing issues. By reallocating the use of  human 
resources within the combined national offices  of  the merged firms,  the 
firms  are able to either examine new and different  topics and issues or dou-
ble their efforts  in the completion of  current projects that were underway prior 
to the merger. Although there will certainly be some elimination of  duplicate 
positions and responsibilities, the mergers also provide the opportunity to 
make use of  the best resources available in all instances. 
I don't believe that the mergers of  firms  will result in a reduced level of 
academic support I hope Deloitte & Touche will expand the existing programs 
of  support and activity. 
Conclusion 
I have discussed but a few  of  the impacts of  mergers on the auditing pro-
fession.  As you can imagine, within a merged firm  the impacts, consequences 
and challenges are great and there are many issues that need to be dealt with 
both on a national and a local level. However, our emphasis has not changed. 
Our number one focus  is to provide quality professional  service to our clients. 
As a result, we believe that our clients are the big winners as a result of  the 
mergers of  firms.  Our clients have benefited  from  an improved, more effec-
tive and efficient  auditing process, better trained and well-rounded auditing 
professionals  and the receipt of  services from  an enhanced, worldwide or-
ganization that is balanced and strong in the world's major economic regions. 
Jonathon E. Killmer 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Today I speak to you on the subject of  mergers in the accounting profession 
from  the viewpoint of  a firm  that has not participated in the "mega-merger 
binge". Coopers & Lybrand has not found  it necessary nor advantageous to 
enter into a merger with another large firm. 
To appropriately analyze the impact of  a merger, or, in the case of  Coop-
ers & Lybrand, no merger, one must have an understanding of  the reasons 
why a firm  would seek to strengthen its position by undertaking what has 
been termed a "mega-merger". 
Four areas surface  when one explores why a firm  would merge. These 
are: 
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Of  course, on the other side of  the formula  for  mergers, there are inher-
ent risks. These can be categorized as follows: 
• Significant  dislocation and change 
• Diversion of  focus  from  the marketplace to tasks involved in internal 
integration 
• Possible diversion from  client service because of  change 
• Uncertainty in the minds of  partners and staff 
Clearly, Coopers & Lybrand is not opposed to mergers, but we do not be-
lieve in merging just for  a merger's sake. In fact,  we have been the benefi-
ciary of  recent mergers, particularly in the European market, which has 
positioned Coopers & Lybrand as a pre-eminent firm  as we approach 1992. 
However, we at Coopers & Lybrand value our culture and recognize it as a 
significant  competitive strength. 
Let me share with you a series of  events that took place in 1989 and 1990 
that were the result of  "inappropriate cultural fits",  which in turn significantly 
enhanced Coopers & Lybrand. 
In February, 1989, the Swedish representative of  KPMG merged with 
Coopers & Lybrand. 
In April, 1989, Treuarbeit, German representative of  Price Water-
house, merged with Coopers & Lybrand. 
In October, 1989, Deloitte in the United Kingdom announced its in-
tention to merge with Coopers & Lybrand, rather than joining in the 
Touche merger. 
In October, 1989, Deloitte in the Channel Islands announced it would 
merge with Coopers & Lybrand. 
In October, 1989, Deloitte Belgium merged with Coopers & Lybrand. 
In November, 1989, Deloitte Austria merged with Coopers & Lybrand. 
In January, 1990, Touche Ross Spain merged with Coopers & Lybrand. 
I bring these mergers up to point out why the cultural fit  is so critical. We 
strongly believe that a strong cultural fit  is of  paramount importance. Basi-
cally, culture includes the personalities of  the firms,  the way they are orga-
nized, and their objectives, philosophy and priorities. This is particularly 
true in an professional  services firm,  where teamwork is the foundation  of  a 
successful  organization. When the fit  isn't right, dysfunction  results and ul-
timately secession occurs. 
Therefore,  a primary consideration at Coopers & Lybrand for  consider-
ing any merger is that we are not willing to give up our culture and, in 
essence, become a different  firm.  Those firms  which embody the same cul-
tural traits as Coopers & Lybrand become ideal merger candidates. Such traits 
include quality service, commitment to attracting and retaining outstanding 
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people, an environment that is open, encouraging and driven by self  deter-
mination, and an environment where initiative, innovation and creativity are 
encouraged. 
Now, let us address some other points, including practice, technology, 
consulting and support for  education and research. 
As I previously stated, one of  the reasons most often  given for  mergers 
is to provide better service to global clients, with mergers creating a better 
balance of  global coverage for  the firms  involved. Fortunately, Coopers & Ly-
brand started on this voyage in 1957 with the creation of  Coopers & Lybrand 
International - bringing together principally the U.S. firm  of  Lybrand Ross 
Bros. & Montgomery and Cooper Bros., a U.K. firm  spanning the British Com-
monwealth. 
Through the years, we have added countries and firms  - and incidentally 
have never had a member firm  secede - to where Coopers & Lybrand has, 
in place, the critical mass necessary to successfully  compete in the global mar-
ketplace. Recent additions to our firm's  roster of  clients - such as Avon, Cad-
bury, Schweppes, Kraft,  the Limited, Mutual of  Omaha, Sanyo, and Unilever 
- attest to our worldwide competitiveness. Now, with the addition of  the 
firms  previously mentioned, we have significantly  added to an already potent 
force. 
Touching briefly  on technology, Coopers & Lybrand has long been ac-
knowledged as a leader in audit technology - developing, many years ago, a 
worldwide uniform  audit approach. Coopers & Lybrand also established the 
first  fully  dedicated computer auditing group and first  created expert system 
software  such as ExperTax. We are currently developing a fully  integrated 
microcomputer-based audit workstation. 
At our Manufacturing  Technology Center, clients can play out "what if" 
scenarios to determine the impact of  advanced technologies, such as just-in-
time or computer integrated manufacturing,  before  making a multimillion dol-
lar investment. 
We have more than sufficient  capital to continue our investments in tech-
nology. In fact,  our challenge is not in the availability of  capital, but to make 
sure that we are investing in the right activities to stimulate our long-term 
growth. 
Let us now focus  on consulting. Our management consulting practice has 
long been recognized for  focusing  on emerging issues. Our recent study "Made 
in America: A Survey of  Manufacturing's  Future", has captured national at-
tention with its findings  on the competitive position of  U.S. manufacturers. 
Our philosophy of  "Solutions for  Business" is a reflection  of  the consulting 
practice. 
This philosophy means bringing value by helping to identify  and assess 
the risks and opportunities formed  in the shifting  business landscape. This, 
of  course, translates into quality service. We remain committed to strength-
ening and enhancing our global consulting network, along with our other ser-
vices, through internal growth as well as merger and acquisition opportunities 
in specific  markets. 
This brings us to the issue of  support for  education and research. This 
has been and will continue to be a strength of  our firm.  In the area of  higher 
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education, a Coopers & Lybrand Foundation program, "Excellence in Audit 
Education", has reached over 25,000 students at 250 colleges and universi-
ties across the country. This program includes the widely acclaimed "Cable 
Co. Chronicles" videotape series. 
The firm  continues to fund  significant  developments in the whole education 
process, particularly curriculum development and teaching. We are also 
proud to support the cooperative effort  of  all six large firms,  including Coop-
ers & Lybrand, in funding  the Accounting Education Change Commission -
a truly extraordinary effort  to improve accounting education. 
Finally, we recently launched "Supporting Youth Education", a mobiliza-
tion of  our people in a national effort  to keep students in high school and to 
improve the quality of  education. For example, in my office  in St. Louis, we 
have 35 volunteers, both professional  and administrative, providing tutoring 
sessions and conducting role model classes in six middle schools in the 
inner city public schools. 
In review of  the four  reasons for  merging, let us look at each of  the cri-
teria as it relates to Coopers & Lybrand. 
• Better client service to global clients - C&L already has the infras-
tructure in place. 
• Technology - our firm  is already on the leading edge and continues to 
demonstrate its creativity and innovativeness. 
• Capital - as previously stated, we have sufficient  capital - the key is di-
recting its appropriate use. 
• Economics - our present organization is functioning  well and is ap-
propriately focused  on the marketplace 
This basically states the reasons why Coopers & Lybrand chose not to 
enter into a merger. But of  course, as previously stated, the most important 
issue is culture. 
In summary, at Coopers & Lybrand, we have demonstrated we have the 
size, strategy, momentum and the will required to compete successfully  in 
the global marketplace. But most importantly, we continue to achieve significant 
growth. For example, from  1982 to 1989, worldwide, Coopers & Lybrand rev-
enues more than doubled. Our firm  is well positioned domestically and in-
ternationally to meet the opportunities and challenges of  our new environment. 
At Coopers & Lybrand, we face  the future  with confidence  and a spirited com-
mitment to the continued, well-managed growth of  our firm. 
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Julia A. Lelik 
Peat Marwick Thorne 
No one who practices in the auditing profession  will have failed  to notice 
that the landscape is changing. As the world realigns itself  economically and 
politically, it is also growing smaller with the advent of  technological achieve 
ments in communication and the continued growth and dominance of  multi-
national corporations. The market place is more competitive and many 
businesses (some, the largest in the world) know no geographical boundaries. 
Auditing firms  are reacting to this global change by positioning themselves 
to better serve their clients as they expand their businesses into the larger 
and seemingly more fertile  international marketplace. We have already seen 
one result - mergers either nationally or internationally, or both. Many of  the 
panel members here today have experienced the magic and mystery of  merg-
ers. Auditing firms  that a short time ago saw themselves as competitors, are 
now pooling their auditing, accounting, consulting, taxation and other re-
sources. 
Mergers mean bringing people, standards, methodologies, technologies 
and cultures together. This "bringing together" presents many challenges 
and opportunities which arise as the fabric  of  a new and larger auditing firm 
is woven. As a result the impact of  mergers on the auditing profession  can 
be addressed in a number of  ways. I would like to limit my observations to 
my own recent experience in "merging" the auditing methodologies of  the 
predecessor firms  that now represent Peat Marwick Thorne, the Canadian 
firm  of  Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). 
Background 
In September, 1989 Peat Marwick Thorne was formed  through the merger 
of  Thorne Ernst and Whinney and Peat Marwick. Thorne Ernst and Whin-
ney was a member of  the international firm  of  Ernst & Whinney (now Ernst 
& Young) and Peat Marwick was a member of  KPMG. The international firm 
of  KPMG itself  was formed  in 1987 through the merger of  KMG (Klynveld 
Main Goerdeler) and PMI (Peat Marwick International). 
Both Canadian predecessor firms  were well established in the Canadian 
auditing scene with histories dating back to 1869 for  Thorne Ernst and Whin-
ney and 1913 in the case of  Peat Marwick. Peat Marwick Thorne emerged 
as the largest auditing firm  in Canada after  the merger activity settled down. 
Comparing Audit Approaches 
When firms  merge, a natural step is to compare the way things were done 
in the predecessor firms.  Previously, as competitors, information  as to how 
"the other firm"  conducted its audits was, at best, sketchy. The merger af-
forded  us an opportunity to consider and study in considerable detail "the 
other" methodology. In today's auditing environment it was not surprising 
178 
to find  our audit processes were supported by quantitative models and com-
puter technology. 
Much energy is devoted to studying and structuring auditing models to 
assist auditors in making consistent judgements. Nevertheless I have found 
that auditors tend to ask two very fundamental  and practical questions: 
What procedures need to be applied in the circumstances? 
How much do I need to do? 
While this may appear to be an obvious observation, these questions 
were at the root of  many of  the specific  and more technical issues being con-
sidered as we were making our comparisons. In my view, the successful  de-
velopment of  an audit process and its acceptance by its users depends not so 
much on its sophistication but rather on its ability to quickly and appropri-
ately answer those simple questions on a basis consistent with their own in-
tuitive judgement. 
The Whole is not the Sum of  its Parts 
Another common question auditing firms  ask is: are we doing more or 
less than our competition? A merger presents the opportunity to assess the 
validity of  a perception that may have existed that one firm  was doing more 
or less audit work than the other. 
In making comparisons between audit processes, my experience suggests 
that each model must be considered as a complete package. If  the model is 
dissected and comparisons made only on a component by component basis 
there is limited insight into the end product gained if  the whole is not also 
considered. For example, how much to audit is traditionally determined by 
decisions as to the risk of  error in the account and the auditor's required pre-
cision. If  we only compared the risk levels being used in the models we 
might inappropriately conclude that one approach causes us to do more 
work than the other because the detection risk being assumed is lower than 
the other. On the other hand, we may reach a different  conclusion if  a com-
parison was made of  both the precision and risks being used. 
Do we stop there? Should we also measure and take into account the var-
ious hurdles each process sets to lower detection risk? For example, more 
onerous documentation or compliance testing standards to establish lower 
control risk in one approach may provide a greater barrier to increasing de-
tection risk than under another. Does this then mean one approach will 
cause the auditor to do more, more often  than the other? 
Implications for  the Auditing Profession 
In the end, if  one looks at the actual procedures selected and amount of 
work done under the different  approaches they were remarkably similar. But 
an examination of  the details of  the processes suggests that different  firms 
follow  somewhat different  pathways to answer those simple questions. If  the 
end result is about the same, then a stringent policy in one component in a 
given process would need to be balanced by a less rigorous requirement in 
another. But between the two audit processes themselves the mix of  the pol-
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icy decisions made may be different.  I once heard someone say that there 
are two pathways to the the truth - through science or faith.  In auditing firms 
there seem to be many! 
In a merger, the challenge lies in reconciling the differing  pathways so 
that the auditors using the "merged" audit process see it as familiar,  yield-
ing results consistent with their own judgement. Expand this harmonization 
effort  from  a national level to the international arena and the complexity of 
the process is multiplied. But to better serve our clients internationally there 
is no other option. 
In the larger context of  standard setting for  the profession  one can only 
speculate. Imagine a body of  auditors meeting to discuss one aspect of  au-
diting with each deriving their view of  the specific  issue from  their experi-
ence with their own audit process. Will the standard evolve as a stringent one 
or not? Would the standard have been different  had all at the table known 
the pathway used by the others? 
One cannot help but wonder what impact, if  any, the combination of  in-
creased knowledge of  the "competition's" audit process and fewer  auditing 
firms  on the playing field  will have on the auditing standards the profession 
will set for  itself  in the future. 
Some Closing Thoughts 
In closing, I would just like to add that, while mergers bring with them 
problems, they also bring solutions. They bring with them not only challenges 
but also opportunities. They bring with them the jolt of  sudden change but 
they can also spur progress on. They bring with them conflict  but also har-
mony. They bring with them unknowns but also insight. Mergers mean cop-
ing with and managing change. But then is not one of  life's  constants change 
itself? 
Roger R. Nelson 
Ernst & Young 
Good Afternoon! 
Why Merge 
Professional  services firms  face  significant  challenges from  the external 
environment in terms of  globalization,  regulation,  deregulation,  privatization, 
specialization,  and rapid technological  change. In addition, we must face  the 
internal challenges of  client service, quality,  productivity,  and cost. Succeed-
ing in the professional  services business depends on how we succeed with 
these challenges. It will not suffice  simply to respond to them, but to constantly 
adjust our course. 
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Let me comment on why I'm talking about professional  services firms  rather 
than CPA firms.  The demand for  tax and management consulting services is 
growing at a faster  rate than the demand for  audit services, so these services 
are becoming more important as avenues for  growth. As a matter of  interest, 
I spent the past 20 years of  my 29 working years primarily in international 
operations and consultation after  starting in audit. 
Increasingly, clients are looking to us to view their business issues from 
a business advisory perspective. To respond to this demand from  the mar-
ketplace, we are expanding our vision of  the business to include a broader range 
of  financial,  operational, and information  management skills and services. 
Competition for  professional  services has been intensifying  and this will 
continue. Ten years ago, as CPA firms,  we could not advertise or solicit busi-
ness. Now, we compete in developing business relationships worldwide, and 
competing against a wide variety of  professional  services firms.  These firms 
include our traditional Big Six competitors, and increasingly, non-traditional 
competitors like investment and commercial banks, law firms,  and various 
consulting firms. 
Globalization of  Markets 
Let's look at some other forces  transforming  the marketplace. We're ex-
periencing the birth of  a truly global business environment. Long-standing 
trade barriers are being eliminated, new markets are opening, and joint ven-
tures are criss-crossing national boundaries. Globalization will be the watch-
word of  the 1990s. The ability to attract and retain major accounts depends 
on the depth of  your worldwide resources. 
1992 - the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement - emerging world markets, 
and cross-border offerings  are rapidly establishing global free  trade. Enor-
mous business opportunities are emerging from  these initiatives. Most re-
cently, we have witnessed remarkable social and political events in the Soviet 
Union, East Germany, and Hungary which have profound  implications. As a 
matter of  interest, I feel  professional  services is one of  the few  areas the U.S. 
has a true competitive advantage and a lead on foreign  competition. 
In Continental Europe, a unified,  deregulated market of  320 million peo-
ple is well on its way to becoming a reality. Even before  1992, the transition 
to a fully  integrated European market is creating increased activity. Compa-
nies are recognizing the need to move quickly and intelligently to position 
themselves to benefit  from  this enormous market. The need for  strong, lead-
ing edge practices outside the U.S. was a driving  force  in our merger. 
Speaking of  competition, let's not neglect to mention the importance of 
Japan. The tremendous growth in Japan's stature and influence  in the global 
business community is shown by statistics pertaining to the top 10 worldwide 
banks by size. Twenty years ago, there were six U.S. banks on the list, and 
none from  Japan. Today, there are eight from  Japan, and none from  the U.S. 
These market forces  were an important consideration in our forming 
Ernst & Young. Our clients are demanding greater levels of  service and in-
dustry expertise from  their business advisors in every market as they move 
toward global operations. The merger gives us extensive professional  serv-
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ice capabilities to meet and anticipate our clients' needs worldwide. Meeting 
the needs of  clients, no matter where they do business, is a fundamental  rea-
son for  mergers of  professional  services firms.  Meeting those needs with a 
depth of  service capability is essential. Mergers are driven by these objectives. 
Globalization has led us to develop: a strong worldwide firm;  industry and 
functional  capabilities to help multinational corporations address financial, 
operational, and information  management needs; a single worldwide audit 
approach; and the ability to coordinate audit teams no matter where located. 
Multinationals want outstanding resources in places like Nigeria, Korea, 
Thailand. The merger also allows us to accelerate our response to the op-
portunities provided in the worldwide market. 
Competitive Position 
While the opportunities are significant  for  professional  services firms,  so 
are the competitive threats. For professional  services firms,  market position 
is critical to being competitive. This is true for  geographic, industry, and func-
tional markets. Building position generally requires significant  investment 
and time. Mergers are one way to quickly gain the critical mass needed in 
target markets to improve market position and needed to develop service ca-
pabilities that can be responsive to the most significant  and complex client 
issues. The merger has given us greater geographic coverage in functional 
specializations by industry, allowing us to take advantage of  more market op-
portunities by providing more services to clients. 
Compatibility 
In order for  merged firms  to take proper advantage of  these opportuni-
ties, the merging firms  must be compatible in international and domestic ge-
ographic markets, in industry markets, and in functional  markets. The 
merging firms  must also be compatible in goals, strategies, and values. Oth-
erwise the merger may cause as many problems as it solves. Compatibility 
was a prime consideration in planning Ernst & Young. 
Client Service 
There are a number of  other important reasons for  mergers that are 
client-related. Clients increasingly seek help dealing with a variety of  com-
plex business issues, including: 
• Industry-specific  issues, 
• Technology issues, 
• Operations issues, and 
• Finance issues. 
We know that industry experience is the single most sought-after  trait 
among clients looking for  a firm  like ours. And, clients also want quality serv-
ice at reasonable fees.  The critical mass created makes it easier to special-
ize, and it accelerates the ability to identify  market needs and respond to 
opportunities. 
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In the ease of  Ernst & Young, our recent merger better positions us to 
help clients by deepening and broadening our functional  and industry serv-
ice capabilities. It allows us to better provide services when and where they 
are needed in technical specialties within targeted industry practices such 
as financial  services and health care. The expanded services available are im-
portant to clients of  all sizes, not just large multinationals, but mid-size com-
panies and others as well. 
Financial Implications 
Another reason for  mergers is that they help increase efficiency.  The re-
sulting firm  is better positioned to use its resources more effectively  as a re-
sult of  greater economies of  scale. Moreover, there are opportunities for 
rationalization in the administrative area, and for  enhancing service. A larger 
base is available to support significant  investments in the audit, tax, and con-
sulting practices for  future  growth and profitability.  Specifically: 
• There can be increased investments in productivity, quality, re-
search, education and training, marketing, and proprietary software. 
• Management information  systems can be combined and enhanced, 
which is the case with Ernst & Young. 
• Offices  in the same city can be merged, however, long term leases 
and the cost of  negotiating new ones make this complex. 
"Corporate Citizenship" 
Merged firms  also are generally in a better position to act as good cor-
porate citizens by making greater contributions to the community. For ex-
ample, we are the sponsor of  the U.S. Olympic Job Opportunity Program in 
which we are helping 400 U.S. Olympic athletes obtain career-oriented em-
ployment. 
Worldwide, we have been authorized by the Nobel Foundation to spon-
sor the Nobel Prize Services of  programs, consisting of  the Nobel Prize cer-
emonies telecast, and the Nobel video and curriculum library for  high schools 
and colleges. 
Human Resources 
In the human resources area, media coverage of  mergers tends to focus 
on people displacement, and rarely mentions the opportunities mergers pres-
ent to the people involved. The expanded capabilities of  a merged firm  should 
be attractive in the marketplace. 
The merger impacts people, management, processes, systems - and most 
people have some difficulty  with change. On the other hand, it has allowed 
us to use a clean sheet of  paper to design what is needed, going forward. 
What, then, is the bottom line? Our merger has significantly  strengthened 
our firm  and the profession.  We can now invest in the people and technology 
to keep up with the challenges of  our changing business environment. 
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James K. Loebbecke 
University of  Utah 
I have been invited to this conference  to present my views on the fact  of 
the recent mergers among large accounting firms.  These mergers present 
a number of  interesting questions and issues. Certainly, they are complex 
and it is unlikely that their impact can be discernable until a significant  pe-
riod of  time passes. In order to accomplish the goals of  this paper, I have cho-
sen to focus  on the possible impact of  the mergers on the quality of  audits. 
In fact,  my views are really in the nature of  concerns that arise from  firm  size, 
whether the result of  merger or growth from  other sources. I will present 
these concerns along three lines of  reasoning. 
1. Too Much Help 
One of  the reasons that firms  merge is to marshall more and better de-
velopmental resources. When national staffs  are assembled for  the purpose 
of  research and development, naturally they undertake activities consistent 
with that purpose. In today's environment, that means developing more, and 
more sophisticated, computer-based audit decision aids. These tools should 
improve both the effectiveness  and the efficiency  with which audits are per-
formed,  and provide greater consistency across the firm's  practice. However, 
they also may provide certain negative effects: 
• First, sophisticated audit tools require training for  proper use. There 
may be a risk that if  the cost of  that training is great, a firm  will fail 
to provide it on a comprehensive and/or timely basis. This could 
result in improper implementation and misuse of  the tools. 
• Second, use of  decision aids may cause auditors to become mech-
anistic in their approach to the audit. Their focus  may fall  on com-
pleting the questionnaire or getting the computer program to work 
rather than on accomplishing the audit objective. They may fail  to 
understand the concepts and processes that underlie the tools, and 
this may result in failure  to recognize aberrations to the situations 
the tools were designed for  and how to deal with them. 
• Finally, use of  decision aids may preclude auditors from  develop-
ing experience of  the type required to make higher-level judgments. 
In other words, if  the auditor's efforts  are aimed at successful  use 
of  the decision aids, those efforts  may supplant other types of  ex-
periences that are more instructive in nature. 
2. Growth, Growth, Growth 
Large firms  seem to need to keep growing. I see at least two reasons for 
this. First, there appears to be an economically-based growth spiral in effect. 
Firms need to hire and provide incentives to top-notch people in order to stay 
competitive. This requires that new opportunities exist for  those people. 
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Those opportunities can be created by acquiring new clients and engagements. 
In addition, as a firm  grows, so do the number of  its partners. In turn, as time 
passes, the number of  retired partners increases significantly.  A growing pool 
of  current and future  retired partners carries with it a significant  pension fund-
ing obligation. In order to meet that obligation and at the same time adequately 
compensate working partners, the firm  must maintain increasing profits  over 
time, which requires growth. 
In addition to the economic spiral, or perhaps because of  it, there seems 
to be an attitude of  competitiveness among members of  large accounting firms 
that motivates growth. It might be expressed as a "grow or die" philosophy; 
or a belief  that bigger firms  are inherently superior to smaller firms,  so 
growth is a means of  becoming the best among the large firms. 
I see several potentially negative effects  from  an over-orientation towards 
growth: 
• First, it may cause pressure to free  partner time to devote to prac-
tice development, which in turn results in delegation of  engagement 
responsibilities to lower staff  levels. This may reduce audit quality. 
• Second, it may serve as a motivation to accept marginal clients. 
This could have several ramifications.  For example, clients may be 
obtained that have dishonest management who could effectively  de-
ceive the auditor. Or, the client acceptance might be rationalized by 
understating the real risks associated with the client, thereby in-
creasing the audit risk incurred. 
• Growth may cause increased specialization. On the one hand, that 
could be beneficial  to an audit practice, but on the other hand, it could 
go too far  and result in a lack of  auditors who can provide a broad 
perspective to managing audit engagements. 
• It's possible that partners or managers who are not effective  busi-
ness developers will be pressured or culled out of  the firm.  These 
may, however, be persons who have strong technical skills. Over 
time, this could seriously deplete a firm's  technical resources. 
• There may be pressure on audit partners to "go beyond the audit" 
and be a "true financial  advisor" to the client. This could cause the 
partner to lose his or her objectivity in conducting audits. 
3. Unbalancing the Risk-Reward Relationship 
The area of  practice that has the greatest potential for  growth is consult-
ing. Not only is the market broader in terms of  service opportunities, profit 
margins are greater than for  audit services. Some firms  follow  a strategy of 
providing audit services for  artificially  low fees  in order to create opportuni-
ties for  higher-profit  consulting work. As a firm  expands in consulting, and 
audit is relatively stable, one could expect mounting economic pressures within 
the firm  to allocate earnings in proportion to contribution, i.e., more earnings 
to consulting partners and less to audit partners. 
At the same time, audit partners are subject to greater risk than consul-
tants due to the nature of  auditing and the related liability that exists, including 
criminal liability. Thus, the situation exists where the risk-reward relation-
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ship for  partners in the audit practice of  a firm  can become severely out of 
balance. Better audit partners will respond to this by leaving the audit prac-
tice, which in turn will negatively effect  audit quality. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of  my remarks has been to indicate a series of  concerns that 
I have about some potential negative effects  on the quality of  auditing that 
could arise from  the extensive growth of  large public accounting firms.  In 
doing this, it is not my intention to suggest that mergers and growth should 
be disallowed. Rather, I am attempting to suggest that large firms  must be 
sensitive to these problems and control them through effective  management. 
This may be problematical, however, because of  all of  the urgencies affect-
ing management during the period of  a large merger as well as the fact  that 
the problems I have cited are essentially behavioral in nature and difficult  to 
deal with. 
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